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Unemployment benefits are crucial to addressing unemployment, but are 
not, in and of themselves, sufficient. Activation policies are also 
essential. These should enable the unemployed to become employable, 
i.e. ready to re-enter the labour market (LM). Yet the contractualization 
of social rights and the loosening of definitions of ‘suitability’ of job 
offer, as well as the exacerbation of sanctions, seem to be inspired more 
by the need to reduce public expenditure than by any desire to empower 
the unemployed. At the same time, any policy that takes only the supply 
side into account would seem insufficient to adequately promote 
employment. Moreover, boosting employment also depends on how the 
right to work is interpreted, and whether such interpretation implies the 
mere encouragement of employability on the supply side or, rather, the 
promotion of a macroeconomic policy aimed at full employment, 
according to which the qualitative dimension of working contracts and 
conditions count. Indeed, regarding the latter, the working conditions 
offered in the LM, as well as the flexibility applied within working 
relationships, should be taken into consideration in any attempt at 
addressing unemployment, as should the role of governments in 
providing welfare and activation. At the same time, the relationship 
between social and labour law in dealing with the current challenges of 
the LM should be highlighted, taking into consideration both their 
mutual influences and differing goals.  
Thus, the contributions to this book map out possible links between 
social security protection and working conditions offered by the LM, and 
how such dimensions impact on each other and affect individuals’ lives. 
The need for macroeconomic policy geared toward full employment, 
supported by adequate activation policies, as well as the need to assure 
people of a life lived in dignity, are two recurring themes in the authors’ 
contributions. These, in turn, concern both employment and social 
security law. Unemployment is one side of the coin, while the flipside 
comprises working conditions and working contracts offered by the LM. 
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Indeed, the higher the unemployment rate, the more likely the risk of 
working conditions offered under working contracts being eroded, and 
of the spread of non-standard work. 
At the same time, the types of working contracts and the working 
conditions offered by the LM have a direct impact on social security 
protection provided to the unemployed: working contracts characterised 
by discontinuity create difficulty in fulfilling those eligibility requirements 
required to access insurance unemployment benefits. This also makes 
more likely the direct accessing of assistance, where it is offered by 
domestic systems. Together, working contracts that offer low wages 
reduce the amounts of insurance unemployment benefits, since these are 
calculated as a percentage of prior earnings. At the same time, 
unemployment benefits and assistance seem to be increasingly being 
utilised as tools to promote employment, notwithstanding that their 
social security goals are formally framed in terms of ensuring that lives 
are lived in dignity. 
This book is divided into three parts. The first part is devoted to 
analysing the concept of “suitable job offer” and its possible effects on 
the individual’s circumstances. This part also provides an in-depth 
analysis of the links between sanctions and social rights, with a particular 
focus on the right to live in dignity. 
The second part considers LM trends in terms of possible ways to 
characterise the right to work, and possible ways to develop working 
time as a feature of the working contract that can be used both to tackle 
unemployment and to improve worker health and safety, while also 
providing greater flexibility for both employers and employees. 
The third part looks at the contractualization of social rights and its 
impact on LM institutions. It suggests some possible models for a more 
functional and effective LM and for a social protection system focused 
on improving individuals’ rights. 
With regard to the first part, the increasing conditionality between social 
rights and activation duties requires unemployed people who access 
unemployment benefits or assistance to undertake activation duties. 
Thus, these unemployed must, for example, accept training and 
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mentoring activities offered by public employment services (PES) and, at 
the same time, accept any “suitable” job offer. 
If precarious working contracts are characterised as “suitable” and thus 
must be accepted by the unemployed, and if they are actually offered 
increasingly by PESs, it will likely become increasingly difficult for the 
unemployed to access insurance social protection against unemployment, 
especially considering the often-stringent eligibility requirements 
(typically, a minimum period of work within a specific time frame prior 
to unemployment). This, in turn, will lead to conditions in which those 
who lose their job tend to be forced to re-enter the LM under precarious 
working contracts. 
Moreover, the definition of suitability of job offer affects the 
circumstances of individuals in many additional ways. When an 
unemployed person refuses a suitable job offer, she incurs sanctions, i.e. 
postponement of benefit payments, reduction in the amount of benefits, 
and/or total benefit loss. Such consequences may have a direct impact 
on an individual’s right to a life of dignity, which social security systems 
must guarantee to citizens in accordance with domestic, European and 
international regulation.  
Thus, one might question how far the law can push the beneficiary of an 
unemployment benefit to accept a job offer. The conditions under which 
a job offer is considered suitable are thus important, as is the question 
whether an unemployed person should be forced to accept any job offer 
in order to avoid having their benefits removed or reduced, or whether 
certain job offers may be refused. 
Alexandre de le Court analyses the definition of suitable employment in 
three member states: Spain, The Netherlands, and Germany. In 
particular, he focuses on the relationship between precarious forms of 
work and the possibilities for reintegrating the unemployed into the LM, 
while also considering the risk of “precarious reintegration”. 
Looking beyond the EU, Nelli Diveeva and Elena Sychenko look at the 
notion of “suitable employment” as defined by Russian legislation, in 
light of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and of international 
instruments. In particular, they consider special rules for specific groups 
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of people in the Russian LM, highlighting the discrimination profiles of 
the regulation. 
Also taking an international perspective, Alexandre de le Court (in 
respect of the EU) and Nelli Diveeva and Elena Sychenko (in respect of  
Russia) consider the impacts of restrictive definitions of suitable 
employment on the right to work and on the choice of the beneficiary of 
unemployment benefits/assistance to choose the type of contract and 
the type of job, and consequent working conditions, as they re-enter the 
LM. 
The concept of suitability of job also impacts on the social rights of the 
unemployed with respect to protection in case of unemployment. The 
transition from unemployment to employment is an EU goal, and 
through it the EU aims to actively include the unemployed in the LM. 
Thus, activation initiatives and social security protection are vital in 
supporting the unemployed to re-enter the LM. This approach is also 
applied to assistance, i.e. each person should receive adequate income 
support and, at the same time, such support should be applied in 
conjunction with activation initiatives to assist re-entry into the LM. 
However, this relationship between activation policies and 
unemployment benefits or assistance in terms of minimum income 
should also be informed by the consequences, in terms of sanctions, for 
those beneficiaries who fail to comply with activation duties. Indeed, if 
activation initiatives or “suitable” job offers (as defined by the domestic 
legislation) are not accepted, even worse consequences than joblessness 
may affect the unemployed, i.e. loss of the economic support that would 
enable a life lived in dignity. In terms of assistance, leaving a person 
without economic support may violate the right to adequate minimum 
income benefits, which can be vital in ensuring lives are lived in dignity.  
Anja Eleveld focuses on the relationship – as provided by the European 
Pillar of Social Rights – between the EU goal of inclusion in the LM and 
the protection of basic social rights. In particular, the author discusses 
how the minimum wage has been seen as a tool for expanding the scope 
of employment policies. Nevertheless, this expansion brings with it the 
risk of abandoning the social rights perspective, which should, on the 
contrary, be further strengthened if the European Pillar of Social Rights 
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is to be advanced. Further, Eleveld takes an interdisciplinary approach in 
analysing the link between tougher work-related sanctions and 
investment, in both social protection and activation policies, in most EU 
member states. 
As discussed, the right to work can be viewed from a number of 
different perspectives: on one hand, as a social right and, on the other 
hand, as a way to deal with unemployment. These different dimensions 
are analysed in the second part by Vincenzo Pietrogiovanni, who focuses 
on the various definitions of the right to work, as well as the major 
restrictions upon it, highlighting the lack of its justiciability. 
Depending on the perspective one takes, the bringing to bear of the right 
to work can be seen as a question of labour supply employment policy, 
to be achieved via the neoliberal approach of supporting employability 
policies. Yet from another standpoint, the right to work may be best 
realised through a macroeconomic policy aiming at full employment. At 
the same time, the quality of job offers must be considered in relation to 
the duty of the State – as it exists in many States and as stated as an EU 
goal – to promote macroeconomic policy geared toward the 
achievement of full employment. Thus, full employment should be 
regarded as a policy goal to tackle low-paid and precarious jobs, too.  
In the transition out of and into the LM, hybrid possibilities also exist, 
including specific unemployment benefits compatible with specific ways 
of structuring working time. Working time, as an element of any working 
contract, plays an important role in shaping working conditions in the 
LM. Its regulation, and its combination with public benefits, can serve as 
a valuable tool in the redistribution of working hours between workers, 
and thus the avoidance of dismissals. Yet, at the same time, working time 
offers a means of protecting workers’ health and security, and of 
achieving a healthy work-life balance. These aspects present a more 
challenging dimension at present, with digitalization eroding the 
boundaries between work and free time. Thus, if an unemployed person 
is forced to take on a duty to be available (to work and to accept suitable 
job offers), the worker must also assume a right to unavailability outside 
her regular working hours. The manner in which one frames these rights 
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may have a profound bearing on the characterisation of an individual’s 
rights. 
In this connection, in the second part of the book, Reinhard Singer, 
Stephan Klawitter and Friedrich Preetz focus on the distinctions 
between the categories of working time and rest periods. Rest periods 
should be granted without interruption, though this objective seems 
increasingly elusive in light of the opportunity afforded by digitalization 
to be online at all times. The authors illustrate some possibilities that 
could be offered by German legislators to mitigate the risks that constant 
availability pose to health and safety at work: indeed, the current 
Working Time Law seems to inadequately acknowledge the right to 
unavailability and the right to flexibility, both of which can be important 
tools for achieving a positive work-life balance. 
Tania Bazzani deals with such dimensions of the working contract, too: 
health and safety protection for workers, and flexibility, for both 
employers and employees. In particular, she adopts a comparative 
perspective to focus on the role of both collective bargaining and public 
short-term work schemes. These aspects of working time may help 
provide flexibility and avoid dismissals. However, negative effects 
resulting from abuses of short-term work schemes are also highlighted. 
With regard to the third part of the book, the conditionality between 
social rights and activation duties is analysed through the lens of 
contractualization of social rights. In this context, conditionality refers to 
the relationship between social rights and the duties of beneficiaries: 
sanctions are targeted at beneficiaries of unemployment benefits or 
assistance who do not comply with activation duties. Conditionality, in 
this form, reduces social rights to a quid pro quo, a kind of contractual 
relationship between citizens and the public administration. Despite 
criticisms of such an approach, the administrative reforms made last year 
by member states seem to have been squarely inspired by it.  
Bazzani’s contribution looks at the tendency toward such an approach in 
three specific member states: Italy, Spain, and Denmark. Although these 
three systems are characterized by normative and LM differences, 
common aspects of contractualization in active and passive LM policies 
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and recent reforms may be highlighted; these also affect the role of LM 
actors, such as PESs, social partners, and social security institutes. 
Moreover, as discussed by Bazzani in a further contribution, attempts at 
coordination and cooperation activities between public and private 
actors in the LM show how such actors can go beyond a mere 
contractualization approach or a merely-bureaucratic reciprocal 
relationship, instead achieving the kind of collaboration that leads to the 
achievement of common goals, including the fostering of social 
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The obligation of unemployed to accept “suitable” employment. 
Continental Welfare States in a multilevel perspective 
 






It could be said that one of the functions of systems of social protection in 
case of unemployment is to empower unemployed workers to refuse jobs 
which do not suit their expectations, even if only to a certain extent. On the 
one hand, those systems provide the right to partial replacement of previous 
wages. On the other hand, they involve the obligation for benefit holders to 
seek and accept employment defined as “suitable” or “adequate”. This work 
analyses the legal definition of the notion of suitable employment in Spain, 
The Netherlands and Germany, within the context of the regulation of more 
precarious forms of work, so as to explore the possible influence of the 
former on the pressure to reintegrate the labour market under precarious 
circumstances that unemployed can experience. It then reconstruct the legal 
definition under the perspective of its definition in international fundamental 
rights instruments and assesses how such a reconstruction can limit that 




1. Introduction  
 
An important factor of the rise of non-standard work, and more generally, 
the degradation of working conditions, is unemployment. Higher levels of 
unemployment, and thus the existence of a greater “reserve army”, gives 
greater power to employers to hire workers on their own terms. Within this 
context, systems of social protection in case of unemployment play a 
function of empowering unemployed workers to refuse jobs which do not 
suit their expectations, even if only to a certain extent. On the one hand, 
those systems provide the right to partial replacement of previous wages. On 
the other hand, they involve the obligation for benefit holders to seek and 
accept employment defined as “suitable” or “adequate”. The content of the 
notion of “suitable” employment varies in function of the duration of the 
period of unemployment and the regime under which unemployment benefit 
holder fall. In the beginning, and generally in contributory regimes, the 
obligation only extends to searching and accepting employment requiring 
the same qualifications as the previous job and at the same salary level. After 
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a certain period of unemployment, and, generally, in assistential regimes, it 
can include any offered job which the unemployed can physically assume, 
whatever the type of contract, the content of the job or the salary. 
Within this context, the present chapter is an attempt to explore the legal 
definition of the notion of suitable employment on the one hand, and how 
the conceptualization of the notion of suitable employment within the 
international social rights framework could contribute to guarantee the 
reintegration of unemployed within the labour market without this involving 
a degradation of working conditions or occupational status.  
This chapter does not attempt to articulate a particular definition of 
precarious work, and does not pretend to contribute directly to its definition. 
Taking into account the complexity of the concept, its several dimensions 
and legal determinants,1 it builds more on some of the expressions of those, 
like involuntary part-time employment, temporality of employment 
contracts, lack of access to social security or low earnings, without 
forgetting the gender perspective of the problematic. 
Also, unemployment protection regimes have been recalibrated and put more 
emphasis on their activating character. The legal elements of activation have 
to be taken into account, as it is contented that they have an impact on the 
intensity of the obligation to search for or accept suitable employment. 
Different forms of activation (which could be ordered on a spectrum going 
from workfare measures to more positive, enabling or empowering 
measures) put the obligation to accept suitable jobs in a different context. 
The effectiveness of support measures or the control of the obligation, the 
availability of training and the legal conceptualisation of such aspects have 
an influence on the consequences of the notion of suitable employment on 
the circumstances of the reintegration of unemployed in the labour market. 
The analysis of the notion of suitable employment in connection with the 
idea of precarious work gives a particular point of entry in the discussions 
and debates about the relation between unemployment protection and labour 
market regulation on the one hand, and on the debates about the content and 
meaning of fundamental social rights like the right to social security, or the 
right to work, which in their turn enrich the actual and potential applications 
of the notion of suitable employment as a limit to the commodification of 
workers through activation policies. 
The analysis includes three models of unemployment protection, centred on 
three cases.  
The Spanish case, where suitable employment is openly defined, but 
operates in a context of insufficient protection against unemployment, both 
                                                
1 See on those aspects, N. Kountouris, “The legal determinants of precariousness in personal 
work relations: a European perspective”, Comparative Labour Law & Policy Journal, 
Vol. 34, 2012-2013, 21-46   
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in its passive aspect as in connection with active labour market policies, and 
where protection against unemployment is also a factor of the unbalanced 
implementation of the flexicurity model. 
The chapter then proceeds to the analysis of the legal definition of the notion 
of suitable employment in The Netherlands, as a model which is said to run 
along the idea of flexicurity and which has been the theatre of the shift of 
continental unemployment protection regimes towards a two-tier system 
(contributory and means-tested), with activation policies with an important 
work-first character. 
The third model is the German unemployment protection system, inspired by 
the Dutch system but with shorter contributory unemployment benefits  
The fourth part is an attempt to reconstruct the notion of suitable 
employment through its connection with fundamental social rights as 
defined in international social rights instruments, mainly the right to work 
and the right to social security. It tries to assess which could be the analytical 
and normative consequences of such a reconstruction on the interpretation of 
the legal conceptualization at national level of suitable employment in a way 
which could limit the reintegration of unemployed in the labour market 
under precarious forms of work.  
 
 
2. The Spanish case: an open notion of suitable employment in a 
context of insufficiency of unemployment protection 
 
2.1. The notion of suitable employment: an open definition in the hands 
of the Public Employment Services 
 
The Spanish legal notion of suitable employment involves the application of 
several alternative functional criteria, combined with a geographical and an 
economic criterion. 2  Will be considered as suitable, the job which 1) 
corresponds to the habitual profession of the worker; 2) her training or 
physical skills; 3) her last occupation (if it has been exercised at least three 
months)3; or 4) her (implicit or explicit) request. As geographic criterion, the 
law states that the job cannot involve a change in habitual residence, except 
                                                
2  Article 301 of the General Social Security Act (Ley General de la Seguridad Social) 
3  This period has however to be considered as too short, given the fact that, certainly in a 
situation of scarcity of employment, it is not uncommon to accept emergency 
occupations, due to pressing needs, but which finish to last more than three months, in 
which case the job seeker could see himself trapped in a professional itinerary which does 
not correspond to his capabilities or difficult his promotion through employment; see L. 
Mella Menéndez, El Compromiso de Actividad del Desempleado, Centro de Estudios 
Financieros, Madrid-Barcelona-Valencia, 99 
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if appropriate housing is available. As economic criterion, the law states that 
the new salary has to be the one applicable to the job in question.4  
After receiving benefits for one year, will be accepted as adequate any job 
which the Public Employment Service considers “that the worker could 
exercise”. The slightly circular meaning of this new professional criterion 
and its undetermined character, whose application only depends on the lapse 
of time, brings serious difficulties regarding its interpretation. But the law 
also states the in assessing the suitability of the job offer, the PES will “take 
into account the duration of the contract, temporary or open-ended, or the 
working time, full-time or part-time”. Although the aggressive character of 
the initial wording in a Legislative Decree was played down in the final 
legislation (it mentioned that the adequacy had to be considered without 
regards to duration of the contract or working-time), the unemployed is 
again confronted to great legal uncertainty, not knowing towards which 
objective those elements have to be taken into account (protection of the 
unemployed or facilitating fast labour market reintegration), and, again, 
potentially augmenting the discretionary power of the Employment Services. 
This could be viewed as decreasing legal certainty, which could in its turn be 
considered contrary to the idea of “clear rights and responsibilities” of the 
unemployed, contained in the European Employment Guidelines.5 
Some authors consider that this wording consecrates the fact that the 
duration of the contract or the fact that it would be part-time cannot be used 
as a valid justification to refuse a job offer, as already pointed towards by 
jurisprudence.6 Others deem that the new wording compels the employment 
service to take into account the quality of employment and the 
characteristics of the contract in relation with personal circumstances in 
considering which job is adequate7.  On the other hand, the obligation to 
accept part-time work should also be considered as contrary to its voluntary 
character, a principle which, should it be reminded, finds consecration in 
                                                
4  The latter criterion should be considered as contrary to art. 10 of ILO Convention 44, to 
the extent that this provision defines the salary of reference in the sector as a subsidiary 
criterion, to be applied in the cases where tow other criteria could not be applied: the 
salary which the worker would have obtained if she would have continued to be employed 
in the same form, or could have obtained, given her habitual occupation, in the región 
where she was generally employed. 
5  Council Decision 2010/707/EU of 21 October 2010 on guidelines for the employment 
policies of the Member States, Guideline 7 
6  L. Mella Menéndez, El Compromiso de Actividad del Desempleado, Centro de Estudios 
Financieros, Madrid-Barcelona-Valencia, 117-118 
7  C. Molina Navarrete, “El concepto de "colocación adecuada": "profesionalidad" versus 
"empleabilidad" del trabajador”, Tribuna social: Revista de seguridad social y laboral, nr 
143, 2002, 19; R. Cristóbal Roncero, “El programa de renta active de inserción en la Ley 
45/2002”, in A.V. Sempere Navarro, (coord.), Empleo, despido y desempleo tras las 
reformas de 2002 (Análisis de la Ley 45/2002, de 12 de Diciembre), Aranzadi, 2003, 285 
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Directive 97/81/CE on Part-Time Work8, even if the applicability of the 
latter on the case at hand is not direct.  
In any case, an important element is that the public employment services has 
to apply all the aforementioned criteria, “taking into account the personal 
and professional circumstances of the unemployed, his insertion itinerary, 
his work-life balance, the characteristics of the job offer, existence of 
transport as well as the characteristics of the local job markets”. This 
broadening of criteria, on the one hand, gives a lot of discretion to the 
employment services in determining if a job has to be considered adequate. 
On the other hand, it provides for legal elements which should permit the 
courts to review the decision of the employment services, by allowing them 
to take into account the circumstances of the case (and, admittedly, decide in 
favor of the freedom to choose one’s occupation that the right to work 
should entail).  
 
 
2.2. Suitable employment in a context of “flexiprecarity”9 
 
As we have seen in the previous section, the notion of suitable job does 
guarantee that an unemployed is prevented to have to accept atypical 
employment like fixed-term or part-time work. In this context, it is important 
to underline that more than 90% of the currently created employment in 
Spain has a temporary character. According to EUROSTAT, the temporary 
employment rate for 2016 revolves around 26% (for 23 % in 2012) 
Moreover, a great part of those fixed-term contracts have a very short 
duration. 
 
                                                
8  S. de la Casa Quesada, La protección por desempleo en España, Comares, Granada, 
2008, 127. 
9  The term refers to the unbalanced implementation of the idea of flexicurity in Spain, 
where contracts have been flexibilised without that “security” of workers, through 
unemployment protection and enhancement of their employability, has been reinforced. 
On this subject, see J. López, A. de le Court, S. Canalda, “Breaking the equilibrium 
between flexibility and security: flexiprecarity as the Spanish version of the model“, 
European Labour Law Journal, 2014, vol. 5, nº 1, 19-43. 
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Source: own elaboration from the online database EPA from the Instituto Nacional 
de Estadísticas (Asalariados con contrato o relación laboral temporal por duración 
del contrato, sexo y grupo de edad, 4th trimester 2017) 
 
I 
n this context, it is important to point out that in the case of the acceptation 
of a new job, the right to contributory benefits is not ended, but suspended 
for one year, in case the worker would lose its job in the meantime. 
Also, in the Spanish context, part-time work can be clearly seen as a 
precarious form of work. Part-time work has a problematic definition, 
according to which any employment contract with a number of hours 
inferior to a full-time contract of comparable worker is a part-time contract, 
and the fact that proportionality of access to social security rights 
automatically applies, and makes their access more difficult.10 Part-time 
                                                
10  J. López López, C. Chacartegui Jávega, C. and C. González Cantón: “Social Rights in 
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work also involves the application of strict proportionality criteria, even to 
minimum benefits. 
Also, while the Spanish law guarantees in principle the voluntary character 
of part-time work, also in application of the EU Directive on Part-time work, 
the proportion of involuntary part-timers has started to increase since 2004, 
before soaring with the crisis. According to EURSOTAT, in 2016, 7,7% of 
employees has to be considered as underemployed part-time workers (with 
an EU average of 4.3%). As part-timers form around 15% of the Spanish 
employees, this means that more than half of part-time work is involuntary. 
This new phenomenon of the Spanish labour market has, again, to be read as 
a new trend of re-commodification, both in-work as out-of-work, because of 
its consequences on access and level of unemployment benefits. Moreover, 
involuntary part-time work, also to be described as “underemployement”, is 
a form of “disguised” unemployment. It is also an important factor of in-
work poverty, especially for the young.11  
Also, despite being characterized as problematic by European authorities in 
the context of the Employment Strategies,12 the Spanish trend of recourse to 
fixed-term work initiated in the precedent decade has never been reversed. 
Only the 2008 crisis decreased the temporality rate, given that fixed-term 
worker bore the burden of job destruction. Some timid measures had been 
introduced before the crisis, above all in terms of subsidies for the promotion 
of conversion into open-ended contracts and the promotion of exceptional, 
open-ended contracts with lower compensation in case of dismissal, but not 
in terms of changes in the legal configuration of fixed-term contracts, except 
the introduction of limits to their “chaining” and an “absolute” limit of three 
years. However, in the wake of the crisis, the introduced limits were 
suspended, and the 2012 labour law reform did nothing else than rely on 
lowering protection of open-ended contracts, to try to revert the trend, 
without results.13  
Again, this has negative consequences in terms of entitlement to the right to 
unemployment protection, due to the contributory character of the latter and 
                                                                                                              
and H. Arthurs, (ed.) Rethinking Workplace Regulation: Beyond the Standard Contract of 
Employment, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 2013, 333–349. 
11  European Commission, “Is Working enough to avoid Poverty? In-work Poverty 
Mechanisms and Policies in the EU“ in Employment and Social Developments in Europe 
2011, 145 
12  Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on Spain’s 2014 national 
reform programme  and delivering a Council opinion on Spain’s 2014 stability 
programme, SWD(2014) 410 final 
13  J. López, A. de le Court, S. Canalda, “Breaking the equilibrium between flexibility and 
security: flexiprecarity as the Spanish version of the model“, European Labour Law 
Journal, 2014, vol. 5, nº 1, 19-43. Moreover, according to Chapter 2 of the OECD 
Employment Outlook 2013, p. 97, regulation of temporary contracts has been flexibilised, 
mainly by lenghtening their maximum duration. 
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the greater difficulties to fulfil the requisites of sufficient contributory 
periods for persons working in fixed-term contracts. The high temporality 
rate has also a negative effect on the precarization of workers and their 
employability14, and, at least in the Spanish context, specifically on their 
employment chances15, which are also a consequences of the higher in-work 
commodification fixed-term work involves. 
Within this context of important precarisation of workers in temporary and 
part-time contract, and the high in-work commodifying level of the latter, 
the possibility to consider those types of contracts as suitable employment, 
given the legal definition, can be seen as quite high. 
Another important feature of the Spanish labour market which is problematic 
from the point of view of forcing workers back in the labour market through 
the broadening of the notion of suitable employment, is the low level of 
wages, and above all of the minimum wage. 
Here again, an important element of precariousness arises, as pointed out by 
the European Committee on Social Rights: 
“In its previous conclusion (Conclusions XVIII-2) the Committee held 
that the minimum wage was manifestly inadequate as it fell far below 
the threshold of 60% of the average wage. It also requested detailed 
information on net values of both minimum and average wages. 
The Committee notes from the report that on the basis of the Royal 
Decree 1632/2006 of 29 December the minimum interprofessional 
wage was fixed at € 570,60 per month. It rose to € 624 in 2009 by 
virtue of the Royal Decree 2128/2008 of 26 December. The 
Committee however observes that the report, again, fails to provide 
information as requested on the net values of minimum and average 
wages. It notes from Eurostat that the average annual gross earnings in 
2007 amounted to € 21,890 in 2007 (€ 1,824 per month). Therefore, 
even in the absence of information on the net values, the Committee 
considers that despite the growth of minimum wage, the situation 
remains unchanged - the level of the minimum wage remains very low 
and thus not fair. The Committee also notes from OECD that 
minimum relative to average wages of full-time workers in 2007 
amounted to 45%. 
Conclusion 
                                                
14  J. López, A. de le Court, S. Canalda, “Breaking the equilibrium between flexibility and 
security: flexiprecarity as the Spanish version of the model”, European Labour Law 
Journal, 2014,  2014, vol. 5, nº 1, 19-43 
15  J. Polavieja, “Partial deregulation in Spain: more cons than pros”, Working Paper 
2003/195, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Madrid, 2003 
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The Committee concludes that the situation in Spain is not in 
conformity with Article 4§1 of the Charter on the ground that the 
minimum wage is manifestly unfair.”16 
Given that minimum wage has been frozen during the last years, it could not 
be said that the situation has evolved favourably, with the exception of the 
last year, which saw an increase of the minimum wage to 707,6 €. In 2016, 
according to EUROSTAT, minimum wage represented 36% of the gross 
average wage. 
This has also an importance as to the sufficient character of unemployment 
benefits, given their close connection to previous earnings, and poses into 
question, not only the sufficient character of a great part of the wages, but 
also of social protection benefits. 
On the other hand, within the Spanish context, the importance of the 
discussion about the strictness of the notion of suitable employment and its 
effects on the growth of precarious employment has to be downplayed 
somewhat, and this among others, for the following reasons. 
Firstly, the obligation to accept suitable employment only applies to 
unemployed perceiving contributory or non contributory benefits. However, 
because of the growth of long-term employment, combined with stricter 
entitlement conditions and the lack of a universal, means-tested, subsidiary 
protection scheme for those running out of contributory benefits17, like in 
most other continental welfare states, almost half of the unemployment 
population does not perceive any benefits, whether they can appeal to family 
solidarity or not. Only 3% of those unemployed have access to regional 
social assistance schemes, most of which (except the Basque Country or in 
Navarra) are not configured as subjective rights, depending on the 
availability of fixed budgets, have very strict access thresholds, do not 
provide for sufficient resources or even exclude applicants whose situation 
of necessity is only due to their being unemployed. In any case, those 
unemployed not covered by benefits, even if they theoretically have access 
to ALMPs and PES, are not subject to an obligation to accept suitable jobs, 
are not prioritized in those offers, and are compelled to accept any job out of 
sheer necessity. 
                                                
16  Conclusions XIX-3 – Spain – Article 4-1, 2011  
17  Non-contributory benefits are only available to unemployment older than 45 years with 
family at their charge, whose household income do not pass the threshold. 
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Evolution of the number of unemployed not covered by benefits 2004-2014 
 
Source: own elaboration from Employment Ministry Database (Prestaciones por 
Desempleo) and Encuesta de Población Activa (2015) 
 
 
Secondly, one has to take into account the important degree of 
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Evolution	  of	  the	  number	  of	  job	  placements	  2005-­‐2012 
 
Source: own elaboration from the online database Estadísticas Laborales (Spanish 
Ministry of Employment) 2012 
 
The overwhelming majority of unemployed find a job by their own efforts or 
through other placement systems, and efficacy of the public employment 
service seems even to dwindle further from the year 2010 onwards.18  
It is against this background that the recent Spanish reforms concerning 
ALMPs have been oriented towards privatizing the functions of the PES, by 
opening them to private employment agencies, most of them being also 
temporary work agencies, not only concerning orientation and placement of 
job seekers, but also other aspects of support measures, like training.19 The 
                                                
18  While in 1992, taking into account the whole labour force of the unemployment 
administration, the ratio of unemployed per PES workers was 191, one of the lowest of 
the OECD, in 2010 it amounted to 208, moreover in a year which had seen increased the 
numbers of PES workers to face soaring unemployment, but which subsequent cuts 
certainly have not bettered, to the contrary . If we extrapolate the increase between 2007 
and 2010 of the workers of the national PES to the workforce of all Spanish PES (22,6%), 
we arrive to a ratio in 2007 of 107 unemployed per PES worker. It seems thus, within the 
approximate character of the data and method used, that the situation might have 
improved slightly at the best, but certainly not to join the 1992 ratios of Germany (39), 
France (79), the Netherlands (32) or even a country whose Welfare State model is closer 
to the Spanish one, like Portugal (51). Moreover, we could assume that those foreign 
1992 ratios have bettered under influence of ALMP extension. Own elaboration from the 
SEPE website (http://www.sepe.es/contenido/estadisticas/datos_recursos/index.html), and 
INE (EPA); see also http://www.fsc.ccoo.es/comunes/recursos/99922/361352-
Cuadro_resumen_con_evolucion_en_los_cinco_ultimos_anos..pdf; 
19  Ley 11/2013 de 25 de julio de medidas de apoyo al emprendedor y de estímulo al 
crecimiento y de la creación de empleo, 32nd additional disposition; Real Decreto-ley 
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public tenders to externalize those functions involve a remuneration of those 
agencies in function of re-integration of job-seekers for at least 6 months, 
introducing this limit in the formalization of what might be considered as 
“durable” integration. Those tenders also involve remuneration of those 
agencies in case they provide the information to PES permitting those to 
sanction unemployed, involving a publicly remunerated private control on 
the acceptation, amongst other aspects, of suitable employment. Again, it 
should be reminded that it would be mainly unemployed receiving benefits 
which would be diverted by the PES to those private agencies for their 
reintegration.  
This aspect of lack of effectiveness of PES also has to be connected with the 
more general structure of Spanish ALMPs.  
Evolution of the proportion between different ALMPs in Spain 2002-2015 
 
Source: own elaboration from EUROSTAT, 2018 (expenditure on LMP) 
 
 
Employment incentives have traditionally represented the biggest part of 
Spain’s ALMP’s budget, despite the fact that almost all studies point 
towards very poor macro- and micro-economic effectiveness of those hiring 
subsidies in terms of employment creation, generally pointing towards 
deadweight effects, (the hiring would have occurred also without the 
subsidy) with some very particular and limited exceptions in case of small, 
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well-targeted groups, or substitution effects (a worker is replaced by a 
subsidized worker)20. They include mainly hiring subsidies, as well as 
subsidies officially classified as “for the maintenance of jobs”. However, the 
latter category is referring mainly to subsidies for substitution or job 
adaptation in matters of maternity risks and leave, and, since the crisis, to 
short-term work schemes of temporary contract suspensions21 (scheme that 
was limited to the end of 2013). It is also important to state that the category 
“training” does not only include training for unemployed but also training 
for workers in employment. Moreover, even if the importance of those 
“incentives” declined over the years, it seems that the measures taken 
following the crisis have broken that trend, mainly through an increase in 
relative terms of the recourse to hiring subsidies (as argued here above) 
combined, from 2012, with a decrease in the proportion of the budget 
dedicated to training, the relative position of which stabilized in 2013 but 
decreased again in 2014. On the other hand, the general budget of ALMP 
has passed from 8.956.710.000 € in 2010 to 6.401.840.000 € in 2015.22 
Thirdly, there is very few, if almost any, data concerning the application by 
the PES of the notion of suitable employment, whether taking into account 
sanctions related to the refusal of a suitable job offer, or other data. This 
                                                
20  J.P. Martin, D. Grubb, “What works and for whom: a review of OECD countries' 
experiences with active labour market policies”, IFAU Working Paper, 2001:14, 
http://www.ifau.se/upload/pdf/se/2001/wp01-14.pdf; J. Boone, J.C. van Ours, “Effective 
Active Labour Market Policies”, IZA Discussion Papers, 2004 I. Marx., “Job subsidies 
and cut in employers´social security contributions: the verdict of empirical evaluations 
studies”, International Labor Review, n°1, 2001, 69 ; A. Ammermüller, T. Zwick, B. 
Boockmann, and M. Maier, “Do hiring subsidies reduce unemployment among the 
elderly? Evidence from two natural experiments”, ZEW Discussion Papers, No. 07-001, 
2007, ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp07001.pdf; ILO, The youth employment crisis: 
Time for action, Report V in the context of the 101st session of the International Labour 
Conference, Geneva, 2012, 58-59; for the Spanish case, see D. Pérez del Prado, Los 
instrumentos económicos de fomento del empleo, Tirant lo Blanc, Valencia,  2011, 101-
104; F. Saez, “Políticas de empleo y su evolución en España”, and C. García Serrano, 
“Los resultados de las políticas activas de Mercado de trabajo en España. Evidencia 
empírica disponible”, both in VV.AA., La evaluación de las políticas de ocupación, 
Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, Madrid, 2000;   
21  It is important to observe that those systems, inspired from the German Kurzarbeit but not 
as developed as the latter, involves a transfer of business risks from the company towards 
the state, or more precisely, towards passive unemployment protection (payments of 
benefits) on the one hand, but also towards the workers, as during the suspension, they 
“consume” the rights to insurance benefits that they have generated. The exceptions to 
that “consumption” in a form of a replacement of a maximum 6 months of benefits, will 
only apply in case of suspension plans approved before the end of 2013, and only in case 
of unemployment following dismissal on economic, organization or production grounds 
before the end of 2014, excluding termination of temporary contracts or dismissals on 
other grounds (Article 16, Ley 3/2012, de 6 de julio, de medidas urgentes para la reforma 
del mercado laboral) 
22  EUROSTAT, expenditure on LMP (2018) 
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might also be explained by the fact that, with a job market characterized by 
high structural unemployment figures, which have soared with the job 
destruction and measures taken in the wake of the crisis, without giving 
signs to be significantly reduced in the years to come.  
There are almost no official numbers or databases concerning the patterns of 
sanctions, other than press releases from the government. In 2010, Spain 
counted around 3 million benefit holders. The proportion of sanctioned 
benefit holders would thus be 8,7% in total, and 0,2% for serious offence (of 
which refusing suitable employment would be one. When looking at the 
published jurisprudence (generally appeal-level decisions), the greatest part 
deals with problems surrounding sanctions or extinctions related to 
movement of unemployed out of the country, with questions concerning the 
computing of income to access assistance benefits coming second, and the 
rest of the most important groups of judgements concerns recognition of 
unemployment benefits in case of partial unemployment, and sanctions 
concerning the refusal of job offers.23  
However, concerning the latter, disputes are generally about other subjects 
than the refusal to accept a proposed job offer because of the employment 
precariousness it would involve. However, one of the main judicialised 
aspects of the matter is the refusal by unemployed women of jobs for 
reasons of care. However, apart from a few recent exceptions, 24  the 
jurisprudence of the Tribunal Supremo is quite strict, as it generally 
considers that the need for care is not a justified ground to refuse a job offer, 
as the rights related to care have to be exercised in the context of the labour 
contract (something which is made more difficult with the last labour 
                                                
23  Analysis based on keyword searches („sanction“ and „unemployment“) in the online  
database „Aranzadi bibliotecas“. 
24  The Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia, court of appeal in social matters, decided in 
a judgment of 4 April 2005, AS 2005, 1460, 1) that the refusal to participate in training 
had to be assessed under the same circumstances as the refusal of an adequate job offer, 
as the PES have to take into “account the personal and professional circumstances of the 
unemployed, his insertion itinerary, his work-life balance, the characteristics of the job 
offer, existence of transport as well as the characteristics of the local job markets” for all 
the obligation of the unemployed; and 2) that a worker having refused to participate in 
training because the participation would make it impossible to care for his child, because 
his wife was also following training, could not be sanctioned. More interesting even, the 
Court reinforced its interpretation by referring to ILO Convention 44 and, above all, ILO 
Recommendation 165, according to which family responsibilities of the unemployed have 
to be taken into account in the assessment of the suitable character of employment. To 
justify the reversal of jurisprudence in comparison to the criteria established by the 
Tribunal Supremo, followed by the jurisprudence commented in section I.1, the Court 
argued that the principle of the promotion of work-life balance, since the Law 39/1999 of 
5 November of promotion of work-life balance of workers,24 modifying disposition of 
labour law and social security law, is to be seen as a general criterion of interpretation in 
labour and social law 
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reforms and the growing pressure put on workers by employers). This 




3. The Dutch case: a notion of suitable employment under a model 
evolving along the idea of flexicurity 
 
3.1. A work-first model based on the restriction of the notion of suitable 
employment 
 
At the end of the eighties and during the nineties The Netherlands, through 
the Werkloosheidswet (WW) put in place a system of contributory 
unemployment protection consisting in a replacement wage of 70% of 
previous wages, with a duration in proportion to previous contribution 
periods and a maximum duration of 5 years, which was reduced in the first 
decade of the XXIst century to 38 months, and will further be reduced to 24 
months by the 2014 Wet Werk en Zekerheid (with the possibility that the 
reduction can be compensated through collective agreements).  
Until the 2014 reform, the notion of suitable employment which had to be 
accepted by unemployed had been defined in non-legally binding, but 
widely applied Guidelines. The interpretation of the notion had to be based 
on three factors: the characteristics of the work (which are primarily 
assessed in function of the previous job and qualifications), the level of 
salary and duration of travel. The strictness of the interpretation of those 
three factors depends on the duration of unemployment. As such, for 
example, every six months a worker had to accept a job from a lower 
educational category, which means that after a year and a half, persons with 
a higher education degree were to accept also jobs not requiring any 
qualifications. After 6 months, lower salaries should be accepted, 
corresponding to jobs of the lower educational category which have to be 
accepted, with minimum salary and applicable collective agreement salaries 
considered as minima.25 The suitability would also depend on the availability 
of jobs in the sector of the previous work, so that in case of high general, 
sectorial or local unemployment, suitability would be more broadly 
interpreted. The latter is an important expression of the re-commodifying 
character of how return-to-work is framed, as it is a feature that depends 
heavily on the necessities of the employers and the situation of the labour 
market, rather than on characteristics on which the unemployed has (had) at 
least some control (qualifications,…). 
                                                
25 Richtlijn Passende Arbeid 1996 (replaced in 2008) http://www.st-ab.nl/abwor57.htm 
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In 2008, new (non-legally binding but widely applied) Guidelines on the 
notion of suitable job were published, allowing wider interpretation, in 
detriment to the benefit-receiver. As such, any job had to be considered 
suitable (even if it does not match the level of the precedent job) after 52 
weeks of unemployment, instead of the former year-and-a-half. Moreover, 
after those 52 weeks, it was also considered that a job had to be considered 
suitable, even if the salary was lower than the level of benefits, due to the 
fact that, in case of long-term unemployment, the new system permitted to 
top the new salary with partial benefits so as to match the former benefit 
level.26 Before this period, the salary limit to a suitable job is fixed at the 
level of the type of work which has to be accepted in function of the 
qualifications (every 6 months, this lowers by a category – there are 4 
categories, from higher education to no qualifications -27 with the level of 
benefits as a limit, and work of a temporary character has to be accepted.28 It 
is worth to note that the European Committee of Social Rights has concluded 
to a situation of non-conformity with art. 12-1 of the European Social 
Charter, given the lack of information the Dutch government has given 
concerning the question “whether there is a reasonable initial period during 
which an unemployed person may refuse a job or a training offer not 
matching his/her previous skills without losing his/her unemployment 
benefits”,29 which would lead us to think that the actual period could be 
deemed unreasonable. 
Finally, with the 2014 reform, after 6 months of having received 
unemployment benefits, the notion of “suitable job” will imply “any job 
which suits the capacities and qualifications of the worker”, which would 
mean that jobs according to lower qualifications as well as salary will have 
to be accepted. On the other hand, the notion itself has not been altered, and 
still provides for social, physical and mental grounds to consider unsuitable 
employment which would be considered, in principle, suitable. Also it could 
be reasonably assumed that previous jurisprudential or other criteria on 
assessing the notion of suitable employment after 6 months, like the 
probability in case of accepting employment at a lower qualification level to 
                                                
26  G. Vonk and W. Zondag, “Passende arbeid: nog steeds een levend begrip?”, Serie 
Onderneming en Recht, 50 (2009), http://irs.ub.rug.nl/ppn/353590924  
27  Richtlijn passende arbeid 2008, available at http://www.st-ab.nl/wetwwor1rpa08.htm  
28  Inspectie Werk en Inkomen. Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 
“Flexibele arbeid en uitstroom”, Report, November 2011, 
https://www.inspectieszw.nl/Images/Flexibele%20arbeid%20en%20uitstroom_tcm335-
327742.pdf  




come back to employment corresponding to the qualification of the worker 
(important to prevent degradation in employment) could still be applied. 
But the notion of “suitable job” during the first 6 months of unemployment 
will not be interpreted any more according to non-binding guidelines (which 
established that suitable job meant a job of the same level as the previous 
job), but will be defined by a government regulation,30 roughly defining 
suitable employment as an employment corresponding to the level of the 
previous employment, and not involving earning less than 70% of the 
previous salary or of the comparable salary for that occupation.31  
In 2007, the obligation of unemployed to look for work, contained in the 
law, has been detailed in a Governmental regulation,32 which putted forward 
the principle of “the shortest way to work”. It discerned between 
unemployed “close” to the labour market, which had an obligation to 
sufficiently look for work and accept invitations to job interviews, and those 
“further” from the labour market, for which reintegration activities like 
training, workshops and voluntary work had to be combined with job 
interviews, under the supervision of a “reintegration coach”.33 The PES 
distributed unemployed between the two groups and took into account their 
potential and limitations, the situation of the job market, the number of job 
vacancies and the notion of suitable employment in deciding the 
reintegration measures. From 2007, agreements on the concrete execution of 
those obligations were compulsory. The regulation was replaced in 2012, 
when the separation between unemployed “closer to” and “further from” the 
labour market has been abolished, all unemployed having the same 
obligation to look for work. Some violations, mostly those related to the 
obligation of information, are sanctioned by a fine in function of the gravity 
and the circumstance of the case. 
Those unemployed not having access to contributory benefits for lack of 
previous contributory periods or because the period of contributory benefits 
has expired, have access to the means-tested social assistance scheme, 
                                                
30  Besluit van 11 december 2014, houdende nadere regels omtrent het begrip passende 
arbeid zoals genoemd in de artikelen 24, derde lid, van de Werkloosheidswet en 30, vijfde 
lid, van de Ziektewet (Besluit passende arbeid WW en ZW) 
31  According to the memorandum to the Project Wet Werk en Zekerheid, 94, as a 
“compensation” for the latter measure, the system which provided for the payment of 
benefits for the difference of working hours between the previous and the new job to be 
accepted, or “hours compensation system”, is replaced by one of “compensation of 
remuneration”, similar to the system already in place for long-term unemployed. This 
means that, upon accepting a job with a lower salary, 70% of the difference between the 
new and the previous salary will still be paid out as unemployment benefits, on top of the 
new salary, for the rest of the duration of benefits 
32  Besluit sollicitatieplicht werknemers WW 2007 
33  A.C. Damsteegt, De Werkloosheidswet anno 2007, Kluwer, Deventer, 2006, 56-57 
 40 
administered by the municipalities and regulated by the 2003 Wet Werk en 
Bijstand (WWB – Work and Assistance Act).34 
Instead of a “suitable” job, reflecting the obligations of unemployed under 
the WW, unemployed falling into the assistance scheme (or, generally, any 
person claiming social assistance) have now the obligation to try to obtain 
“generally accepted work”, a notion which in contrary to Dutch legal 
practice, has not even received a beginning of legal definition. In application 
of the individualization principle of social assistance it shall be applied, 
interpreted and substantiated (as well as temporary exceptions given) at the 
level of municipalities.35  
Parliamentary discussion of the notion did not offer more light on the 
concept than that it would imply the severance of the link between the job 
and qualifications, as well as the consideration as not generally accepted 
work of prostitution, work in illegal conditions and below the minimum 
wage, or work that goes against the worker´s legitimate moral objections, 
without totally ruling out personal circumstances. This means that for those 
unemployed, the notion of suitable employment could be seen to have been 
degraded to a notion of mere “legal employment”. Moreover, studies show 
that the concept is overwhelmingly used as means of pressure to accept any 
job that is offered to the benefit claimant, independently of individual 
circumstances, underlining the “work-first” character of the Dutch 
unemployment protection schemes.36 
The changes in the social assistance system introduced in the first decade of 
the XXIst century did not really have effects on the number of payments of 
benefits, which continued to vary more in function of overall economic 
performance. This confirms that the scheme has served to absorb 
unemployed who have run out of insurance benefits. Financial incentives for 
municipalities for lowering the numbers of benefit holders had some 
influence on limiting entries to the scheme, but other schemes, like benefits 
for young disabled persons, saw an increase in beneficiaries, which suggests 
another movement of absorption. Also, the work-first approach, reinforced 
by those same financial incentives, made that a relatively high percentage of 
                                                
34 Wet van 9 oktober 2003, houdende vaststelling van een wet inzake ondersteuning bij 
arbeidsinschakeling en verlening van bijstand door gemeenten 
35 E. Sol, M. Sichert, H. van Lieshout, and T. Koning, T., “Activation as a Socio-Economic 
and Legal Concept: Laboratorium the Netherlands” in W. Eichorst, O. Kaufmann, R. 
Konle-Seidl, Bringing the Jobless into Work. Experiences with Activation Schemes in 
Europe and the US, Springer, Berlin-Heidelberg, 2008, 184 
36 G. Vonk, and W. Zondag, “Passende arbeid: nog steeds een levend begrip?”, Serie 
Onderneming en Recht, nº, 50, 2009 
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persons returned to the scheme after employment, with no real increase in 
durable work participation.37 
Moreover, the following graph shows that the proportion between 
unemployed within the contributory scheme and the assistance scheme, 
while being quite similar in the beginning, evolved into an ever higher part 
of unemployed in the assistance scheme. The gap closed with the beginning 
of the crisis, suggesting that the contributory scheme absorbed a great part of 
job losses in a first phase, but after that, it started widening again. 
 
Evolution of Unemployed in contributory and non-contributory unemployment 
scheme in the Netherlands 
– in % of the workforce (2004-2015) 
 
Source: own elaboration from the OECD online database 2018 (participant stock on LMP) 
 
 
This might have been produced by the ever stricter limitation of maximum 
duration of the contributory system, as well as a generally higher qualifying 
periods for which the average maximum duration of benefits has 
decreased.38 In 2007, 25% of new unemployed had right to a maximum 
duration of benefits of 6 months, 15% between 6 and 12, 14% between 12-
                                                
37  M. Blommenstijn, G. Kruis, R. van Geuns, “Dutch municipalities and the implementation 
of social assistance: Making social assistance work“, Local Economy, n° 27, 2012, 623-
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18, 15% between 18 and 24, and 30 % between 24 and 38. This decrease of 
average benefit duration can be seen in the increase of recipients of 
assistance benefits since the beginning of the century. Therefore, more 
unemployed, generally younger and women,39 flow faster into the assistance 
scheme (if they do not find an acceptable job), with lower benefits as a 
consequence, as well as an obligation to accept almost any (legal) job, 
whatever its characteristics. Therefore, the system itself provides for a 
gradually higher pressure on the unemployed to reintegrate the labour 
market due to the status change passing into unemployment assistance 
involves in terms of balance between rights and obligations. 
 
 
3.2. Suitable employment and regulation of the labour market based on 
the idea of flexicurity 
 
The period of the 2000s build on the first, limited attempts of re-regulation 
of atypical contracts initiated in the 1990s, with the idea to limit 
precarisation induced by part-time, fixed-term and temporary agency work 
so as to combat segmentation, in line with the implementation of ideas of 
flexicurity. 
Protection of standard contracts operates through a system of causal 
dismissal, with notice periods of one to four months coupled to a system of 
previous control of the causes and authorization by the UWV (Public 
Employment Services), without compensation for dismissal, or, at the option 
of the employer or in case of contestation by the worker of the decision of 
the UWV, by the Courts, applying a less stricter test of causality but granting 
compensation if function of a jurisprudential formula 
(kantonrechtersformule).40 This system of control of the decisions of the 
employer before it can be executed is quite unique in Europe, and, despite 
demands from employers’ organizations, has never been replaced by the 
more generally applicable self-executing character of the dismissal with 
posterior control by Courts or administrative organs.  
Part-time work was further addressed by a Part-time Employment Act in 
200041, a legislation which was weighed in favor of the employee, as proved 
by jurisprudence relative to it.42 Protection is organized in line with the Part-
                                                
39  UWV, “Invloed van verkorting van de maximale WW-duur”, kennismemo 10/09 
http://www.uwv.nl/overuwv/Images/Invloed_verkorting_maximale_WW-duur.pdf  
40  A.T.M. Jacobs, Labour Law in The Netherlands, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 
2004 
41  Wet Aanpassing Arbeidsduur, of 19/2/2000 
42  M. Blázquez Cuesta, N.E. Ramos Martín, “Part-time employment: a comparative analysis 
of Spain and the Netherlands”, European Journal of Law and Economics, n° 28, 223-256, 
at 226; 
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time Work Directive,43 with one important addition, which is that it institutes 
a subjective right to “switch” back and forth between part-time and full-time, 
without need to present reasons, only limited in case of proven serious 
reasons of business interest of the employer.44 The choice conferred by this 
legislation has also been effectively enforced by Courts,45 and it is also 
important to note that, women and man have generally the same probabilities 
to increase the numbers of hours they work.46 
The Flexibility and Security Act of 1999 re-regulated the quite liberalized 
system of recourse to fixed-term contracts, except for the automatic 
conversions to an open-ended contract when work continued after its term, 
prompting employers to wait one month between reengaging.47 The 3-3-3 
rule was created (maximum three contracts, or maximum three years, and 
minimum three months between fixed-term contract, sanctioned by 
conversions into open-ended contract) legitimizing quite extended use of 
fixed-term contracts. On the other hand it consolidated protection for 
workers with several dispositions: system of fictitious minimum hours for 
on-call workers, probation period limited to 1 month for contract of less than 
two years, and finally, a system of presumption of formal (open-ended) 
contract, in case of a work relation of minimal 20 hours per months during 
three months. The latter seems not to have been really effective, because the 
initiative of its enforcement lay in hands of the worker. Collective 
agreements can alter some of the protection rules, above all the 3-3-3 rule, 
some enhancing protection, and other reducing it further. However, it is 
above all the latter which happened, as collective bargaining seems to have 
progressively altered the 3-3-3 rule towards more flexibility, partly because 
of decreasing bargaining powers and possibly also as consequence on the 
concentration of protection for standard workers within negotiations.48 This 
                                                
43  Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement 
on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC 
44  S.D. Burri, H.C. Ophitz, A.G. Veldman, “Work-familiy policies on working-time put into 
practice. A comparison on the Dutch and German case law on working-time adjustment”, 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, vol. 19, n° 3, 
2003, 321; 
45  J. Visser, “Flexibility and Security in Post-Standard Employment Relations: The 
Netherlands”, in K. Stone and H. Arthurs, Rethinking Workplace Regulation. Beyond the 
Standard Contract of Employment, Russel Sage Foundation, New York, 2013, 135, 147 
46  M. Blázquez Cuesta, N.E. Ramos Martín, “Part-time employment: a comparative analysis 
of Spain and the Netherlands”, European Journal of Law and Economics, n° 28, 2009, 
255 
47  A.B. Keizer, “Non-regular Employment in the Netherlands”, in VV.AA. “Non-regular 
Employment – Issues and Challenges Common to the Major Developed Countries”, 
Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training Report, No. 10, 2011, 162 
48  J. Visser, “Flexibility and Security in Post-Standard Employment Relations: The 
Netherlands”, in K. Stone and H. Arthurs, Rethinking Workplace Regulation. Beyond the 
Standard Contract of Employment, Russel Sage Foundation, New York, 2013, 135, 148 
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has been an unfortunate move from the point of view of de-
commodification, given that “Flexworkers” (fixed-term workers and workers 
through temporary agencies), in 2011, had around four times more chances 
to end perceiving unemployment benefits than standard workers.49 
Agency work was also re-regulated in the same period (while agencies 
themselves were totally liberalized), imposing non-discrimination rules and 
information obligations, as well as an important protection feature, which is 
that a contract with a temporary work agency is deemed to be a formal 
labour contract, except for the first 26 weeks. This rule has been changed 
through collective agreements with a system of phases. The rights of the 
worker grow in function of his advancement in the phases, with an open-
ended contract in the last phase, or after a maximum of 3,5 years of 
temporary work (conditions applicable since 2004, around 7% of agency 
workers are in the second and third phase).50 
Above all, an important element, if not the most important, of the “success” 
of Dutch labour market performance (at least in terms of unemployment) has 
been the effect of “sharing” the jobs induced by high temporality and part-
time work. On the other hand, this high labour market flexibilization has 
been gradually, even if slightly, reduced over the last decade. This is 
reflected by the fact that part-time work in the Netherlands seems to be 
overwhelmingly of a voluntary nature, which is largely a result of 
collectively negotiated and legal measures designed to make part-time work 
attractive.51 Another measure to compensate for flexibility in general has 
also been the constant indexing of minimum wage to general wage and price 
developments.52 
However, less favorable developments are also observed. 
It seems that employers in some sectors have restructured their work 
organization in great part on the most precarious forms of atypical work, a 
development which finds its expression in the fact that transition rates 
                                                
49  Inspectie Werk en Inkomen. Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 
“Flexibele arbeid en uitstroom”, Report, November 2011, 
https://www.inspectieszw.nl/Images/Flexibele%20arbeid%20en%20uitstroom_tcm335-
327742.pdf, 20. Moreover, agency work gives even worse results than fixed-term work, 
not only in terms of unemployment, but also in terms of risk of disability. 
50  A.B. Keizer, “Non-regular Employment in the Netherlands”, in VV.AA., “Non-regular 
Employment – Issues and Challenges Common to the Major Developed Countries”, 
Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training Report, No. 10, 2011, 166 and 169 
51  J. Visser, “Flexibility and Security in Post-Standard Employment Relations: The 
Netherlands”, in K. Stone and H. Arthurs, Rethinking Workplace Regulation. Beyond the 
Standard Contract of Employment, Russel Sage Foundation, New York, 2013, 135, 146; 
W. van Oorschoot, “Balancing work and welfare: activation and flexicurity policies in 
The Netherlands, 1980-2000”, International Journal of Social Welfare, nº 13, 24 
52  J. Visser, “Flexibility and Security in Post-Standard Employment Relations: The 
Netherlands”, in K. Stone and H. Arthurs, Rethinking Workplace Regulation. Beyond the 
Standard Contract of Employment, Russel Sage Foundation, New York, 2013, 135, 150 
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between fixed-term and standard employment has decreased from 35% to 
18% in less than ten years. Moreover, important wage-gaps between 
standard employment and fixed-term and agency work shows that from the 
point of view of the worker, greater flexibility is not compensated by more 
wage security.53 On the other hand if compared to other European countries, 
those wage gaps are amongst the lowest,54 which would confirm, from the 
wage point of view, the Netherlands as a model of flexicurity given the 
comparatively milder consequences for workers of labour market 
segmentation.  
Moreover, the Werk Wet en Zekerheid, while restricting unemployment 
protection and the notion of suitable employment also modifies labour law, 
according to the traditional lines of an intended balanced application of the 
idea of flexicurity. While flexibilizing protection against dismissal in 
standard contracts (by limiting cases that can be brought before the judge), it 
provides for more protection for temporary agency workers, as well as for 
fixed-term workers, the latter by modifying the 3-3-3 rule so as to limit 
fixed-term employment to two years, which is to be welcomed, given the 
tendency of collective bargaining to adapt the 3-3-3 rule in favor of the 
necessities of employers. 
To finish with some lines about the aspects of protection against 
unemployment related to support measures for the unemployed, the Dutch 
system of reintegration measures is extremely complex. Next to difficulties 
of quasi-markets for employment services to living up to the pre-conditions 
for a well-functioning market (absence of real competition due to a lack of 
sufficient competitors, necessity of regulation and administrative steering, 
high transaction costs), they did not involve the development of innovative 
practices, did not provoked significant cost reductions nor important effects 
of reintegration, inevitably led to neglecting the needs of unemployed 
needing complex, and thus costly initiatives, and finally involved less 
visibility due to complexity and a certain level of confidentiality of business 
contracts, leading to blurred political accountability.55 The complexity also 
resides in the decentralization within the WWB (municipalities are 
competent for reintegration measures within that scheme) and the 
contracting out of most reintegration services within a competitive market, 
with however partial reversals. The diversity of practices, goals and 
procedures followed by the different actors makes evaluation difficult. The 
occurrence of creaming (selecting unemployed which are easier to 
                                                
53  J. Visser, “Flexibility and Security in Post-Standard Employment Relations: The 
Netherlands”, in K. Stone and H. Arthurs, Rethinking Workplace Regulation. Beyond the 
Standard Contract of Employment, Russel Sage Foundation, New York, 2013, 135, 152. 
54  European Commission, Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2011, 2012 
55  T. Bredgaard, and F. Larsen, “Quasi-markets in Employment Policy: Do They Deliver on 
Promises?”, Social Policy and Society, vol. 7, nº 3, 2008, 341-352; 
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reintegrate) and parking (leaving more problematic unemployed out of the 
programs) following considerations of cost-effectiveness does not help to 
solve the picture. Therefore, research seems to be quite negative about the 
results of the Dutch system of reintegration and concludes to its high costs 
and the very limited effects the changes of the beginning of the century 
(contracting out and changes in WWB reintegration) have had.56  
 
 
4. The German model: the creation of a precarised underclass through 
the combination of assistencialisation and restriction of the notion of 
suitable employment 
 
4.1. A Notion of Suitable Employment Defined Under the Principle of 
Proportionality Limited to Contributory Unemployment Protection 
 
Germany, in the context of the 2010 Agenda and through the well-known 
Hartz-laws, inspired by the Dutch model through a movement of uploading 
and downloading of a model of unemployment protection through the Open 
Method of Coordination in the framework of the European Employment 
Strategy,57 reformed its system of unemployment protection mainly based on 
contributory, wage replacing and status-protecting schemes towards a two-
tier system. Unemployed with sufficient contributory periods have access to 
Arbeitslosengeld I, or ALGI, based on contributory wage replacing benefits, 
whose duration is proportional to previous contributions and limited to one 
year. After expiration of the contributory scheme or in absence of a 
sufficient previous contributory period, unemployed have access to the ALG 
                                                
56  J. van Dijk et alii “Werk is overal, maar niet voor iedereen. Aan de slag met een 
doelmatig arbeidsmarktbeleid”, Report of the Nicis College voor Stedelijke Innovatie, Den 
Haag, 2008, which states that integration is extremely expensive (around half a million 
euro for successful reintegration), while the new system seems only to have bettered 
overall integration chances of benefit recipients by 3 %; M. Hoogenboom, “The 
Netherlands: two tiers for all”, in J. Clasen, and D. Clegg, (eds.), Regulating the Risk of 
Unemployment: National Adaptations to Post-Industrial Labour Markets in Europe, 
OUP, Oxford, 2011, 75-99. 
57  K. Vogler-Ludwig, “Two Years of the Renewed Lisbon Process: Did the European 
Employment Strategy Gain or not?” European Employment Observatory Germany 
Discussion paper, 2007; S. Stiller and M. van Gerven, “The European Employment 
Strategy and National Core Executives: Impacts on activation reforms in the Netherlands 
and Germany”, Journal of European Social Policy, vol. 22, nº 2, 2012, 118-132; S. Stiller 
and M. van Gerven, “The European Employment Strategy and National Core Executives: 
Impacts on activation reforms in the Netherlands and Germany”, Journal of European 




II system, which merged the previous follow-up systems for unemployed 
with the general social assistance schemes. The ALG II-system provides 
means-tested benefits (divided in cash benefits and an allowance for housing 
and heating costs) guaranteeing the constitutionally sanctioned 
Existenzminimum, or basic income. 
Under the contributory system, Arbeitslosengeld I, or ALGI, the concept of 
suitable employment (Zumutbare beschäftigung) is defined under section 
140 of the Sozialgestezbuch III (SGB III), and encompasses “all employment 
corresponding to the abilities” of the worker, in absence of personal or 
general grounds for refusal.  
The law itself defined some of those grounds of refusal (conditions below 
the law or collective agreement; lower salary, with a threshold starting at 
20% of the previous salary and lowering in function of the duration of 
unemployment, with as ultimate threshold the level of unemployment 
benefits itself; is also excludes jobs requiring disproportionate travel time). 
On the other hand, the definition remains open and considers as generally 
unsuitable those jobs which run against the objectives of unemployment 
protection as defined by the law or constitutional rights of unemployed58, or 
when, given the personal circumstances (illness, family, care obligations), 
the acceptance of the job would disproportionally burden the worker.59  
However, section 140 SGB III states explicitly that the fixed-term character 
of employment or the fact that it does not coincide with the qualification of 
the worker does not involve in principle that the job is unreasonable or 
unsuitable, severing thus the link with the previous occupation, and 
transforming occupational protection into a mere decreasing salary threshold 
system.60  
The current legal notion of suitable employment has been only slightly 
altered by the Hartz reforms, except for younger unemployed.61 However, 
                                                
58  For example, the Constitutional Court, in its judgment of 18 November 1986 (1 BvL 
29/83), declared the exclusion of students from benefits contrary to the equality principle, 
given the insurance character of unemployment benefits, and, thus, the fulfillment of the 
same obligations in terms of contribution of unemployed students. 
59  K. Niesel (ed.), SGB III Sozialgesetzbuch Arbeitsforderung – Kommentar, C.H. Beck, 
München, 2002, 336-340. 
60  S. Sell, „Entwicklung und Reform des Arbeitsförderungsgesetzes als Anpassung des 
Sozialrechts an flexible Erwerbsformen? Zur Zumutbarkeit von Arbeit und 
Eigenverantwortung von Arbeitnehmern“, Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt– und 
Berufsforschung, vol 31, n° 3, 1998, 539; I. Dingledey, “Germany: moving towards 
integration whilst maintaining segmentation“ in J. Clasen and D. Clegg, (eds.) Regulating 
the risk of unemployment, OUP, Oxford, 2011, 59. 
61  Within this context, it is interesting to observe that the worker will comply with the 
availability criteria, also when he does not want to accept full-time employment, when 
part-time employment is considered a usual form of employment in the labour market 
corresponding to the unemployed. This enlarges the previous adaptation to persons having 
worked part-time for reasons of care. 
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the Hartz I law (“Erste Gesetz für moderne Dienstleitungen am 
Arbeitsmarkt”), which applied from the 1st of January 2003, reformed and 
fine-tuned the sanction system.62  
Refusal of a suitable job offer or to participate in a labour market integration 
measure is since then sanctioned with a suspension of three weeks the first 
time, 6 weeks the second and 12 weeks the third. A total of 18 weeks 
suspensions, without regards to the different reasons involve the loss of right 
to (contributory) unemployment benefits.63 Another important change has 
been the reversal of the burden of proof for the existence of grounds to 
refuse a job offer or participate in integration measures, which is now to be 
borne by the unemployed, when those grounds are linked to their sphere of 
responsibility. 64  The inspiration for this change was found in the 
jurisprudence, which had assumed that the unemployed carried the burden of 
proof for grounds linked to personal circumstances, circumstances it is easier 
for him to prove than the public employment services.65 
Putting an end to the disproportionate character of the 12 weeks sanction and 
the absence of alternatives would promote the use of sanctions by the 
Bundesagentür für Arbeit, and the reversal of the burden of proof, even if 
linked to seemingly practical considerations, would further the evolution 
towards the individual responsibility of the worker in putting an end to his 
(insured) situation of unemployment. However, research has shown that not 
only those legal changes contributed to an increase in the application of 
sanctions. The Bundesagentür accompanied the reform with new directives66 
which also influenced the increase in sanctions. It has also been showed that 
the latter also depended highly on the resources of the different regional 
branches of the public employment services, as well as the local level of 
unemployment (the less unemployment, the more the sanctions).67  
                                                
62  Within the contributory system, as established by case-law, the foundation of the 
sanctions is grounded on the insurance character of the system, and thus on “the need for 
the community of insured to defend itself against risks for which the insured is himself 
responsible or in the remedy of which he does not participates”. Therefore a suspension of 
benefits has to be imposed “when the insured, taking into account all the circumstance of 
the individual case and striking the balance between his interests and the interests of the 
community of insured, if another behavior of the insured can be expected”.  Davilla, S., 
Die Eigenverantwortung im SGB III und SGB II, Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 2011, 243. 
63  § 159 Sozialgestezbuch III. 
64  § 159 (1) 2nd paragraph Sozialgestezbuch III. 
65  K.-U. Müller and F. Oschmiansky, „Die Sanktionspolitik der Arbeitsagenturen nach den 
„Hart“-Reformen. Analyse der Wirkungen des „Ersten Gesetzes für moderne 
Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt“, WZB discussion paper, August 2006, 6. 
66  Rundbrief 55/03 zur Bewerbaktivierung. 
67  K.-U. Müller and F. Oschmiansky, „Die Sanktionspolitik der Arbeitsagenturen nach den 
„Hartz“-Reformen. Analyse der Wirkungen des „Ersten Gesetzes für moderne 
Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt“, WZB discussion paper, August 2006. 
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In 2012, 734.557 sanctions were imposed, with only 7.632 leading to the 
total loss of benefits. 24,6% were related to the fact that the loss of 
employment was attributable to the worker (which, as already said, does not 
lead to the loss of the right of benefits, but only to a sanction), 3,8% for 
refusal of a suitable job, 1,6% for insufficient efforts in the job search, 1,7 % 
for the refusal or the interruption of an integration measure (orientation, 
training,…), 33,3% for failure of showing up at an appointment with the 
PES, and 35% for late inscription as jobseeker.68 
Those figures show, like in the Spanish system, that the refusal of a suitable 
job offer is not to be found as an important feature of conflictiveness in 
reintegration by unemployed in the labour market. However, it should not be 
forgotten that the threat of sanctions has in itself a disciplinary effect, for 
which it is difficult to analyse with precision the influence of the notion of 
suitable employment on unemployed accepting precarious jobs. 
However, an important element in our analysis, and also the most important 
feature of the Hartz reforms has been the reorganization of the different 
schemes of unemployment protection in an integrated two-tier system, 
consisting of the previously commented contributory ALG I, limited to one 
year, after which unemployed fall into the means-tested ALG II system 
where unemployed which are able to work perceive social assistance 
benefits guaranteeing the Existenzminimum, or basic income. The latter 
system is also open to unemployed not qualifying for the the ALG I system 
because of too short or the absence of contribution periods. Contrary to the 
ALG I system, where integration contracts are not compulsory, and proposed 
on an individual basis by the PES, all unemployed under ALG II have to 
“agree” on an integration contract. 
The configuration of ALG II as a general scheme for unemployed also 
involves the obligation to accept a suitable job. However, the content of the 
notion is different as in the case of ALG I, and has a separate definition in 
the SGB II. 
§ 10 of the new SGB II is built on the principle that all jobs are suitable to 
persons which are able to work, before containing the following exceptions: 
if the worker is not physically, intellectually or mentally in position to 
perform the work, if the new job would difficult the finding of a job 
corresponding to the previous job, but only given the special physical 
requirements of the previous job, if the job would jeopardize the education 
of the children of the household, in the absence of available day care 
facilities, if it would be incompatible with the exercise of care of one or a 
                                                




family member which cannot be ensured by other means, or any other 
special serious ground. 
§ 10 (2) SGB II then gives a list of jobs which cannot be considered as 
unsuitable in se, and which will thus require one of the previous conditions 
for the unemployed to have the right to refuse: employment which does not 
correspond to qualifications for which the unemployed has been trained or 
for which she has previously been employed; a job which, taking into 
account the education/training of the unemployed, has to be considered as 
inferior; when the workplace is further than the previous workplace or place 
of training/education; a job with working conditions inferior to the previous 
work; if it involves the termination of current employment, except if the 
need for benefits might be ended by the new job.  
 
 
4.2. Assistencialisation, suppression of suitable employment and 
precarious employment as reintegration measures 
 
The limitation of the contributory system to one year and the disappearance 
of a notion of suitable employment within the context of ALG II brings us to 
focus the attention on the latter scheme. 
The relation between the ALG II holder and the administration is strongly 
asymmetrical and characterized by an important dependency of the former 
from the latter.69 Obligations are vaguely described (the law does not define 
the obligations nor the modalities of the “activation”) and are thus 
unilaterally defined by the administration. It is also important to note that 
appeals against decisions are not suspensive. Moreover in case of discretion 
of the administration, the courts can only annul a decision in case of error, 
and the decision of the Court has no substitutive effect, in the sense that it 
only compels the administration to take a new decision70. 
Also, if no integration contract is signed, it can be replaced by an 
administrative act (and accompanied with a sanction of decrease of 30% of 
benefits). Asymmetry manifests itself also in remedies of non-compliance: 
while non-compliance by the unemployed is (automatically) sanctioned by 
the administration (consisting in a “retention” of the obligation of the 
administration, which is payment of benefits) the contrary can only be 
remedied through court action. 
Sanctions have to be applied automatically when there is no justified ground 
for the behavior of the unemployed contrary to his integration contract or the 
                                                
69  K.J. Bieback,“Kooperation im Zwangsverhäaltnis. Teilhaberechte und Vertragsstrukturen 
in der Arbeitsmarktverwaltung“, Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie, n° 30, 2009, 190. 
70  A. Gagel, Kommentar SGB III – Arbeitsforderung: mit SGB II: Grundsicherung für 
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law,71 which, above all for unemployed less than 24 years old, for which the 
only sanction is the scrapping of benefits, is generally seen as 
disproportionate.72 
Finally it should also be noted that the Hartz IV reform, while increasing 
activation of social assistance benefit recipients, also meant an extension of 
coverage of the scheme (activation measures and benefits), not only to 
persons within the formerly less activating social assistance system, but also 
to persons formerly considered as incapable to work, persons in training or 
education, or persons which did not enter into account for the scheme, 
mostly members of the household of benefit holders. This resulted in an 
important shift of the social insurance state based on status protection 
towards a more universalist (better coverage) social protection system, with 
the integration in a more active system with more visible needy persons, but 
with lower benefits for those who previously entered in the two wage-related 
unemployment protection systems.73   
When looking at the link between suitable employment and precarious work, 
two elements considered as “integration measures” of ALG II should be 
taken into account.  
The first is the so-called “minijobs”, which would not be accepted as 
suitable employment under ALG I, because they do not give entitlement to 
social security benefits, but which in the ALG II system can even be 
combined to a certain extent with benefits. 
This form of marginal part-time work, which had always been present, but 
sensibly grew within certain parts of the service sector, mainly due to their 
exemption from income taxes and social insurance contributions to a certain 
level (450€ per month). Therefore, in 2012, around 1.300.000 persons 
combined income from work (which however does not give rise to social 
security rights) and benefits. 74  While those contracts were originally 
designed for persons, like housewives and students, who did not depend on 
their work to have access to social security, mainly because of the 
importance of the breadwinner model, during the 2000s they started to be an 
important source of precarious employment, to be considered as not only 
with higher in-work commodifying value, due to the flexibility of their 
arrangements and the consequent power of the employer over the life 
                                                
71  K.-J., Bieback,“Kooperation im Zwangsverhäaltnis. Teilhaberechte und 
Vertragsstrukturen in der Arbeitsmarktverwaltung“, Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie, n° 
30, 2009, 197. 
72  Eicher/Spellbrink-Rixen 2008 § 31 Rz. 53 Kommentar SGB II. 
73  R. Konle-Seidl, “Changes in the governance of employment services in Germany since 
2003”, IAB discussion paper, nº 10/2008, 
https://www.econstor.eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/32752/1/608382280.pdf 
74  W. Eichhorst, “The unexpected appearance of a New German Model”, IZA Discussion 
Paper, nº 6625, 2012, 17. 
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organization of the worker, but also with a spill-over effect on entitlement to 
social security benefits. Generally seen, in 2012, 12,6% of part-time work is 
involuntary (the worker actually wants to work more hours), which is the 
same level as 2004, a level which slightly grew with the beginning of the 
crisis.75 Concerning the relation between part-time work and unemployment, 
research has shown that over a period of 5 years, around 20% of part-timers 
end up in (total) unemployment, a percentage that rose to 29% in the case of 
marginal employment. 76  Those workers also generally end within the 
assistance scheme, as they have no access to contributory unemployment 
protection for lack of social contributions. 
Another source of precarisation are the so-called 1-euro-jobs. Those are 
employment opportunities that provide 1 to 2 euro per hour worked on the 
basis of 30 hours per week for six to nine months in addition to full benefits, 
reserved to ALG II holders, and have replaced the direct job creation 
schemes providing for regular jobs at collective agreement level wages 
qualifying for social security.77 While they have been found to have positive 
effects in terms of employability and reintegration chances, above all for 
women and long-term unemployed, research points towards the substitution 
effects of those measures for the following reasons. The public interest 
character of the jobs is in most cases quite relative, or not sufficiently 
controlled, which led to an important number of unemployed within those 
jobs (316.000 in August 2010). Moreover, the competitive advantages which 
they involved for the employers participating in the scheme, did not lead to 
job creation, quite to the contrary: important substitution effects were 
observed, for which it can be concluded that those jobs displaced normal 
employment submitted to social contributions.78  
In 2011, around 45% of the working-age population had a standard contract, 
11% part-time workers, 6% on fixed-term contracts, 2% in agency work, 4% 
in marginal jobs (mostly minijobs) 7% were self-employed, 1,5% 
unemployed with a job, 6% unemployed and 21% inactive. 61,7% of the 
active, employed workforce has thus a standard contract. While in 1992, the 
proportion of standard contracts was roughly the same (45% of total 
working-age population, but 66,1% of employed population), it declined 
over the years but recuperated between 2007 and 2011) and the percentage 
                                                
75  OECD, online statistics database, Incidence of Involuntary Part Time Workers, 2014. 
76  K. Schulze Buschoff, P. Protsch, “(A-)typical and (in-) secure? Social protection and 
“non-standard” forms of employment in Europe, International Social Security Review, 
vol. 61, nº 4, 2008, 57. 
77  B. Ebbinghaus, W. Eichorst, “Distribution of Responsibility for Social Security and 
Labour Market Policy. Country Report: Germany”, Amsterdam Institute for Advanced 
Labour Market Studies Working Paper, nº 97/52, 2007, 46. 
78  S. Davilla, Die Eigenverantwortung im SGB III und SGB II, Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 2011, 
198-199. 
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of inactive population was 26%, the bulk of employment increase in the last 
20 years has been in atypical contracts.79 However, if the labour market is 
increasingly segmented, the change over the last 30 years has not been 
radical. 
But segmentation of the labour market traduced mainly into wage inequality 
and growing low pay sector (20% overall, and 30% for women), due 
amongst other to the wage gap atypical employment involved.80 This might 
be one of the reasons why the current debate about re-regulation of the 
labour market has been centered on the wage component, and mainly the 
introduction of statutory minimum wage. 
Finally, the shortening of the reference period to assess the right to 
contributory unemployment benefits introduced by the Hartz reforms from 3 
to 2 years penalizes temporary employment. This is also the reason why a 
transitory measure has been introduced (and extended to the end of 2014), 
and will involve that higher numbers of unemployed formerly in temporary 
contracts will pass directly, or rapidly into ALG II, with higher negative 
activation and less access to genuine measures reinforcing their 
employability. 
 
Evolution of unemployment in contributory and non-contributory 
unemployment protection schemes in Germany (2004-2015) 
Source: own elaboration from OCED online database 2018 (participant stock on LMP) 
                                                
79  W. Eichhorst, V. Tobsch, “Has atypical work become typical in Germany? Country case 
studies on labour market segmentation”, SOEPpaper on Multidisciplinary Panel Data 
Research, nº 596, 2013 
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The liberalization of atypical employment, at the margins of the labour 
market, combined with an increase of the service sector, the adaptation of 
market actors to the flexibilisation of some contracts (hostelry and care 
institution incorporated greatly the minijobs within their employment 
structure, for example) the relative shrinkage of the scope of collective 
bargaining and company-level practices have permitted the appearance of a 
constellation of more, but more unequal employment forms, perjudicating 
above all low-skilled workers.81 
Within this context, it is not surprising that ALG II is ever more associated 
with the phenomenon of “circular mobility”. For example, between 
September 2011 and August 2012, 1,97 million unemployed under ALG II 
reintegrated the labour market, but 1,76 million people entered the scheme, 
half of which had already left ALG II within those same twelve months.82 
This has brought some authors to conclude that through processes of 
precarisation and stigmatization, the ALG II negative activation system has 
created a new form of “underclass” moving between precarious employment 
and precarious social protection.83 
  
 
5. Suitable employment and protection in case of unemployment under 
a multilevel fundamental social rights framework 
 
5.1. Dignity, the right to social security, the right to work and 
employability 
 
5.1.1. ILO conventions as expression of the right to social security 
 
One of the first ILO Convention one thinks about when speaking about 
unemployment would be the 1952 ILO Convention n° 102 concerning 
minimum standards on social security.  On the one hand, it has been 
designed with the purpose to promote and guide the incipient construction of 
the post-war social security systems, by extending coverage and 
contingencies, promoting adequate benefits, loosening the tie between 
contributions and benefits and unifying the systems. On the other, it would 
serve as a framework for new and more specialized Conventions. Both 
                                                
81  W. Eichhorst, V. Tobsch, “Has atypical work become typical in Germany? Country case 
studies on labour market segmentation”, SOEPpaper on Multidisciplinary Panel Data 
Research, nº 596, 2013; B. Palier, and K. Thelen, “Institutionalizing Dualism: 
Complementarities and Change in France and Germany”, Politics & Society, vol. 38, nº 1. 
82  K. Dörre, „Bewährungsproben für die Untersicht – Soziale Wirkungen aktivierender 
Arbeitsmarktpolitik“, forum arbeit, 3/2013, 7.  
83  Ibidem. 
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objectives have to be seen within the broader goal of preventing competition 
on basis of labour costs84.  
Part IV of Convention 102 concerns unemployment, and has been ratified by 
a great number of EU Countries85. It defines the unemployment contingency 
as “suspensions of earnings, as defined by national laws or regulations, due 
to inability to obtain suitable employment in the case of a person protected 
who is capable of, and available for, work”.  
An important element of the protection is the idea of absence of suitable 
work. To help interpreting this concept, recourse has to be made to ILO 
Convention 44, which defines more concretely the notion, also in the context 
of allowing suspension of benefits for an adequate period in case of refusal 
of a suitable employment, and also ILO Recommendation 67 on Income 
Security. 
In this context, work shall be considered as not suitable when its acceptance 
involves new residence without adequate accommodation, lower wages or 
work conditions, or at least lower than those fixed by collective agreements 
were applicable. Also, an occupation which is a priori suitable can be 
refused, if the refusal is not unreasonable, giving all considerations involved, 
including the personal circumstance of the unemployed. Have to be taken 
into account the length in the previous occupation, the chances of obtaining 
work in the same occupation, vocational training and suitability for work of 
the unemployed. Finally, after a period considered reasonable, giving the 
circumstance of the case, the suitability can be interpreted more broadly, and 
can, under certain conditions, involve change of residence or less favourable 
working conditions86.  
It is important to observe that during the drafting of the Convention, the ILO 
Office made clear (already in 1951) that the main requirement of an effective 
unemployment system are efficient employment services, facilities for 
retraining and a general programme of full employment, three elements 
without which unemployment cannot be controlled and its duration 
shortened.87 This should be seen as a link between the notion of suitable 
work and the availability of support for the unemployed for a meaningful or 
durable reintegration in the labour market. The absence or insufficient 
character of the support the unemployed receives in his reintegration 
trajectory should thus be taken into account when assessing her obligation to 
                                                
84  T. Dijkhof, International Social Security Standards in the European Union. The Cases oft 
he Czech republic and Estonia, Intersentia, 2011, 4. 
85  Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK.  
86  T. Dijkhof, International Social Security Standards in the European Union. The Cases of 
the Czech republic and Estonia, Intersentia, 2011, 65-66. 
87  T. Dijkhof, International Social Security Standards in the European Union. The Cases oft 
he Czech republic and Estonia, Intersentia, 2011, 69. 
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accept jobs which would represent an occupational degradation. On a 
broader level, it links the obligation of the unemployed with the obligation 
of the State in terms of support measures, for a conceptualisation of the latter 
as a right of the unemployed. 
In this respect, it is also important to mention Convention 168, which, 
however still not having been ratified by a lot of countries, ties full 
employment policies more tightly to unemployment protection. One the one 
hand it obliges the signatories to consider a priority a policy designed to 
promote, full, productive, and freely chosen employment by all appropriate 
means, and cite explicitly amongst those means employment services, 
vocational training, and vocational guidance above all amongst categories of 
persons liable to have difficulties in finding lasting employment (art. 7 and 
8). 
The Convention uses a lot of the same categories and concepts as 
Convention 102, but fixes higher standards (85% of employees to be 
covered, 50% of previous salary or, in case of non-salary related benefits, 
the highest amongst three minimum thresholds: 50% of minimum wage, 
50% of the wage of an ordinary labourer, or the minimum essential for basic 
living expenses, minimum period of 26 weeks per spell of unemployment or 
39 weeks over a period of 24 months). It includes also temporary 
unemployment in case of suspension of contracts within the contingencies. 
Benefits can be refused, suspended, reduced or ended in case of voluntary 
unemployment, refusal of suitable employment or, which is new, “when the 
person concerned has failed without just cause to use the facilities available 
for placement, vocational guidance, training, retraining or redeployment in 
suitable work“.  
According to the Committee of Experts of the ILO, the social goal the notion 
of suitable employment as an ILO standard fulfils is to preserve workers 
“against compulsion to accept work below their level of education and 
skills”. Within that perspective, it could be said to have no direct connection 
with the precarious character of the jobs to be accepted, as long as those jobs 
correspond to the skills of the workers. On the other hand, the Committee of 
Experts states clearly that “unemployment benefits should not be used as an 
instrument for channelling unemployed persons into any available jobs 
under the threat of having no income at all, which would completely 
undermine the nature and purpose of unemployment benefit as considered by 
ILO standards. The Committee considers that treating all workers as 
ordinary labourers who should only be physically and mentally fit for the job 
they are offered, leads to commodification of the labour market and negation 
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of the principle that “labour is not a commodity” enshrined in the 
Declaration of Philadelphia”88 
It should also not be forgotten that the broadening, and after a period of time, 
disappearance of the notion of suitable employment in function of the 
duration of unemployment has to be seen in parallel with the negative 
activation function of the limited duration or the degradation in benefits, 
constituting thus a double degradation (and thus affection of the dignity) 
which the unemployed has to suffer. Therefore, the notion of suitable 
employment has to be interpreted within the context of proportionality. 
Within that framework, the widening of the notion of suitability in function 
of time constitutes a restriction of the fundamental right to dignity. 
Therefore, the “degradation”, compared to the qualifications, previous 
employment and expressed choices of the unemployed should answer a 
legitimate goal, no other measures should be available (like retraining or the 
existence of other jobseekers for whom the job would not signify such a 
degradation) and a proper balance has to be stroke between the interests of 
the unemployed and those of the state, or community of insured. 
Within this context, the automatic disappearance of the limits to the 
employment which an unemployed has to accept within the Dutch and 
German means-tested systems, should not be considered as acceptable. In 
those models, there is an ever greater proportion of workers under atypical 
contracts who end more rapidly within means-tested schemes which involve 
the obligation to accept any (legal) job. Those workers do not have the same 
rights in terms of refusing unsuitable employment as workers with the right 
to longer periods under the systems of contributory unemployment benefits. 
Degradation operates thus more rapidly, but not in function of the time in 
which those workers have been unemployed, but merely under their falling 
within a different protection scheme. Those cases should thus be considered 
to be unacceptable, above all when taking into account the cases of “circular 
mobility” observed in those cases. 
One could object to such a vision by stating that, under the international 
social rights instruments analyzed, the application of the notion of suitable 
employment as a limit to the obligatory reintegration of unemployed within 
the labour market is limited to the scope of the obligation of the Contracting 
Parties to provide unemployment protection schemes (being mainly limited 
contributory schemes with minimal coverage), and this scope does not 
extend to the follow-up means-tested schemes of social assistance or ALG 
II.  
                                                
88  Committee of Experts of the ILO, “General survey concerning social security instruments 
in light of the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization”, Report of the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Report 
III (Part 1B), 100th session of the ILO, 2011, 210. 
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However, a justified answer to that objection could be rooted in the human 
right to social security. Its conceptualization as a fundamental human right, 
for example through the interpretation of the UN Committee of Social, 
Economic and Cultural rights, involves the existence of some core elements 
as the minimal content of the obligation of the state:89 
-­‐ Adequate benefits ensuring  the right to family protection, an 
adequate (or dignified) standard of living  and the right to health 
-­‐ Coverage of all risks and contingencies associated with the inability 
to realise social, economic and cultural rights (to which one could 
add the realization of individual fundamental rights) 
-­‐ Affordable contributions in case of social insurance 
-­‐ Non-discrimination in the guaranteeing of social rights 
As such, the right to social security is to be defined in terms of an obligation 
of the state to provide protection against social risks. It is the existence of a 
risk in which the right is rooted, which means that it is the occurrence of a 
risk which actions the right to protection. This implies an important 
connection between the reality faced by individuals and the legal framework 
which has to take into account that reality. 
It also involves that the definition of the scope of social security does not 
depend on the characteristics of the programs and policies, but the risks 
which those programs cover. It is one of the reasons for which, for example, 
the private character of some insurance programs does not automatically 
exclude them from the scope of social security, 90  or that qualifying 
unemployment protection schemes as insurance based, tax-based, with 
means-tested benefits or wage-replacement benefits does not exclude them 
from the scope of the right, or the obligation to provide social security.91  
                                                
89  W. Langford, “Social Security and Implications for Law, Policy and Practice”, in Riedel, 
E., (ed.) Social Security as a Human Right: Drafting a General comment on Article 9 
ICESCR. Some challenges, Springer, Berlin, 2007, 29-53. 
90  D. Pieters, Social Security: An Introduction to the Basic Principles, Kluwer Law 
International, Alphen aan de Rijn, 2006, 3-4; U. Becker, “Privatization and Activation: 
Analysis”, in U. Becker and F. Pennings, (eds.) International Standard-Setting and 
Innovations in Social Security, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan de Rijn, 2013, 386. 
91  This is for example also the stance of ILO Conventions on unemployment protection, like 
Convention 102, which provides for both systems, contributory or tax-based, as systems 
of protection against unemployment. Also, entitlement to social protection benefits is 
considered by the ECtHR as a right protected (as “possession”) independently of the 
involvement of the claimant in the (economic) constitution of the right. The right to social 
security under the ECHR (even if limited as a right to possession of benefits) shares also 
an integrated view of social security, centred on the risk to be protected, however limited 
to the right of access to existing systems. 
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In that line, the European Committee of Social Rights seems to take into 
account the German system of ALG II (assistance benefits) as part of social 
security for unemployed.92 
Within such a framework, the disappearance of the notion of suitable 
employment as a limit to precarious reintegration of unemployed in the 
labour market applying solely for the reason that those unemployed are not 
able to access a more protective system, in some cases even because the 
activation measures under the means-tested system forced them to take up 
employment not permitting them to qualify for the more protective system 
(“circular mobility” phenomenon or precariousness trap), should not be 
justified under the fundamental right to social security.  
This seems also to be the vision of the Committee of Experts of the ILO, 
which considers that a policy disregarding the notion of suitable employment 
for long-term unemployed, obliged to accept any job offered, would not be 
compatible with Convention 168, “since this instrument does not permit any 
trade-off between the suitability of employment and the duration of the 
benefit, where provision of longer benefit may be conditioned by the 
acceptance of less suitable jobs”. The distinction operated by Convention 
168 between short-term and long-term unemployment involves not the 
possibilities for states to introduce stricter benefit conditions, but the 
obligation to provide unemployed with additional assistance in finding 
suitable employment.93  
It should also be said that the obligation of unemployed falling into the 
means-tested schemes to accept any jobs, could also be analysed under the 
framework of unequal treatment. Within this perspective, could it be 
considered as justified that some unemployed, for the only reason of falling 
under that scheme, are deprived from any protection as to the form of their 







                                                
92  European Committee of Social Rights, Conclusions XX-2 (2013) (Germany), 18, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Conclusions/State/GermanyXX2_en.p
df 
93  Committee of Experts of the ILO, “General survey concerning social security instruments 
in light of the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization”, Report of the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Report 
III (Part 1B), 100th session of the ILO, 2011, 209. 
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5.1.2. The approach of the European Social Charter: the right to work 
 
The right to work as an individual right 
When constructing the notion of suitable employment under a fundamental 
social right perspective, attention should also be given to the European 
Social Charter. Article 12 of the Charter contains the obligation of the 
Parties to maintain a system of social security at least at the level of ILO 
Convention 102 and to progressively raise its level. This links the Charter 
clearly with the ILO framework on Social Security.  
Concerning suitable work as a sanctionable obligation of unemployed, the 
European Committee of Social Rights has also generally accepted the 
evolution towards negative activation measures (sanctions), considering 
however that the conditions to which the payment of unemployment benefits 
is subjected, including any obligations to take up offered employment, 
should be assessed under Article 12-1 of the Charter (or Article 12-3 in the 
case of new developments) or, in certain cases, in case of loss of 
unemployment benefits due to refusal of employment, under article 1-2, 
considering the possible violation of freedom the right to freedom of work. 
A Statement of Interpretation concerning this subject has been reiterated in 
the General Introduction to the 2012 Conclusions.94 More generally, the 
                                                
94  Article 1-2: requirement to accept the offer of a job or training or otherwise lose 
unemployment benefit 
The requirement for persons claiming unemployment benefit to accept the offer of a job 
or training or otherwise no longer be entitled to unemployment benefit should be dealt 
with under Article 12-1. However, the Committee takes due account of the Guide to the 
concept of suitable employment in the context of unemployment benefit drawn up by the 
Committee of Experts on Social Security of the Council of Europe at its 4th meeting, held 
in Strasbourg from 24 to 26 March 2009, and holds that the loss of benefit or assistance 
when an unemployed person rejects a job offer may constitute a restriction on freedom to 
work where the person concerned is compelled, on pain of losing benefit, to accept any 
job, notably a job: 
•which only requires qualifications or skills far below those of the individual concerned; 
•which pays well below the individual’s previous salary; 
•which requires a particular level of physical or mental health or ability, which the person 
does not possess at the relevant time; 
•which is not compatible with occupational health and safety legislation or, where these 
exist, with local agreements or collective employment agreements covering the sector or 
occupation concerned and therefore may affect the physical and mental integrity of the 
worker concerned; 
•for which the pay offered is lower than the national or regional minimum wage or, where 
one exists, the norm or wage scale agreed on for the sector or occupation concerned, or 
where it is lower, to an unreasonable extent, than all of the unemployment benefits paid to 
the person concerned at the relevant time and therefore 
fails to ensure a decent standard of living for the worker and his/her family; 
•which is proposed as the result of a current labour dispute; 
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Committee has also analysed negative activation measures under articles 12 
and 13 of the Charter taking into account the following elements: the 
measure has to be reasonable and consistent with the objective of providing 
a long-lasting solution to the problem of deprivation experienced by the 
individual (this was developed in the framework of article 13 – social 
assistance, but could be applied within the broader framework of 
unemployment protection, insisting on the long-lasting character of the 
return to work), account has to be taken of the number of persons adversely 
affected by the measures, the existence of reasons to refuse work, the extent 
of the reductions of benefits, the purpose of the conditionality, and the 
means which are given to the services to monitor case-studies.95 
The approach of the Committee shows the important connection of the idea 
of suitable employment with the right to work. 
The right to work is one of the economic and social rights which present the 
most difficulties not only as to its content but also as to its realization.  
Firstly, it has a vague character which gives rise to diversity of meanings and 
interpretations. Not only from a theoretical point of view, which make it 
sometimes viewed as having an inferior status among the already 
(erroneously) criticized vague character of social rights. In this sense, it 
poses the difficult questions of its situation between the right to being idle 
and exploitation within the labour market, inclusion or exclusion of non-paid 
form of works or care, generally heavily gender-related, or its implication 
for and its interchangeability with the right to a basic income.96   
                                                                                                              
•which is located at a distance from the home of the person concerned which can be 
deemed unreasonable in view of the necessary travelling time, the transport facilities 
available, the total time spent away from home, 
the customary working arrangements in the person’s chosen occupation or the person’s 
family obligations (and in the latter case, provided that these obligations did not pose any 
problem in the person’s previous employment); 
•which requires persons with family responsibilities to change their place of residence, 
unless it can be proved that these responsibilities can be properly assumed in the new 
place of residence, that suitable housing is available and that, if the situation of the person 
so requires, a contribution to the costs of removal is available, either from the 
employment services or from the new employer, so respecting the worker’s right to 
family life and housing. 
In all cases in which the relevant authorities decide on the permanent withdrawal or 
temporary suspension of unemployment benefit because the recipient has rejected a job 
offer, this decision must be open to review by the courts in accordance with the rules and 
procedures established under the legislation of the State which took the decision. 
95  J. Tooze, “Social Security and Social Assistance”, in J. Kenner and T. Hervey, (eds.), 
Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2003, 190. 
96  G. Mundlak, “The Right to Work – The Value of Work” in D. Barak-Erez and A. Gross 
(eds), Exploring social rights: Between theory and practice, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2007, 342. 
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The right to work is often implying an obligation for the states to implement 
policies aimed at attaining full employment. According to the Committee of 
Social Rights, “if a state at any time abandoned the objective of full 
employment in favour of an economic system providing for a permanent 
pool of unemployed, it would be infringing the social charter”97. Seen in this 
light, one could sustain that the obligation to aim at full employment seems 
to have been forsaken by many a country, even if not overtly, by abandoning 
any link between protection against unemployment and demand-side 
policies, and focusing mainly on activation and other supply-side policies to 
“create” employment. This stance should be seen as implicitly accepting the 
neoliberal and human-debasing theories about the “natural rate of 
unemployment” or the necessity to maintain a “reserve army” as numerous 
as possible for markets to function optimally, without regards for moral 
implication or consequences on society.   
Moreover, the European Committee of Social Rights has furthered itself 
from the idea of full employment, by deciding in 1984 not to review the 
compliance of states with the goal of full employment, but only the measures 
taken to achieve that goal.  
From the perspective of legal instruments, those practical difficulties are 
enhanced by the different positions and content of the right in the 
constitutional and international rights instruments incorporating it. The right 
to work within the EU charter, let alone within the general EU legal 
framework, with its highly marked individual and commodified character, 
does not correspond at all with the right to work as framed within the 
International Covenant on Social, Economic Rights, or the European Social 
Charter. 
The European Social Charter for example encompasses a broad spectrum of 
rights and obligations within the concept of the right to work, from the 
obligation or rather responsibility of the state to provide work to the right to 
non-discrimination in the access to work, the prohibition of forced labour, 
the freedom to choose one’s occupation and the right to vocational training 
and job placement (articles 1, 9, 10 and 15 of the ESC).  
On the other hand, article 15 of the CFUE seems to define the right to work 
mainly in terms of the freedom to pursue one´s business or engage into 
work, moreover within the context of the right to free movement, as 
confirmed by the jurisprudence referred to in the Explanations.98 The latter 
do not connect article 15 CFRUE with article 1-1 ESC, but rather with 
article 1-2, apparently excluding interpretation of the CFRUE´s right to work 
in terms of obligation for the states to ensure employment for all.  This 
                                                
97  European Committee of Social rights, Conclusions I, 1969-70, 14. 
98  D. Ashiagbor, “The Right to Work”, in G. De Búrca and B. de Witte (eds.), Social Rights 
in Europe, Oxford, 2005, 243-244. 
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inscribes itself within a legal framework which, even in terms of creation of 
employment, put the market as the main, and almost sole responsible for the 
fulfilment of the main possibility to effectively exercises that freedom.99  
Another problematic aspect of this right is that it could even be said to be 
“dangerous”. At a theoretical level, it has been criticized for inducing people 
into exploitation through the employment relation, amongst other 
“techniques” through interpreting it as implying a duty to work in 
disguise, 100  certainly when coupled with the activation aspects of new 
welfare state models. Combined with the interpretation of the right to work 
as paid work, or commodified work, this has also effects on the capacity to 
care and its gender-related consequences.  
There is here, however, a problem of logical interpretation of the content of 
fundamental rights. Fundamental rights should not imply enforceable 
correlated duties to the owner of the right, other than within the context of 
the balance with other fundamental rights in case of conflict. Or it could be 
said that duties associated with some fundamental rights, find their origin 
more in the idea of solidarity than the core content of the right itself. 
But even if the duty to work could be connected to the idea of solidarity, this 
would be in a negative way, in the sense that there is a duty not to depend on 
solidarity when one does not have to, lowering as such the possibilities or 
extent of access to solidarity to those who really need it. But this leaves the 
question open to who needs solidarity and who does not. And as solidarity is 
not in itself a right or a fundamental right, but more a value, a social norm, 
or a broader category of rights (see for example the “solidarity rights” of the 
EUCFR), from a legal perspective this question has to be resolved taking 
fundamental rights into account, amongst which the right to work, which 
cannot be done when that right is also read as a duty.  
As shown in the German context, the right to work contained in article 12 of 
the Basic Law, framed as the right to freely choose an occupation which one 
can value and which can secure one’s means of existence, not only can be 
framed as legitimating protection against unemployment as a means to 
guarantee that right, but can also theoretically serve as a limit to work-first 
measures, or the degradation of the notion of suitable employment. Dutch 
jurisprudence has also indirectly interpreted article 4 of the ECHR 
(prohibition of slavery and forced labour) along the same lines in the case of 
obligatory participation in work-first projects, so as to strike down the 
imposition of work-first measures which were not proved to contribute to the 
meaningful reintegration of the concerned unemployed. 
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Therefore, the freedom of choice of occupation (enshrined in article 6 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, but also 
article 1-2 of the European Social Charter, or article 15.1 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union) should function as a limit to the 
degradation of suitability. It would imply that someone would not be free if 
he or she had to enter into an occupation he or she reasonably does not want, 
under the pressure of need. Moreover, the principle of dignity would also 
constitute a limit to that degradation, in the sense that a job which would 
prevent or seriously impede the personal development of someone, taking 
into account his qualifications and capabilities, should not be considered as 
suitable.101 The principle of dignity should thus also constitute a limit to the 
degradation involved by the enlargement of the criteria of suitability of a job 
in function of the duration of unemployment, taking into account the 
conditions of the labour market. A job which would prevent or seriously 
impede the personal development of someone, given his qualifications and 
capabilities, should never be considered as suitable. 
 
The right to work as an obligation of the state 
To come back to the obligation of states, under international social security 
standards, to provide assistance to unemployed to take up suitable 
employment, reference should again be made to the right to work, under its 
programmatic aspect.  Within the context of the European Social Charter, 
despite the abandonment of a direct assessment of full employment policies 
under the right to work, the European Committee of Social Rights still gives 
some meaningful positive content to that right, which is important within the 
context of activation.102 In 1999, the monitoring procedure of the European 
Social Charter in respect of article 1-1 was “restarted”, based on an 
assessment of the balance between several indicators like economic 
performance, employment rate, unemployment, labour policy, also with 
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attention to measures destined to the categories most affected by 
unemployment, as well as long-term unemployment103. Concerning labour 
market policy, the Committee seems to have narrowed its approach to only 
taking ALMPs into account, as most cases of non-compliance (in the 2012 
“round”) are now related to insufficient or ineffective ALMPs.104 On the one 
hand the Committee assesses the employment situation, generally in terms of 
unemployment and employment rates compared with economic growth. On 
the other hand, it assesses broadly the adequacy of employment policy, 
generally interpreted in terms of measures of active labour market policies 
compared to rate of unemployment and economic growth, with sometimes 
special attention to long-term unemployed as well as youth. 
An interesting feature of the interpretation by the Committee is that for EU 
countries, the rate of access of unemployed to ALMPs as well as spending 
on ALMP´s are compared with the EU average, taking EURSOTAT as a 
source, and the country is found to be in non-compliance when it is below 
that average.105  This should also be read taking into account General 
Comment 18 of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, which considers as a violation of the right to work of article 6 of the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, amongst others, “the 
failure to  adopt or implement a national employment policy designed to 
ensure the right to work for everyone; insufficient expenditure or 
misallocation of public funds which results in the non-enjoyment of the right 
to work by individuals or groups”.106 
It centres also on sufficient training for long-term unemployed, or access of 
unemployed to ALMPs in a context of rise of unemployment despite 
economic growth.107 There is thus a clear connection between the right to 
work and the right to vocational training. It is also important to note that, for 
Spain, the Committee reserved its 2012 conclusions, observing that more 
than 55% of unemployed had access to ALMPs, but wanted more 
information of the type of ALMPs unemployed had access to. Well now, a 
brief look at the online EUROSTAT database could have shown the 
Committee that almost 70% of unemployed having access to ALMPs in 
reality have access to what EURSOTAT calls “employment incentives” i.e., 
as our Spanish case study has shown, mainly decreased social security 
contributions in favour of the employer without sufficient conditions related 
to employment creation. Only 13% had access to training in 2010, and less 
than 3,4% had access to “labour market services” i.e. orientation and 
                                                
103 M. Mikkola, Social Human Rights of Europe, Karelactio, Porvoo, 2010, 138-146. 
104 Conclusions 2012 – Slovak Republic, Turkey, Bulgaria Georgia. 
105 Conclusions 2012 – Italy – Article 1-1. 
106 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment Nº 18 The Right 
to Work, 24 November 2005, E/C12/GC/18, point 36. 
107 European Committee of Social Rights, Conclusions 2012 - Slovak Republic - Article 1-1. 
 66 
placement. Within this respect, it could be concluded that, at least in 2010, 
Spain violated the right to work of article 1-1 of the ESC, as interpreted by 
the Committee of Social Rights. 
This approach connects again with the view of the ILO Committee of 
Experts on the purpose of unemployment protection under ILO Standards, 
exposed here above, under which the idea of suitable employment involves 
the obligation of the states to provide additional assistance to long-term 
unemployed to find acceptable employment. From this point of view, there 
is a clear link between suitable employment as a limit to the obligation of 
unemployed to reintegrate the labour market, the right to work as a limit to 
the degradation of the notion of suitable employment and the right to social 
security. 
Those connections also configure the notion of suitable employment, not 
only as a limit to the individual obligation of unemployed to reintegrate the 
labour market, but also as an element of the definition of the obligation of 
the states under the right to work, under its programmatic aspect, as to the 
goal of their employment policies. 
Again, according to the ILO Committee of Experts, the states have the 
obligation “eliminate the risk of undue suspension of benefits in case of 
refusal to accept unsuitable jobs by restoring balance between quality of jobs 
offered and qualifications of jobseekers”. Within this perspective, the 
obligation to accept any (legal) employment has to be construed taking into 
account the obligations of states to provide the unemployed with the proper 
services to make them able to take up suitable employment, and not 
“orienting the employment services to providing workers suitable for jobs 
rather than jobs suitable for workers”.   
As just seen, the right to work approach has thus some importance as an 
argument for recalibration of ALMP towards more enabling measures like 
training, on the one hand, and guaranteeing genuine access to those 
measures. 
However, concerning active labour market policies, the flagship initiative 
“An Agenda for new skills and jobs: A European contribution towards full 
employment”, which encompasses the European Employment Strategy 
within the Europe 2020 framework 108, does not provide for real guidelines 
concerning the support of unemployed to find suitable employment. Even 
worse, the Commission insists on the fact that further attention should be 
given to the cost-effectiveness of ALMPs and the conditionality of benefits 
with participation, two elements which have been proven at the centre of an 
on the one hand, the sharpening of the notion of suitable employment as a 
limit to the obligation of reintegration and the prioritization of the support of 
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workers with greater chances of reintegration, to the detriment of other 
unemployed, agumenting their chances to have to accept any “legal” job. 
While being an important part of flexicurity policies, the document does not 
really highlight the importance of training of unemployed, only naming it 
between other activation measures PES should comprehensively provide in a 
more targeted way to more vulnerable workers (low-skilled, younger 
workers, older workers, unemployed). Mention is made of the necessity of 
re-skilling of older workers, blue-collar workers and workers returning from 
parental leave, but training seems not to be viewed as a right, nor given 
special place within ALMPs, and not even mentioned within the section 
related to those measures, which seems to be only seen in connection with 
the necessities of the labour market, rather than increasing the life choices of 
the unemployed. The document further treats training within flexicurity 
policies as continuous training of the labour force in general, or within the 
framework of short-term working arrangements like the German system of 
Kurzarbeit (involving working time reduction coupled with partial 
unemployment benefits).   
These findings echo the more general conclusion made by Freedland and 
Kountouris about the fact that the European Employment Strategy has 
“somewhat ground to a halt” as a “right to work” intervention.109  
But the previous observations about the notion of suitable employment under 
an international social fundamental rights perspective centred on the right to 
work should also bring us to put forward another perspective on the more 
concrete definition of the right to work as programmatic obligation of the 
states, inspired form the more general idea of interconnectedness of 
fundamental or human rights. What is meant here, is that other obligations of 
states under social fundamental rights which are not directly connected to 
the right to work could be brought forward as “right to work interventions” 
as defined by Freedland and Kountouris.  
As an example, one could refer to article 4 of the 1988 Additional Protocol 
to the European Social Charter (Right of the elderly to social protection). 
The European Committee on Social Rights analysed the Spanish “Ley de 
Dependencia” which involved financing of care services for dependent 
persons, mainly elderly, as a realization of that right. Studies of the effect of 
that Law found that it had an important effect on creation of employment in 
the social services sector, at a time when unemployment in Spain rose from 
10 to 27%, next to be an attempt to formalize, from the point of view of 
social security contributions, care by members of the family.110 From that 
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point of view, the realization of the right to social protection could also be 
read under the right to work, as it created non-precarious employment, 
moreover in highly feminized sector, indirectly contributing to the 
availability of suitable employment. It should however be noted that fiscal 
consolidation in the wake of the crisis ultimately led to infrafinancing of the 
scheme. 
Finally, another important aspect for the connection between suitable 
employment and precarious work is the framing of the right to work in the 
Spanish Constitutional context, as a right to protection against termination of 
employment. According to the Spanish Constitutional Court, the individual 
perspective of the right to work of article 35 of the Constitution involves a 
right to stability in employment, which has to be guaranteed by a right not to 
be dismissed without a legally established cause, implying also formal 
guarantees as to the visibility of the dismissal, as well as the right to an 
“adequate reaction” against the dismissal, which established the possibility 
of revision by the Courts of the cause and procedure under the right to fair 
and effective trial of article 24 of the Constitution.111  
The German Constitutional Court also recognized from a reading of the right 
to freedom of occupation within the light of the Social State clause, and the 
right to stability in employment derived thereof, the constitutional obligation 
of the state to establish a minimum level of protection against dismissals as 
well as guarantee its (minimal) revision by the Courts.112 However, the Court 
has not gone as far as stating that dismissal has to be grounded in a cause, 
but that the employer has to respect at least a minimum a level of social 
protection by taking into account to a certain extent the social interests of the 
worker within the framework of the contractual obligation to good faith.113 
Protection against dismissal is framed within the context of balancing the 
right to freedom of enterprise and the right to freedom of occupation.  
It is however, quite strange that this right to stability in employment has not 
received much constitutional attention from the perspective of temporary 
contracts. If the former involves some protection as to the termination of the 
contract, it would be logic to think that some protection would be implied, of 
course not at the termination, given the particular nature of temporary 
employment, but at the moment where that termination is decided, i.e., at the 
start. A correct understanding of the right to stability in employment under 
this framework would be that temporary contracts should also be grounded 
in a (legal, real and reviewable) cause, and not only left to contractual 
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autonomy.114 The lack of constitutional attention to the question might have 
been one of the reasons for a wide interpretation of the causes within the 
Spanish system and important problems of enforcement, leading to a de 
facto liberalization of temporary contracts and the highest rate of temporality 
in the European Union.115 In Germany for example, there is no causality 
required for temporary contracts of less than two years. 
Also, it is important to observe that the right to adequate protection against 
unjustified dismissal is also recognized as a stand-alone right in article 30 of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as in article 24 of the 
Revised European Charter. 
Under this perspective, the notion of suitable employment could be 
construed under the the right to stability in employment, reinforcing the idea 
that the notion of suitable employment could not be construed as obliging 
unemployed to take up precarious forms of work, or those types of work 
which would not guarantee durable integration within the labour market. 
 
 
5.2. Suitable employment as a factor of de-commodification of activation 
policies 
 
Suitable employment as a component of the obligation of unemployed to 
reintegrate the labour market could be reconstructed under a fundamental 
social right framework as: decent employment giving access to social 
security; which should correspond to qualifications, skills and aspiration of 
the unemployed; even if those aspirations could be considered to have to be 
gradually reduced according to the length of the period of unemployment; 
the latter depending however on the fulfilment by the state of its obligation 
to provide suitable jobs and support the unemployed in their adaptation to 
the labour market and their research of suitable employment; without that 
this notion could be reduced to a mere notion of “legal” employment. 
However, the usefulness of this reconstruction of the notion of suitable 
employment to limit the reintegration of workers in the labour market 
through precarious jobs remains to be assessed under the spectrum of 
possible legal policies. From this point of view, it is argued that on the one 
hand, it sheds an additional light on current aspects or the orientation of 
systems of protection against unemployment, stressing in some cases their 
flawed character, not only from the point of view of the realization of 
fundamental social rights, but also concerning their lack of logic within the 
                                                
114  A. Baylos and J. Pérez Rey, El despido o la violencia del poder privado, Trotta, Madrid, 
2009, 52. 
115  J. López, A. de le Court, S. Canalda, “Breaking the equilibrium between flexibility and 
security: flexiprecarity as the Spanish version of the model”, European Labour Law 
Journal, 2014, vol. 5, nº 1, 2014. 
 70 
goals they are assigned by policy frameworks like the European 
Employment Strategy. On the other hand, it is argued that the concept of 
suitable employment under a fundamental social rights framework could 
form the basis of legal arguments to challenge some aspects of its actual 
design or application at a national level. 
The global insufficiency characterizing the Spanish model of unemployment 
protection, above all in terms of coverage, structure of ALMPs and Public 
Employment Services deprives the concept of suitable employment of any 
significant meaning in guaranteeing that jobseekers are reintegrating the 
labour market through jobs corresponding to their qualifications and 
aspirations, or, to use concepts closer to the idea of flexicurity under the 
European Employment Policy, their employability. This aspect is reinforced 
by the “flexiprecarious” character of the Spanish labour market in general, as 
expressed by high levels of temporality, involuntary part-time employment 
and minimum wages under the level prescribed by the European Social 
Charter. The more general insufficiency of ALMPs in the other analysed 
cases, above all in terms of training and prioritization of unemployed closer 
to the labour market, could also be assessed from that perspective, and found 
to create real segmentation between unemployed. There seems to be also 
interdependency between the segmentation of unemployed in terms of 
promoting their employability through ALMPs and the segmentation in the 
labour market itself, as expressed by the phenomenon of “circular mobility” 
of ALG II holders in the German system. 
Focusing on the concept of suitable employment as a limit to the obligation 
of unemployed to reintegrate the labour market, the following observation 
could be made. 
The legal notion of suitable employment should never be designed through a 
closed definition, or reduced to a mere degrading minimal acceptable wage 
scale. Public Employment Services, under possible review by jurisdictional 
organs, should always take into account (and be legally allowed to take into 
account) the different circumstances of the case, under the principle of 
proportionality. Such a framework should include different factors: the 
precarious character of the job offer, related to the skills and capacities of the 
unemployed, his or her participation in the reintegration process, his or her 
possibilities of access to genuine training or retraining programs (mirroring 
the obligation of the state under the right to work), his or her personal 
circumstances, etc... From that point of view, some forms of precarious 
work, like involuntary part-time work or short-term contracts should not be 
considered as suitable employment, above all if they do not conduce to 
sustainable reintegration within the labour market. 
Dutch courts have already paved the way to such an approach. They applied 
it by analogy to the obligation of unemployed falling into the social 
assistance scheme to participate in reintegration measures. 
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The District Court of Arnhem, by a judgment of 8 October 2008, did annul 
the sanction imposed for not accepting a reintegration measure, considering 
that the municipality imposing the sanction on an unemployed with an 
academic background for his refusal to collaborate in the activities of public 
gardening and box packing imposed by his assigned training center had 
failed to make clear how those activities could have a positive impact on the 
reintegration of the unemployed in the labour market. Moreover in an obiter 
dicta the Court considered that the sanction may have violated article 4 of 
the ECHR (prohibition of forced labour), given that the activities at the base 
of the sanction were clearly not conducing towards regular reintegration in 
the labour market. At the basis of the acceptance, in principle, of work first 
practices by the Court lies the idea that social assistance presupposes a 
person to return to paid employment as soon as possible, like in the 
contributory unemployment system.116   
This approach was confirmed by the Central Court of Appeal (Centrale 
Raad van Beroep) in a judgment of 8 February 2010, in a similar case.117 
The Court confirmed that in applying a sanction, a proportionality test had to 
be held to assess possible violation of article 4 of the ECHR, in which four 
factors had to be taken into account: 1) the characteristics of the activity 
(job/training/…) in relation with the possibilities, qualifications, experience 
and family situation of the unemployed; 2) the duration of the period of 
unemployment; 3) the contribution of the activity towards integration into 
the labour market, 4) the severity of the sanction. Work-first activities 
should thus not unreasonably burden their target, be adapted to the 
individual situation and give perspectives on reintegration in the labour 
market.118 
The Courts applied article 4 of the ECHR, but could eventually have applied 
article 1-2 of the European Social Charter, which provides for a “richer” 
definition of the freedom to freely choose an occupation.119 As such they 
helped framed a concept of “meaningful activation” which corresponds to 
the idea of suitable employment as discussed before, and introducing the 
necessary proportionality test in assessing a notion of suitable employment, 
even in the case of unemployment protection systems obliging benefit 
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holders to accept any legal employment, or, in the Dutch definition 
“generally accepted work”. 
To remain in the sphere of the Dutch legal definition of suitable 
employment, it should be questioned if the reduction of that notion to “any 
employment” after 6 months, given the absence of changes in the definition 
itself, should be taken for granted. Under the perspective of suitable 
employment, the definition should remain open and should not immediately 
imply that workers have to accept jobs not corresponding to their 
qualifications, let alone employment which is to be considered as precarious. 
The obligation to have recourse to a proportional assessment, taking into 
account the circumstances of the unemployed, should also be able to open 
ways to reassess the obligation of unemployed falling into means-tested 
schemes to accept “any” employment, through taking into account the factor 
of the duration of unemployment, so as to limit said obligation at least to 
unemployed falling into such schemes because of lack of qualifying period 
to access contributory unemployment protection schemes, with “lighter” 
obligations in terms of accepting suitable employment. 
Also, the open character of the notion, and the need to interpret it under the 
idea of proportionality should also have consequences on particular aspects 
of the function of suitable employment as limit to the reintegration or 
commodification of unemployed, further than its “economic” reserve-wage 
preserving character. Considering that precarious employment, due to the 
complexity of factors determining it, is to a certain extent gender-related, the 
interpretation of the notion of suitable employment (or, even, any 
employment under the means-tested systems), should be able to take into 
account the complexity of those factors. An illustration of this idea could be 
found in a decision of 2005 of a Spanish appeal court in social matters which 
refused to follow the doctrine established by the Tribunal Supremo at the 
basis of the refusal of care as a justification to refuse work. The Tribunal 
Superior de Justicia de Galicia120 decided 1) that the refusal to participate in 
training had to be assessed under the same circumstances as the refusal of an 
adequate job offer (an approach which has also been adopted by the Dutch 
jurisprudence analysed here above), as the PES have to take into “account 
the personal and professional circumstances of the unemployed, his 
insertion itinerary, his work-life balance, the characteristics of the job offer, 
existence of transport as well as the characteristics of the local job markets” 
for all the obligation of the unemployed; and 2) that a worker having refused 
to participate in training because the participation would make it impossible 
to care for his child, because his wife was also following training, could not 
be sanctioned. More interesting even, the Court reinforced its interpretation 
by referring to ILO Convention 44 and, above all, ILO Recommendation 
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165, according to which family responsibilities of the unemployed have to 
be taken into account in the assessment of the suitable character of 
employment. To justify the reversal of jurisprudence in comparison to the 
criteria established by the Tribunal Supremo, the Court argued that the 
principle of the promotion of work-life balance, since the Law 39/1999 of 5 
November of promotion of work-life balance of workers, 121  modifying 
disposition of labour law and social security law, is to be seen as a general 
criterion of interpretation in Labour Law and Social Law.  
However, this position does not seem to be shared by other Spanish courts, 
which continue to interpret restrictively the obligation of unemployed along 
the lines of the 1990s jurisprudence of the Tribunal Supremo, creating 
problems of legal certainty, which have not been solved, given the absence 
of a new pronunciation of the latter on the matter.122 
Those few examples show that there are practical implications of the 
interpretation of the notion of suitable employment under the international 
fundamental social rights framework (reinforced by a multilevel approach 
taking into account European Union law) which could limit the 
consequences of the trend to work-first orientation of unemployed protection 
systems. Generally seen, the legal definition of suitable employment as a 
limit to the obligation of reintegration in the cases analyzed, despite its 
restrictive character, remains open to interpretations potentially limiting the 
reintegration into the labour market under precarious circumstances, whether 
those circumstances being related to the characteristics of the employment 
itself, its potential to entrap workers in precariousness or other factors 
contributing to its precarious character. 
  
 
6. Suitable employment as a right of unemployed and as an obligation 
of the state 
It has been seen that the notion of suitable employment, within a system, like 
the Spanish, of insufficiency of protection against unemployment, both in its 
active as in its passive aspects, loses its de-commodifying function. Above 
the individual level, in a context with 23% unemployment and understaffed 
Public Employment Services, it even loses its meaning, as it is only 
residually enforced. Within this context, it could be said that the 
reintegration in the labour market through precarious work operates simply 
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under the pressure of the huge “reserve army” represented by Spanish 
unemployed, and labour market regulation which, through its imbalance 
between security and flexibility, has created a model of “flexiprecarity”. The 
notion of suitable employment could however have a growing role to play in 
a future where activation, in all its aspects (orientation, placement, training 
and control of the obligations of the unemployed) is being externalized to 
private temporary employment agencies.   
Within the two-tier unemployment protection models, illustrated by the 
Dutch and the German cases, the notion of suitable employment is limited 
through a double movement. The first movement is characterized by the 
legislative intents to gradually restrict it within the contributory 
unemployment protection scheme. The second movement is characterized 
by, on the one hand, the reduction of the maximum and average period of 
contributory unemployment protection, and on the other hand, the practical 
disappearance of the idea of suitable employment as a limit to the obligation 
of unemployed to reintegrate the labour market in the social assistance 
schemes. In that sense, the legal definition of the notion of suitable 
employment is part of the arsenal of negative activation of unemployed. It 
can also be conceptualised as the administrative disciplinary compensation 
for the existence of a reserve wage (due to lower unemployment rates), 
where the restriction of the notion has a clear influence on the precarisation 
of the workforce. In its more extreme expression, like in the German case, 
the practical disappearance of the notion of suitable employment, contributes 
to the creation of a certain type of underclass of workers entrapped in 
precarious employment and precarious unemployment protection, 
reproducing and alimenting the segmentation in the labour market.   
Within this context, the reconstruction of the notion of suitable employment 
under an international fundamental rights framework brings us to the 
conclusion that the following elements have to be taken into account in its 
interpretation as a limit to the obligation of unemployed to reintegrate the 
labour market under precarious circumstances. 
Suitable employment cannot be limited in a way that no consideration 
should be given to the qualifications and expectations of unemployed. Even 
if, in function of the duration of unemployment, jobs not corresponding to 
the qualifications could in principle not be refused without a sanction, other 
circumstances should always have to be taken into account. It is in this 
context that the different legal determinants of the precarious character of a 
job offered should be assessed and read in the light of the personal 
circumstances of the unemployed, permitting to take into account the 
different dimensions of precariousness. 
Also, under fundamental social rights standards, reducing the idea of suitable 
employment to mere “legal” employment, not only for unemployed who fall 
into the means-tested schemes for lack of sufficient qualifying periods or 
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qualifying previous jobs, but also for long-term unemployed, should be 
considered as unacceptable.  
The unacceptable character of such policies is even accentuated by the lack 
of genuine efforts of the state to provide for training and retraining to those 
unemployed. Given the fact that the policies of unemployment protection in 
the continental systems analysed show that the most enabling ALMP 
measures are oriented towards the rapid reintegration of the most skilled 
workers, to the detriment of workers showing more probability to end up in 
long-term unemployment, through different phenomena (privatization and 
application of principles of cost-benefit within PES), sanctions for the 
refusal by those unemployed to accept any employment appear even more 
illegitimate. Therefore, they should be reviewed taking into account those 
circumstances, would those policies be in accordance with the international 
fundamental rights framework. 
The legal definitions of the notion of suitable employment in the three cases 
analysed here, even when reducing it to the idea of mere “legal” 
employment all contain an “escape” clause which should allow the legal, 
judicial or administrative actors to interpret it in a way which would limit the 
obligation to reintegrate the labour market in precarious circumstances, even 
if at first sight, the initial definition shapes the notion of suitable 
employment in a way which reinforces the negative activation aspects of the 
unemployment protection systems concerned. This configuration opens the 
way to take into consideration, not only the precarious character of the 
(refused or offered) job, but also the broader characteristics of the system of 
protection against unemployment in which the obligation to reintegrate the 
labour market inscribes itself.  
Also, concentrating on suitable employment as a limit to the obligation of 
unemployed should not make us forget its “collective” dimensions, shedding 
light on the responsibilities of the state, under the current fundamental social 
rights framework, to devise policies on the demand-side of the labour 
market. This would also permit to exit the sphere of individual obligations of 
unemployed to focus the attention on the recalibration of employment 
policies towards genuine employability, which has gradually disappeared 
from the idea of flexicurity and the European Employment Strategy.   
And this is not only important from the point of view of the de-
commodifying character of unemployment protection policies, but also from 
the economic objectives of employment policies in general. As indicated by 
the ILO Committee of Experts, the notion of suitable employment also 
fulfils the economic goal of preserving the quality of the workforce and to 
prevent labour market policies “which would lead to deskilling of the 
national workforce and the substantial reduction of employment 
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opportunities for unskilled workers at the low end, pushing them into long-





                                                
123  Committee of Experts of the ILO, “General survey concerning social security instruments 
in light of the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization”, Report of the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Report 
III (Part 1B), 100th session of the ILO, 2011, 209 
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The controversies of the concept of "suitable employment" in Russia 
 





The paper researches the notion of suitable employment as defined by the 
Russian legislation. We consider this concept in light of the Constitution of 
the Russian Federation and of the international instruments. This analysis 
leads us to conclusion that the regulations of suitable employment do not 
provide a reasonable and fair consensus between the individual 
characteristics of the citizen, his aspirations in the field of work and the 
interests of society, while special rules established for particular groups of 
people are discriminatory and in some cases might amount to the violation of 
the prohibition of forced labour and to infringing the right of the worker to 





The concept of suitable employment was elaborated to establish the 
involuntary nature of unemployment and the unemployed person's 
availability for the job.  
In this paper, we will research the provisions of Russian law on suitable 
employment and evaluate it in light of international law. We will try to 
answer the question if these provisions correspond to the abovementioned 
aims or the legislator has worded them in a way to force unemployed to 
agree to any job proposed. The paper is divided into two parts: the first one 
will consider the provisions of Russian law on the subject and the practice of 
their implementation. The second part will analyse the compliance of 
Russian approach to the suitable employment with international law, in 
particular we will deal with the ILO documents, UN Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR the European Social Charter (ESCR) 
and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as well as the case-
law of relevant international bodies. 
 
 
2. The provisions of the Russian legislation  
 
Article 37 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation determines that 
everyone has the right to freely dispose of their abilities to work, choose 
their occupation and profession. These provisions make it possible to state 
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that, in exercising such freedom, each citizen determines for himself what 
kind of work will be suitable for him in each case, based on his life 
experience, professional skills, personal characteristics and aspirations. 
Thus, the term "suitable work" becomes exclusively subjective, of course, 
not allowing in this context to identify any objective criteria for its 
definition. Looking for such work, the citizen interacts with the employer, 
who actually exposes his subjective analysis of the employee's expectations, 
thereby forming a "demand-supply" in the labour market. This interaction 
remains in the subjective plane of the negotiation process of a particular 
employee and employer, conducted, of course, within the framework of the 
current labour legislation (principles, prohibitions, obligations, permits, etc.). 
In case of dissatisfaction with the actions of each other, the parties may 
apply to the judiciary, which will assess the development of mutual criteria 
proposed by the employee and the employer in a particular situation to a 
particular place of work. 
At the same time, the same article 37 of the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation establishes the right to protection against unemployment, when 
the legislation on employment guarantees free assistance to citizens of the 
Russian Federation in the selection of suitable employment and employment 
through the mediation of the employment service. In the context of this 
social obligation of the State the criteria determining the suitable 
employment become objective and depend on the level of development of 
society, its aims, objectives, focusing in the same time on the main goal – 
the employment of a citizen. Ideally, the definition of suitable work, for the 
purposes of protection against unemployment in the legislation of each 
country, should find and reflect the consensus between the individual 
characteristics of the citizen and the interests of society. 
The first question that needs to be answered in the analysis of the legislation 
of the Russian Federation is the question of the subjects who are guaranteed 
free assistance in the selection of suitable jobs and employment through the 
employment service. According to the preamble of the Law of the Russian 
Federation of April 19, 1991 N 1032-1 "About employment of the 
population in the Russian Federation" (henceforth - the Law on 
employment) guarantees of the state on implementation of the constitutional 
rights to work and social protection against unemployment are established 
only for citizens of the Russian Federation. In article 5 defining the state 
policy in the field of promotion of employment of the population, this 
postulate finds development through determination of the orientation of such 
policy on ensuring equal opportunities to all citizens of the Russian 
Federation irrespective of nationality, sex, age, social status, political 
convictions and the attitude to religion in realization of the right to voluntary 
work and free choice of employment. Thus, citizenship as a political and 
legal connection of a person with the state contributes to the adoption of 
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social obligations for employment by the latter and does not contribute to the 
implementation of such obligations in respect of foreign citizens and 
stateless persons residing in the territory of the Russian Federation. 
The above-mentioned social obligation is realised on the basis of the 
Standard of the state service of assistance to citizens in search of suitable 
work1 (henceforth - the Standard of the state service). The Decree of the 
Government of the Russian Federation of September 7, 2012 N 891 "About 
the order of the citizens’ registration for the purpose of search of suitable 
work, the registration of the unemployed citizens and the requirements to the 
selection of a suitable work" establishes the procedures for the work of the 
employment service with those who seek employment and unemployed 
people. 
Registration is carried out by public employment service at presentation of 
the citizen’s passport of the Russian Federation or the document substituting 
it, and for the citizens belonging to category of disabled people, the 
individual program of rehabilitation and (or) habilitation of the disabled 
person issued in accordance with the established procedure and containing 
the conclusion about the recommended character and about working 
conditions, as well. Other documents are presented by the citizen at his 
discretion, however, the absence of such documents (confirming his working 
experience or education) will influence, among other things, the definition of 
work for him as suitable or unsuitable and for assigning / not assigning him 
to the category of "experiencing difficulties in finding a suitable job". At 
registration, the citizens are notified in writing that they are registered for the 
purpose of search of suitable work in public employment service. 
Part 1 of article 4 of the Law on employment defines that such work, 
including work of temporary character which corresponds to professional 
suitability of the worker taking into account the level of his qualification, 
conditions of the last place of work (except for the paid public works), the 
state of health, transport accessibility of the workplace is considered 
suitable. 
Part 4 of this article sets out mandatory provisions with regard to what kind 
of job cannot be considered suitable. It will not be suitable if: it is connected 
with the change of residence without the citizen’s consent; the working 
conditions do not comply with the rules and regulations on labour 
protection; the proposed earnings are below the average earnings of a citizen 
calculated for the last three months at their last place of work. 
In addition, part 3 of article 4 establishes evaluation criteria for suitable paid 
work, assuming their interpretation by the law enforcement agent – taking 
into account the age and other characteristics of citizens (however, it is 
                                                
1 The Order of the Ministry of labour and social protection of the Russian Federation N 524, 
13/11/2012.  
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necessary to clarify that these criteria apply only to certain categories of 
citizens in deciding whether they are required to pre-training). 
Further we will analyze these criteria regarding their consistency with the 
national legislation.  
The first criterion relates to the terms of the employment contract in the 
proposed suitable work. Such work can be offered both for an indefinite 
period or for a certain period (up to 5 years). Moreover, the term "work of a 
temporary nature", proposed by the legislator, suggests that work is also 
recognized as suitable for the duration of temporary (up to two months) 
work duties (Art. 59, Chapter 45 of the Russian Labour Code). In the latter 
case, it is hardly possible to state the fact of full employment of a citizen and 
protection against unemployment, although the state's obligation is 
considered fulfilled. 
The second criterion of suitable work is the professional suitability of the 
employee, taking into account the level of his/her qualification. It is not a 
question of professional and qualification compliance of the work offered to 
the citizen only at his last place of work before the address to the body of 
employment service. Since the actual ability of a person to work is a 
condition of his/her legal personality as an employee, the employment 
service has the obligation to offer work options corresponding to any basic 
and/or additional professional and qualification qualities of a citizen, the 
experience and skills of his/her work, which were communicated by the 
citizen when applying to the relevant body. Such informing of employment 
service is carried out through a possible submission of documents on 
education, qualification, training, academic degrees and titles.  
These data are compared by the employment service with the requirements 
of employers contained in the information on available jobs and vacant 
positions. Thus, the potential professional suitability of a citizen for 
particular employment is established and the work is defined as suitable/not 
suitable on the basis of the analyzed grounds. The last word remains, 
however, for the employer, who, within the powers established by labour 
law, assesses the employee's business qualities as suitable/unsuitable for 
him. 
Taking into account the conditions of the last place of work of the citizen is 
the third criterion of suitable work.  It should be noted that under such 
conditions, the current legislation refers only to wages. All other conditions 
are taken into account only in general through the prism of compliance with 
the rules and regulations on labour protection established by legislation. In 
this regard, the offer of work in harmful or dangerous working conditions 
will be considered as a suitable work (if it is not contraindicated for health 
reasons), the proposal of the travelling nature of work, work in several shifts 
will also be considered as a suitable work. It is not taken into account that 
the working conditions at the former place of work were different. It seems 
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that such an approach illustrates a too broad interpretation of suitable  work 
so that the refusal of a citizen from such (for personal, family reasons) will 
entail the impossibility of recognizing him unemployed and obtaining 
appropriate social guarantees. 
With regard to conditions such as wages, the employment Act establishes 
that work shall be read as appropriate if the proposed earnings are not lower 
than the average earnings of the citizen calculated for the last three months 
at the last place of work. It would seem that the legislation establishes a fair, 
efficient legal norm, which takes into account the needs of the person who 
lost his job. However, current Russian legislation virtually eliminates the 
positive, specifying that this provision does not apply to citizens whose 
average earnings exceeded the subsistence minimum of the able-bodied 
population defined in the subject of the Russian Federation. In this case, the 
Law on employment specifies that work cannot be considered suitable if the 
offered earnings are lower than the size of the living wage calculated in the 
subject of the Russian Federation in accordance with the established 
procedure. Thus, the legislator does not protect the right of an employee to 
the level of salary received before applying to the employment service, but 
absolutely unreasonably reduces the possible salary to the minimum 
subsistence level, considering such remuneration appropriate.2 Moreover, if 
we turn to article 133 of the Labour Code, which States that the minimum 
wage is set simultaneously throughout the territory of the Russian Federation 
by Federal law and cannot be lower than the subsistence minimum of the 
able-bodied population3, the situation looks even more critical. It means that 
the Russian legislator actually believes that the establishment of wages by a 
potential employer at the level of the minimum wage translates any work 
into a category suitable from the point of view of such criterion as wages. 
That is, the professionalism of the employee, his/her qualification, work 
experience, etc. can be assessed in the same way as a person who does not 
have professional skills at all, since in the latter case, the salary for the 
proposed job also cannot be lower than the minimum wage in violation of 
labour law. 
In all fairness, it should be noted that the analyzed rate of wage as criteria for 
a suitable job in employment Law has undergone significant changes, not of 
a positive nature, which led to this state of affairs. Initially, the law on 
employment correlated the salary for the proposed work with the average 
                                                
2  For example, according to the Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg No. 963 of 
27.11.2017, the subsistence minimum was defined in the sum of  10,791 rubles (about 
154 euro). Thus any proposed job with the proposed salary in the sum more than 154 euro 
might be found suitable. 
3   The fact that according to Art. 421 of the Labor code the order and terms of step-by-step 
increase of the minimum wage to the size provided by part one of article 133 of this Code 
are established by the Federal law, essentially does not change provisions. 
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monthly salary of a citizen at the last place of work, and if his salary 
exceeded the average wage for the speciality in the region – not lower than 
this average salary. Thus, the level of remuneration achieved by the citizen, 
as well as the differentiation of wages by industry and professional 
qualification were guaranteed. Subsequently, the criterion of average 
regional earnings in the speciality was replaced by the criterion of average 
regional earnings, and in the future – the criterion of the subsistence 
minimum in the subject of the Russian Federation. Even in Russia at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the unemployment insurance Regulation 
(1917) established a rule on finding work as suitable for wages, the norm of 
which was set by the relevant trade unions, based on the realities of 
economic life. 
The fourth criterion of suitable work, defined by the Russian legislator, 
includes the transport accessibility of the place of work. The Law on 
employment establishes that the maximum distance of suitable work from 
the place of residence of the unemployed is determined by the employment 
service, taking into account the development of a public transport network in 
the area. However, as some Russian researchers rightly point out, when 
determining the maximum distance of suitable work from a citizen's place of 
residence, the criterion of transport accessibility of the workplace shouldn’t 
be the only one used, but also the criterion of personal and family status of 
citizens, providing for disabled persons, single and large parents raising 
preschool children, persons of pre-retirement age and other privileged 
categories of citizens with a smaller maximum distance of suitable work 
from their place of residence than that provided for other categories of 
citizens4. 
The state of health of a potential employee is the fifth criterion of suitable 
work –.  In order to take this factor into account, the employment service 
must be provided with the relevant medical records by the person who is 
seeking employment The application of this criterion applies not only to 
persons with disabilities and representing their individual rehabilitation and 
(or) habilitation programs. The criterion of the state of health involves taking 
into account a wide range of different circumstances: the presence of chronic 
diseases (the threat of their development), physical characteristics, age-
related changes, etc. Such facts must be supported by the medical documents 
that the person concerned –the job seeker – must submit to the public 
employment service to be taken into account in assessing the proposed work 
as appropriate or inappropriate.  
Thus, the criteria described together give the concept of "suitable 
employment" for citizens seeking such employment through public 
                                                
4   Seregina L. V. “The concept of suitable work the employment legislation”. Labour law. 
2006, No. 3.  Pp. 10 - 15. 
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employment services. The criteria set out in the legislation are not always 
perceived as a reasonable and fair consensus between the individual 
characteristics of the citizen, his aspirations in the field of work and the 
interests of society. 
 
 
3. International approach to the suitable employment and Russian 
norms 
 
3.1. ILO approach to suitable employment 
The review of international provisions defining the suitable employment will 
be started with the ILO instruments which provide a certain framework for 
shaping the concept of suitable employment: 
 
1. ILO Convention on Employment Policy Convention, 1964, No. 122 
(does not directly deal with suitable employment but provides some 
guidance);   
2. ILO Convention on Employment Promotion and Protection against 
Unemployment Convention, 1988, No. 168 (establishes the criteria 
for suitable employment, but it was not ratified by Russia). These 
criteria are the following: the age of unemployed persons, their 
length of service in their former occupation, their acquired 
experience, the length of their period of unemployment, the labour 
market situation, the impact of the employment in question on their 
personal and family situation and whether the employment is vacant 
as a direct result of a stoppage of work due to an on-going labour 
dispute.  
It is interesting to note that these factors were considered to be the indicators 
of suitable employment by the Committee of Experts on Social Security 
although the European Code of Social Security provides no definition of 
“suitable employment”. This committee, basing on a restrictive 
interpretation of suitable employment requested some states to cease 
applying concepts that were formulated in a very broad manner.5 
3. ILO Recommendation on Employment Promotion and Protection 
against Unemployment, 1988 (No. 176). This document 
complements the list given in the Convention No. 186 with the 
remuneration factor (employment in which the conditions and 
                                                
5  Jason Nickless, European Code of Social Security Short Guide. Council of Europe, 2002. 
p. 39. 
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remuneration are appreciably less favourable than those which are 
generally granted, at the relevant time, in the occupation and district 
in which the employment is offered, shall not be deemed suitable). It 
also establishes more links with the professional characteristics of 
the unemployed, recommending to take into account the abilities, 
qualifications, skills, work experience or the retraining potential of 
the person concerned; 
The ILO Convention on Employment Policy Convention No. 122, as it was 
mentioned above, does not provide the definition of suitable employment but 
it is still a very important tool for the evaluation of the Russian concept. 
According to article 1, each Member shall declare and pursue, as a major 
goal, an active policy designed to promote full, productive and freely chosen 
employment. This policy, in particular, shall aim at ensuring that there is 
freedom of choice of employment and the fullest possible opportunity for 
each worker to qualify for, and to use his skills and endowments in, a job 
for which he is well suited, irrespective of race, colour, sex, religion, 
political opinion, national extraction or social origin. It is important to note 
that the Convention No. 122 according to the provisions of the Russian 
Constitution (art. 15) is directly applicable in Russia.  
In our opinion, the proclaimed freedom of choice of employment and the 
opportunity for the worker to qualify for a job for which he is well suited 
with the reference to his skills and endowments establishes the criteria for 
the assessment of the suitable employment in the countries which ratified 
only ILO Convention No. 122.  
In fact, in 1993 the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations (CEACR) issued an Observation in respect of Spain, 
where referred to the trade-unions’ comments on the new definition of 
suitable employment. Trade unions alleged that it allowed an excessive 
extension of the concept likely to be applied in practice in a manner which is 
contrary to the objective of freely chosen employment. 6  Committee 
requested the Government to supply information on the implementation of 
this provision in relation to the principle of freely chosen employment.  
Assessing the Russian concept of suitable employment in light of the 
principle of freely chosen employment as introduced by ILO Convention 
No. 122 we will conclude that this principle is violated in respect of certain 
groups of unemployed listed in the para. 3 of the article 4 of the Federal Act 
“On employment of population in the Russian Federation”.  
This paragraph lists those for whom any paid work, including temporary 
work and public works, requiring or not requiring (taking into account age 
                                                
6  (CEACR) Observation - adopted 1993, published 80th ILC session (1993) Employment 
Policy Convention, 1964 (No. 122). 
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and other characteristics of citizens) preliminary training that meets the 
requirements of labour legislation will be found suitable. For the categories 
mentioned below the refusal of two “suitable jobs” will amount to the refusal 
to grant the status of unemployed (during 10 days after the registration as 
seeking employment) and will amount to a suspension of unemployment 
benefits for up to three months if such employment was refused twice during 
the period of unemployment.  
Let us consider these groups consequently: 
1) Unemployed who were dismissed more than once during one year 
preceding the beginning of unemployment for violation of labour 
discipline or other actions in the result of a fault.  
The underlying logic for the expansion of the concept of “suitable 
employment” for this group is rather vague. If Russian Federation 
pursues according to the ILO Convention and its national law the 
policy of free chosen employment it is absolutely unacceptable to link 
the right for a suitable job with the person’s behaviour at previous 
works. The person does not become less qualified and does not lose the 
professional experience, skills, education if dismissed for misconduct. 
The only possible explanation for such regulation is to shorten the time 
of unemployment for such people at any expense. In our opinion, such 
approach constitutes an additional liability for this group of 
unemployed already punished for the misconduct at work by dismissal 
and violated the basic legal principle Non bis in idem.    
2) Unemployed who terminated individual entrepreneurial activities or 
who withdrew from rural (farm) holdings.  
The motivation of restriction of suitable employment for this 
“disadvantaged” group is even less comprehensive than in respect of 
the first group. The wording of this provision does not refer to any 
professional characteristics or any working experience, does not refer 
to the period of entrepreneurial activities or of the membership in rural 
(farm) holdings. The latter might at least provide some argumentation 
for the restriction linking the period of entrepreneurship with “out-of-
job” periods. In our opinion, such restriction is a flagrant violation of 
the freedom of choice of employment and the denial of the 
opportunity for these people to use his skills and endowments in a job 
for which he is well suited as provided in the ILO Convention No. 
122. 
3) Unemployed seeking to resume work after a long (more than one year) 
break, and those who applied to employment service bodies after the 
end of seasonal work, as well as unemployed sent by the employment 
service to training and expelled for the misconduct; 
In this group, the legislator united two very different types of the 
unemployed. The first one represents those who did not have a job for 
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a long period of time and are presumed to lose their qualification. The 
second reminds us the group of those who were dismissed from a job 
because of misconduct (see group 1 above) as the expansion of the 
concept of a suitable job for those who were expelled from training 
courses organized by employment service is a type of responsibility for 
such misbehaviour.  
However, again this provision of law does not refer to the changes in the 
professional qualities of the worker. Some people might use the year of 
unemployment to learn new skills, to enhance their professional level during 
the free time. Let us imagine a lawyer who received a PhD in Labour law 
and did not get a job at the university during the year, using this time for 
research and making reports on international conferences. For him, once 
registered as unemployed, any proposed job will be suitable, including a 
part-time unqualified job. This example vividly demonstrates that the 
regulation of suitable employment not only violates the principles enshrined 
in the ILO Convention No. 122 but contradicts a fundamental value of 
international human rights law – the value of human dignity. The danger of 
such approach, citing Jason Nickless, is the erosion of skills as well as the 
impact on the mental health of the person concerned and the potential 
dissidence created in society as a whole.7 
The research of Russian official statistics demonstrates that a great number 
of people are potentially affected by these provisions: almost 600 thousand 
people have terminated individual entrepreneurship and 17989 farm holdings 
finished their activities in 2016.8 For all these people, once they apply for the 
status of unemployed to the Russian employment service, any job will be 
found suitable without any reference to professional qualities, education or 
experience of these people. This group of people becomes particularly 
vulnerable in the times of economic crisis and the state’s approach to their 
protection from unemployment contributes more to drowning them rather 
than pulling out of a desperate situation. CEACR once noted that the concept 
of “suitable employment” has the role of protecting the professional and 
social status of job seekers during the prescribed initial period of 
unemployment.9 Even though it was said in reference to the ILO Convention 
No. 168, which is not ratified by Russia, we believe that these words reflect 
the position of this authoritative body to the basics of employment policy: 
                                                
7  Jason Nickless, European Code of Social Security Short Guide. Council of Europe, 2002. 
P. 37. 
8 Statistics on registration 01.01.2016-01.01.2017. 
  https://www.nalog.ru/rn77/related_activities/statistics_and_analytics/regstats/ (accessed 
20.02.2018). 
9  Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2011, published 101st ILC session (2012) 
Employment Promotion and Protection against Unemployment Convention, 1988 (No. 
168) – Sweden. 
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freedom of choice of employment and the denial of the opportunity for 
these people to use their skills and endowments. 
We suppose these provisions of Russian law considered above also raise two 
other fundamental points of concern. The difference in treatment of the listed 
groups in defining the suitability of employment proposed to them by the 
Employment services brings before us the problem of discrimination. The 
very broad definition of the suitable employment for these groups, without 
taking into account professional, personal or any other factors and the 
provision of legal responsibility for the second refusal of such job reminds 
us the concept of forced labour, prohibited by major international human 




3.2. Discriminatory nature of the Russian concept of suitable 
employment 
 
Summing up our critics of the abovementioned provisions of Russian law in 
light of ILO Convention No. 122 we would like to focus on the issue of 
discrimination. This convention lists the prohibited grounds for the 
discrimination in the realiation of the freedom of choice of employment: 
race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social 
origin. Social status or former business activities, the duration of 
unemployment are not included in this list. However, it does not mean that 
the difference in treatment of former entrepreneurs or the members of rural 
(farm) holdings, or those who did not have work for more than 12 months 
does not amount to discrimination.  
In contrast with the ILO Conventions No. 122 and No. 111 on 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation), which prohibited 
discrimination on the exhaustive list of grounds, UN Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and the European Social Charter guarantee that 
the rights enunciated in these documents will be exercised without 
discrimination of any kind. We can refer to the worker’s right to earn their 
living in an occupation freely entered upon (article 6 of the ICESCR and 
article 1 of the ESC). We can also refer to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which, even though it does not fix the right to work, can be a 
very valuable instrument for consideration of the Russian concept of suitable 
employment in light of elaborated case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) on discrimination. The ECtHR is the only international 
body on the European scene that can issue binding judgements and require 
the states to remedy discriminatory situations and to create effective systems 
of protection. Taking into account the fact that the prohibition of 
discrimination is equally relevant to the rights expressly set out in the ECHR 
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and to the rights which were integrated subsequently as the result of 
evolutive interpretation, the scope of antidiscrimination protections 
guaranteed by article 14 is very wide indeed. For example, it has been taken 
to cover the right of access to work through the broad interpretation of the 
right to respect for private life.10  
The ECtHR established that it is enough for the discrimination in issue to 
"touch the enjoyment of a specific right or freedom,”11; in other words, “the 
facts should fall within the ambit of one or more of the substantive 
provisions of the Convention and its Protocols.”12 We suppose that the 
expansive interpretation of suitable employment for the groups of 
unemployed mentioned in the first paragraph falls within the ambit of at 
least three article: prohibition of forced labour (article 4); the right for 
respect to private life (article 8) as it includes the protection of the moral, 
psychological and physical integrity of the person13 and protection of the 
rights to personal development.14 Our case also might fall within the ambit 
of property right (article 1 of the protocol 1) as far as the second refusal of 
“suitable employment” proposal will lead to the refusal to grant the status of 
unemployed or to the suspension of unemployment benefit. But let us 
consider the difference in treatment of those groups in the light of article 8.  
Taking for granted that the right to personal development is protected under 
article 8 as well as the right to establish relationships with others, including 
relationships of a professional nature15 it is evident that forcing our PhD 
holder to accept a work as a cleaner under the menace of refusal to grant the 
status of unemployed or, if already registered, to suspend the payments of 
unemployment benefits, violates both rights.   Consideration of 
discrimination cases at ECtHR includes several steps: the establishment of 
the difference in treatment; the research of an “objective and reasonable 
justification” for discriminatory provisions that exists if the difference of 
treatment pursues a legitimate aim and if there is a "reasonable relationship 
of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be 
realised.”16   Returning now to the list of those for whom any employment 
would be suitable without relevance to experience, qualification, we will 
consider these provisions applying the approach of the ECtHR.Is there a 
                                                
10  ECtHR, Sidabras and Dziautas v. Lithuania (55480/00 59330/00) 27/07/2004, Bigaeva v. 
Greece (26713/05) 28/05/2009. 
11  ECtHR, "Relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in 
Belgium" v. Belgium (1474/62 et al) 23/07/1968, para. 4. 
12  ECtHR, Okpisz v. Germany (59140/00) 25/10/2005, para. 30, Willis v. THE UK 
(36042/97) 11/06/2002, para. 36. 
13  ECtHR, Brincat and others v. Malta, Raninen v. Finland (20972/92) 16/12/1997; 
Kyriakides v. Cyprus (39058/05) 16/10/2008. 
14  ECtHR, Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine (21722/11) 09/01/2013, para. 65. 
15  ECtHR, С. v. Belgium (21794/93) 07/08/1996, para. 25. 
16  ECtHR, Adrejeva v. Latvia [GC] (55707/00) 18/02/2009, para. 81. 
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difference in treatment in the determination of suitable employment of those 
who withdrew from farmer holding (terminated individual entrepreneurial 
activities/was dismissed for misconduct and so on)? Evidently there is, as the 
concept of suitable employment for them will be much broader including 
any job, while in respect of other unemployed (not listed in our para. 2.1.) 
suitable job will be determined with the consideration of professional 
qualities, taking into account the level of his qualifications, the conditions of 
the last place of work. Whenever a difference in treatment is found, the 
ECtHR has to determine if there was an objective and reasonable 
justification. According to the jurisprudence under article 14, “objective and 
reasonable justification” means that the discrimination in question pursued 
one or more legitimate aim(s) and there was a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be 
realised. The only legitimate aim that might be referred to in the “suitable 
employment” case is the need to ensure the balanced budgetary system and 
ensuring full employment. As to the first aim, it is not relevant in our case as 
unemployment benefits are non-contributory payments, thus there is no 
justification for restricting the rights of those who were not engaged in 
employment before the period of unemployment. The second aim should be 
spread to all the unemployed and therefore does not justify the difference of 
treatment.   This brief analysis brings us to the conclusion that the difference 
in treatment of those groups of unemployed does not have a legitimate aim 
and therefore violates the prohibition of discrimination under the European 
Convention on Human Rights in conjunction with article 8. 
 
 
3.3. The concept of suitable employment in the light of prohibition of 
forced labour 
 
We suppose that the situation in Russia when a great number of people have 
to accept any job proposed by the employment service without consideration 
of their profession or family responsibilities might fall to a certain extent in 
some circumstances within the ambit of the prohibition of forced labour.  
A number of international instruments fix the prohibition of forced labour. 
ILO, which was the first body to adopt a special convention on forced labour 
already in 1930, defines it as all work or service which is exacted from any 
person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has 
not offered himself voluntarily. On several occasions, CEACR has observed 
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that the loss of the right to benefit under certain conditions might be 
equivalent to a penalty within the meaning of the Convention.17  
The prohibition without the definition of what forced labour is may be found 
in the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights and the ECHR. 
Human Rights Committee (HRC) once considered the complaint on the 
suspension of unemployment benefit in the light of the prohibition of forced 
labour.  
In Fauvre v. Australia the Committee interpreted the term "forced or 
compulsory labour" as covering a range of conduct extending from labour 
imposed on an individual by way of criminal sanction, notably in 
particularly coercive, exploitative or otherwise egregious conditions, to 
lesser forms of labour in circumstances where punishment as a comparable 
sanction is threatened if the labour directed is not performed. It further 
referred to the civic obligations which did not amount to forced labour if did 
not have a punitive purpose or effect, were provided for by law in order to 
serve a legitimate purpose under the Covenant. This stance demonstrates that 
the Committee was likely to see the obligation to accept any job in order to 
be eligible for unemployment benefit as a civic obligation. However, such an 
obligation should have a legitimate aim, be lawful and without a punitive 
purpose or effect. In the previous paragraph, we have considered if the 
difference in treatment of people for whom any job would be found suitable 
had a legitimate aim and concluded that it did not. The same conclusion is 
equally relevant when estimating the situation in the light of the conclusions 
of the HRC. Therefore, even if the need to accept any second job as suitable 
might be considered as a civic obligation under the ICPCR, the lack of the 
legitimate aim leads to the conclusion that it is a form of forced labour. 
It is interesting to compare the approach of HRC with the views of the 
ECtHR and the former European Commission on Human Rights, which had 
a number of opportunities to deal with this question:  
In 1976 an unemployed specialised building worker complained to the 
Commission that the obligation imposed on him to accept, in order to 
receive unemployment benefits, a job offer not in conformity with his 
qualifications, constituted ‘compulsory labour’. Rejecting this complaint, the 
Commission observed that he was not compelled, by any penalty, to accept 
such an offer; nor would his refusal constitute an infringement of the law. A 
refusal would only be penalised by the temporary loss of unemployment 
                                                
17  Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 1995, published 82nd ILC session (1995) Forced 
Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) – Chile; Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 1992, 
published 79th ILC session (1992) Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) – Chile. 
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benefits.18 The same conclusion was reached later in the case Talmon v. The 
Netherlands. 19 The applicant, a scientist, complained that the reduction of 
unemployment benefits for the refusal to perform required work, to which he 
had a conscientious objection, amounted to forced labour. The Commission 
declared the application inadmissible as it did not find that the applicant was 
in any way forced to perform any kind of labour or that his refusal to look 
for other employment than that of an independent scientist made him liable 
to any measures other than the reduction of his unemployment benefits.      
The ECtHR applied the same approach in considering the complaint of an 
unemployed philosopher who claimed that due to changes in the relevant 
legislation she was forced to seek and take up employment which was 
deemed to be ‘generally acceptable’ as opposed to being ‘suitable’, 
stipulated in the previous legislation.20 In that case, the ECtHR stated that 
the obligation to accept any kind of work was in effect a condition for the 
granting of benefits, and the State, which had introduced a system of social 
security, was fully entitled to lay down conditions which have to be met for 
a person to be eligible for benefits under that system. The ECtHR 
emphasised that Dutch legislation provided that recipients of benefits were 
not required to seek and take up employment which was not generally 
socially accepted or in respect of which they had conscientious objections.  
This stance of the ECtHR demonstrates that the approach of the Strasburg 
bodies to the issue has changed with time. In spite of the recognition of a 
wide margin of appreciation of the States in establishing the social security 
system, certain positive obligations of the State might be deduced. We 
suppose that the State, establishing eligibility conditions for unemployment 
benefits, might be required to ensure that the work proposed to be given to 
an unemployed person, in circumstances whereas refusal to accept the job 
will lead to sufficient reduction or abolition of the relevant allowance, is not 
be in breach of his freedoms of religion, conscience and belief and is not 
generally socially unaccepted.  
Considering our imaginary case of a PhD holder in light of these findings we 
can hardly allege that the ECtHR might find a violation of article 4 in this 
case. Considering the job of a cleaner from the point of view of social 
stereotypes it cannot be found unacceptable. However, adding to this 
analysis a personal dimension we can argue that accepting non-skilled 
employment by a highly qualified person is socially unacceptable.   
                                                
18  ECtHR, X v. Netherlands, Application 7602/76, (1976) 7 Decisions and Reports 161, 
cited from Nihal Jayawickrama, The Judicial Application of Human Rights 
Law: National, Regional and International Jurisprudence, Cambridge University Press, 
2002. P. 362. 
19  EurCommHR, Talmon v. The Netherlands (30300/96) inadmissible 26 February 1997. 
20  ECtHR, Schuitemaker v. The Netherlands (15906/08) inadmissible 04/05/2010. 
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Let us now consider Russian provisions in light of the European Social 
charter which also has relevance to this issue as it protects the right of the 
worker to earn his living in an occupation freely entered upon. 
According to the interpretation of this right by the European Committee of 
Social Rights, the imposition of excessively strict conditions for receipt of 
unemployment benefit may be regarded as a violation. The ECSR treats 
excessive conditionality in social security law as a form of compulsion that 
is compatible with Article 1§2 only if the resulting employment is 
‘consistent with the dignity of the individual concerned and [their] family 
responsibilities’ or, more generally, can be regarded as ‘non-exploitative’.21 
We suppose that the provisions considered in this part of the paper cannot be 
interpreted differently than as imposing of excessively strict conditions for 
receipt of unemployment benefit and are evidently not consistent with the 
dignity of these groups of unemployed. 
The Russian Government was asked by the ECSR to provide the explanation 
of the system of suitable employment in Russia. It responded in 2017 
describing the general approach, which takes into account the level of 
qualification, the conditions of the last place of work. They did not mention 
the exceptions considered in this paper which cover a great number of 
people.22 By concealing this important information the Government tried to 
demonstrate that the conditions of suitable employment do not amount to a 
restriction of freedom to work.23 However, as it was demonstrated in this 
paper, they do.  
 
 
4. Conclusions  
 
Summing up our analysis we conclude that Russian provisions on suitable 
employment do not provide a reasonable and fair consensus between the 
individual characteristics of the citizen, his aspirations in the field of work 
and the interests of society. Special rules for several groups of unemployed, 
obliging them to accept any second job proposed under the menace of 
unemployment benefit suspension (or the refusal to grant the status of 
unemployed as far as those who are registers as seeking employment are 
                                                
21  S. Deakin, “The right to work” ”, in N. Bruun, K. Lörcher, I. Schömann, S. 
Clauwaert(eds) The European Social Charter and Employment Relation. Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2017. P. 159. 
22  Conclusions 2017 - Fédération de Russie - article 12-1, 2017/def/RUS/12/1/FR , 
08/12/2017.  
23  In the previous conclusions the Committee pointed that in certain cases and under certain 
circumstances the loss of unemployment benefits on grounds of refusal to accept offered 
employment could amount, indirectly, to a restriction on the freedom to work.  
Conclusions 2012 - Russian Federation - Article 1-2 2012/def/RUS/1/2/EN,  07/12/2012. 
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concerned) are not in conformity with the ILO Convention No, 122, ratified 
by Russia. These norms are discriminatory in nature and thus violate the 
ESC and the ECtHR. In certain individual cases, they might be interpreted as 
violating the prohibition of forced labour (ICPCR and the ECtHR) and 


















































The European Pillar of Social rights and the instrumentalization of the 







With the European Pillar of Social Rights, which was proclaimed and signed 
in the Fall of 2017 the EU continues to connect the goal of inclusion in the 
labour market to the protection of basic social rights. This paper critically 
examines this relationship. It argues that the European Commission favours 
employment policies over minimum income policies alongside the 
observation that the European Commission ignores the potential negative 
effects of financial sanctions that are imposed on welfare recipients who fail 
to comply with work-related obligations (work-related sanctions) on the 
access to adequate minimum income benefits. That is, minimum income 
policies have become, above all, an instrument of broader employment 
policies. In response to these developments, this chapter establishes a social 
rights perspective on the ‘activating features’ of minimum income policies. 
This implies that it takes into account that financial incentives aiming to 
stimulate welfare recipients to (re)integrate to paid work, may negatively 
affect their income and - as a result - their right to a minimum means of 
basic subsistence.  
Departing from this social rights perspective, the chapter compares the 
characteristics of national social policies and social protection systems of 
member states that have stipulated relatively high work-related sanctions 
with countries that have stipulated relatively low work-related sanctions. For 
this purpose, this chapter constructs a sanction indicator which quantifies 
work-related sanction provisions in social assistance legislations in 22 EU 
member states. The results of the analysis show that member states that have 
legislated relatively high work-related sanctions tend to spend less money on 
social protection, in particular, regarding benefits and provisions that reduce 
the risk of poverty rate. In addition, the investments of these member states 
in enabling policies are considerable lower compared to member states that 
have legislated relatively low work-related sanctions. Also, the access to the 
threshold of 50% of the median set by the European Committee of Social 
Rights is less well secured in member states that have adopted high work-
related sanctions, compared to member states that have adopted low work-
related sanctions. These conclusions urge the European Commission to 
develop a genuine social rights perspective on the European Pillar of Social 
Rights which seriously considers the amount of social assistance benefits 
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and the extent to which work-related sanctions affect the access to a 





On 17 November 2017 during the Gothenburg Social Summit for fair jobs 
and growth, the Council of the EU, the European Parliament, and the 
Commission proclaimed and signed the European Pillar of Social Rights.1 
According to the preamble, the Pillar aims to ‘serve as a guide towards 
efficient employment and social outcomes when responding to current and 
future challenges which are directly aimed at fulfilling people’s essential 
needs, and towards ensuring better enactment and implementation of social 
rights’.2 This aim is further elaborated in article 14 of the Pillar (minimum 
income) which stipulates:  
“Everyone lacking sufficient resources has the right to adequate minimum 
income benefits ensuring a life in dignity at all stages of life, and effective 
access to enabling goods and services. For those who can work, minimum 
income benefits should be combined with incentives to (re)integrate into the 
labour market”. 
This provision fits with the EU policies of “active inclusion” that – like the 
European Pillar of Social Rights – connects the goal of inclusion in the 
labour market to the protection of basic social rights.3 This paper critically 
examines this relationship. It argues that the European Commission 
continues to favour employment policies over minimum income policies 
alongside the observation that the European Commission ignores the 
potential negative effects of financial sanctions that are imposed on welfare 
recipients who fail to comply with work-related obligations (work-related 
sanctions) on the access to adequate minimum income benefits. That is, 
minimum income policies have become, above all, an instrument of broader 
employment policies. In response to these developments, this chapter 
establishes a social rights perspective on the ‘activating features’ of 
minimum income policies. This implies that it takes into account that 
financial incentives aiming to stimulate welfare recipients to (re)integrate to 
                                                
1  For the text see Council of the European Union, Brussels 20 October 2017 (13129/17), 
Proposal for an Interinstitutional Proclamation on the European Pillar of Social Rights. 
The European Pillar of social rights functions as an evaluative framework for member 
states: it enables member states to test their employment rules and social policies against 
the Social Rights Framework established by the European Commission. As such, the 
Pillar establishes a frame of reference for the EU member states. 
2  Ibid, preamble 12.   
3  Commission Recommendation of 3 October 2008 on the active inclusion of people 
excluded from the labour market, OJ L 307/11, 18 November 2008. 
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paid work, may negatively affect their income and - as a result - their right to 
a minimum means of basic subsistence.  
Departing from this social rights perspective, the chapter compares the 
characteristics of national social policies and social protection systems of 
member states that have stipulated relatively high work-related sanctions 
with countries that have stipulated relatively low work-related sanctions. For 
this purpose, this chapter constructs a sanction indicator which quantifies 
work-related sanction provisions in social assistance legislations in 22 EU 
member states.4 In previous research, I have revealed that recipients living in 
high sanctioning countries tend to experience more material deprivation 
compared to recipients living in low sanctioning countries.5 In line with 
these outcomes I hypothesize that member states that have legislated high 
work-related sanctions for recipients of social assistance (which in the 
context of EU policies are exclusively viewed as ‘incentives’) have adopted 
less protective social systems compared to member states that have 
legislated relatively low work-related sanctions.  
This chapter is organized in the following way: section 2 examines the 
European Policies of Active Inclusion which paved the way for article 14 of 
the European Pillar of Social Rights. Section 3 explains the data used for the 
construction of the sanction indicator. Section 4 constructs a sanction 
indicator for 22 EU member states. Section 5 considers some explanations 
for the legislation of either high or low work-related sanctions in EU 
member states. Section 6 compares the characteristics of social policies of 
member states with relatively high and low work-related sanctions. Section 7 
examines Conclusions of the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) 
on the adequacy of social assistance benefits of the selected EU member 
states and compares this data with the height of work-related sanction in 




2. The EU policies of active Inclusion: an instrumentalist perspective on 
human social rights 
 
Art. 14 of the European Pillar of Social Rights reveals a connection between 
(re)integration policies and the right to an adequate income. The relationship 
between these, in fact, distinct policy areas was established for the first time 
                                                
4  This sanction indicator is more refined than that used in previous studies E.g. A. Eleveld, 
Work-related sanctions in European welfare states: an incentive to work or a violation of 
minimum subsistence rights, ACCES Europe Research Paper Series, no. 2016/01; A. 
Eleveld, “Activation policies: policies of social inclusion or social exclusion”, Journal of 
Poverty and Social Justice, Vol. 25, 2017, pp. 277-285. 
5 Ibid. 
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in the 1990s with the development of EU policies of social inclusion. 
However, since then the focus has been put on employment policies - ‘the 
inclusion of EU citizens in the labour market’-, in particular since the 
adoption of the Lisbon strategy in 2000 and its mid-term review in 2004. 
This changed in 2008 when the European Commission adopted the policies 
of active inclusion which sought to (re)connect the goal of inclusive labour 
markets with the goal of an adequate income support, and access to social 
services such as employment and training services.6 As such, the policies of 
active inclusion united two policy areas which had become increasingly 
separated during the preceding decade: the European Employment strategy 
(EES), focusing on labour markets; and the social Open Method of 
Coordination on social inclusion, focusing on deprived living situations.7 
The joint focus on income support and employment policies has been 
continued in the Europe 2020 strategy8 and - as said -  has become part of the 
recent European Pillar of Social Rights.  
Regarding these developments in EU social policies, the EU policy 
documents on active inclusion are crucial for understanding the meaning of 
art, 14 of the European Pillar of Social Rights. Therefore, this section 
examines some key policy documents on active inclusion. In the first 
document, adopting policies on active inclusion, the Commission stated that 
the goal of adequate income support entails ‘the individual’s basic right to 
resources and social assistance sufficient to lead a life that is compatible 
with human dignity as part of a comprehensive, consistent drive to combat 
social exclusion’.9 Hence, in addition to employment policies, a basic right 
to a minimum income was viewed as an important means to achieving social 
inclusion. At the same time, the Commission clarified that the right to 
adequate income should not be understood as an unconditional right to a 
minimum income, but that the right to social assistance should be interpreted 
in keeping with EU’s employment policies. In this context, the Commission 
referred to the requirement of safeguarding ‘an incentive to seek 
employment for people whose condition renders them fit for work’.10 In 
                                                
6  See note 3. According to the Commission Recommendation, active inclusion policies 
consist of three pillars: (a) adequate income support; (b) inclusive labour markets; and (c) 
access to quality services.  
7  Regarding the goal of adequate means of subsistence, see the Council Recommendation 
92/441/EEC of 24 June 1992 on common criteria concerning sufficient resources and 
social assistance in social protection systems (OJ L.245/46).  
8  For example, the ‘flagship initiatives’ refer to both increased labour participation and 
access to social rights. See communication from the Commission, Europe 2020, A 
strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, 3 March 2010, COM (2010) 2020 
final. Also see Commission Staff Working Document. Social Investment Package. 20 
February 2013, SWD (2013) 39 final, pp. 4-5. 
9  See note 3. 
10  See note 3. 
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short, for the Commission, the goal of ‘inclusive labour markets’ was to be 
achieved by both enabling policies and financial incentives (i.e. work-related 
sanctions in social benefits schemes) aiming at the activation of recipients of 
social benefits.  
Notwithstanding that the EU policies of active inclusion supplemented 
previous focus on employment strategies with a social rights perspective, the 
follow-up documents (including the European Pillar of Social Rights) fail to 
mention potential adverse consequences of such “financial incentives” on  
adequate income support.11 Indeed, these documents argue that “[t]he level 
[of minimum income schemes] should be high enough for a decent life and 
at the same time help people to be motivated and activated to work”.12 In 
other words, the level of income support is (also) viewed as an incentive to 
work, in that it should not be too high (as this encourages inactivity), 
indicating that for EU policies of active inclusion work-related sanctions are, 
above all, a reasonably efficient means to encourage recipients (of social 
assistance) to work. 
The academic literature on EU social policy seems to have adopted a similar 
view on work-related sanctions. For example, scholars such as Marchal and 
van Mechelen,13 have classified work-related sanctions in minimum income 
schemes exclusively as an instrument of inclusive labour markets, while 
ignoring the possible adverse effects these instruments may have on the goal 
of adequate income support (as part of EU policies of active inclusion). 
Their research does not pay attention to the possibility that work-related 
sanctions may produce income below the poverty line for a sanctioned 
recipient.  
If we interpret Art. 14 of the European Pillar of Social Rights along the lines 
of EU policies of active inclusion, it could be argued that a fundamental 
social human right - the right to a basic means of subsistence - has become 
an instrument of governing people’s behaviour. To put otherwise, the right 
to minimum income benefits is only acquired on the condition that the 
                                                
11  See the follow up documents of the Council Recommendation: (1) Communication from 
the Commission. The European platform against poverty and social exclusion: A 
European framework for social and territorial cohesion, SEC (2010) 1564 final, p.6; (2) 
Commission Staff Working Document. Social Investment Package. 20 February 2013, 
SWD (2013) 39 final, p.13; (3) Communication from the Commission. Towards social 
investment for growth and cohesion, 20 October 2013. COM (2013) 83 final, p. 10.  
12  Communication from the Commission. Towards social investment for growth and 
cohesion, 20 October 2013. COM (2013) 83 final, p.19; also see Commission Staff 
Working Document. Social investment package, 20 February 2013, SWD (2013) 39 final, 
p. 10. 
13  S. Marchal and N. van Mechelen, “A new kid in town? Active inclusion elements in 
European minimum income schemes”, Social Policy & Administration, Vol 51, 2017, pp. 
171-194. These authors have used the concept of active inclusion to evaluate activation 
policies in the context of broader welfare policies of EU Member States. 
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recipient ‘behaves well’. This view, which I name the ‘instrumentalist 
perspective’ also seems to constitute the main paradigm in national 
activation policies: welfare recipients are eligible for social assistance 
benefits on the condition that they comply with work-related obligations. 
The problem with this instrumentalist perspective is that it ignores the 
created risk of violating the right to a minimum means of subsistence and 
other basic human rights. Then, from this limited perspective, it is hard to 
recognize (1) that the reduction or even withdrawal of benefits due to the 
imposition of work-related obligations -may leave the recipient in poverty; 
and (2) that these work-based obligations increase the risk of the 
unemployed of being subjected to abuse of arbitrary power (e.g. the 
dependency on the welfare state manager and workfare supervisors) and (the 
subsequent) violations of dignity. In short, from the instrumentalist 
perspective, the view on work-related sanctions is narrowed down to an 
assessment on behavioural effects. Contrastingly, this article builds on a 
social rights perspective that does not consider a work-related sanction as an 
incentive but in relation to a genuine right to a minimum means of 
subsistence. The differences between the instrumentalist perspective and the 




Table 1: Different perspectives on activation policies 
 
Instrumentalist perspective  Social rights perspective 
‘Neutral’ instrumentalist approach to 
activation policies  
Normative approach to activation 
policies 
Focus on labour market participation Focus on social rights protection 
The fundamental right to a basic means 
of subsistence as an instrument for the 
activation of people: only welfare 
recipients complying with work-related 
obligations are eligible for social 
assistance benefits of the last resort  
It is acknowledged that activation 
policies can also have adverse effects 
i.e. the violation of specific social rights 
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3. The data  
 
In order to compare national social protection systems of EU member states 
and the strictness of financial sanctions, the research project aimed at 
gathering data on the sanctioning system of social assistance in as many EU 
member states as possible. This section explains how the member states 
were selected (3.1). Consequently, it goes on to provide some country 
specific remarks with respect to their system of social assistance benefits 
(3.2) and an explanation of the questionnaire (3.3).  
 
 
3.1 The selection of the countries 
 
The questionnaires completed by legal and social policy specialists for 22 
EU member states (see appendix 2) are the main source for this chapter. It 
was our intention to investigate the level of sanctioning in all EU Member 
States. However, during the term of the research, it was not possible to find 
legal specialists for Latvia. In addition, Malta and Hungary were excluded, 
because the available data were not clear enough for the aim of this study. 
Cyprus was also excluded, because at the time of the research the new social 
assistance legislation Law had only recently been implemented and there 
were no guidelines; internal decrees and/or jurisprudence in place for 
answering the questions in a satisfying way. Greece was excluded because it 
did not regulate social assistance benefits for able-bodied people. Finally, we 
decided to exclude Spain for the analysis in this article, since Catalonia, the 
region we had selected (in Spain social assistance benefits are regulated at a 
regional level), had since the reform of 2011 limited social assistance 
benefits (PRIMI benefits) to people with special and additional needs.14 
As a result, the country selection includes 22 EU Member States: Austria 
(AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BU), Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE), 
Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany, Croatia 
(HG), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), the 
Netherlands (NL), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Slovenia (SI), 
Slovakia (SK), Sweden (SE), and the United Kingdom (UK).   
 
 
                                                
14 The data of Spain and data of European States which are not a member of the EU (Norway 
and Switzerland) were used for other publications (e.g. see publications mentioned in note 
4).  
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3.2 Some country specific remarks concerning non-contributory social 
assistance benefits 
In most countries social assistance benefits are regulated at the national 
level. However, in some countries social assistance benefits are partly or 
entirely regulated at a regional or local level. In Austria social assistance 
benefits are entirely regulated at the local level. For this member state, 
therefore, the regulations of the city of Vienna were examined. In addition, 
there were some countries that (partly) regulate social assistance benefits at 
the local level. For example, in Lithuania hardship provisions are regulated 
at the local level. Therefore, for this country, the regulations for Vilnius 
were also examined. In Romania, social assistance benefits are partly 
regulated at the municipal level in the form of emergency benefits. 15 
However, regarding the (very) temporary character of these benefits, they 
were not included. In Italy social assistance benefits are partly regulated at 
the regional level. The regulations of the municipal of Milan were studied, 
but it was decided not to include these regulations in the research, because it 
only offers one relatively small sum for the unemployed who participate for 
six months in an activation project.16 
Three investigated member states have adopted rather limited social 
assistance schemes for able-bodied people. In Italy people are only eligible 
for social assistance benefits if they are unemployed and at least one member 
of the household is under the age of 18, or over 55 and does not (yet) qualify 
for a retirement scheme. In Bulgaria able-bodied people are only eligible for 
social assistance benefits after a waiting period of six months; and in 
Croatia, able-bodied people are eligible for social assistance benefits for a 
maximum period of three years. People can only re-apply for social 
assistance benefits after a period of three months.  
 
3.3 The questionnaire  
The completed questionnaires were the main source for this report. The 
country specialists were asked to fill out the questionnaires for the situation 
at 1 January 2015. 17  With respect to some countries, some additional 
research was conducted by examining the (translated) text of the relevant 
legal regulations. This was the case with the Czech Republic, France, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, and Poland.  
                                                
15  Emergency benefits cover accidents, health issues, home depreciation due to calamities or 
other unforeseen events. These benefits will be sanctioned in case the recipient does not 
fulfill work-related obligations. 
16  See Patti per il riscatto sociale (Milan) (Pacts for the advancement of social conditions). 
17  With the exception of Italy where we also considered some important legislative changes 
in 2015.  
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The questionnaire contained questions on financial sanctions which, 
according to the national or regional legislation on non-contributory social 
assistance, can be imposed on recipients of social assistance who fail to fulfil 
one or more of the work-related requirements:  
(1) register with an employment office; 
(2) sign an integration or insertion contract; 
(3) comply with job research requirement; 
(4) participate in a job community programme; 
(5) participate in a training programme; 
(6) participate in an employment programme; 
(7) other. 
 
This paper refers to a work-related fault where the recipient of social 
assistance fails to fulfil one of these requirements. Initially the questionnaire 
distinguished between the ‘termination’, ‘suspension’ and ‘reduction’ of the 
benefits. However, whereas during the research this term appeared to be 
multi-interpretable, the category of ‘suspension’ was replaced by 
‘termination’ or a ‘reduction of 100%’, dependent on the country specific 
meaning of ‘suspension’. ‘Termination’ means that the benefits are 
withdrawn and that the former recipient must re-apply for the benefits. A 
‘reduction of 100%’ means that the recipient does not receive his or her 
social assistance benefits for a specific period. However, in contrast to 
‘termination’, the recipient does not have to re-apply for the benefits.  
 
 
4. The sanction indicator  
 
In order to construct the sanction indicator, data from the questionnaire were 
categorized. Based on this categorization, I was able to formulate the most 
important indicators depicting the variety of sanctions. Contrary to previous 
analyses, I refined the indicators, as a result of which the number of 
indicators increased. In addition, unlike previous analyses,  I decided to limit 
the indicators to those indicators which are directly related to the span and 
level of the sanction and to recidivism,18 which arguably has contributed to 
the clearness of the indicator.  
In some countries, different sanctions apply depending on the kind of work-
related fault.19 For example, in Denmark, the benefits will be reduced for the 
                                                
18 In previous analyses (see note 150) the degree to which sanctions could be mitigated were 
included as an element of the sanction indicator.   
19 This was the case for Bulgaria, Denmark, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovakia, 
Spain, and the UK.  
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days the recipient failed to participate in one of the prescribed activities.20 
The benefits are instead reduced by 3/20 of the monthly payment where the 
recipient ceases an educational activity without good reason;21 or, if s/he 
rejects an employment activity, social benefits may be terminated 
immediately.22 Whereas the goal of this article is to examine the relationship 
between work-related sanctions and the access to social rights, it was 
decided to focus only on work-related fault(s) as a result of which the 
highest set of sanctions were imposed. The following countries have adopted 
different (sets of) financial sanctions, depending on fault: Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovakia, the UK. For these countries 
we only examined those work-related faults for which the highest sanction 
was legislated.  
As shown in Table 1, various criteria were considered, including the number 
of work-related, sanctioned behaviour; recidivism; period of reduced or 
terminated benefits; percentage of benefit reduction; and the flexibility of the 
periods and percentages of reduction. To calculate a sanction indicator for 
each country, each indicator counted for one point. Elements 6 and 7 
counted double (termination or a reduction of 100% after a first, second or 
third fault for a fixed period of respectively six months or more and one year 
or more) in order to give sufficient weight to these harsh provisions 
relatively to other provisions. As a result, the sanction indicator consists of a 
maximum of 22 points.  
 
Table 1: Elements of the sanction indicator  
1. Termination or a reduction of 100% after a first fault for a minimum 
period of two years or more 
2. Termination or a reduction of 100% after a first fault for a minimum 
period of one year or more. 
3. Termination or a reduction of 100% after a first fault for a minimum 
period of three months or more. 
4. Termination or a reduction of 100% after a first fault for a minimum 
period of two months or more 
5. Termination or a reduction of 100% after a first fault for a fixed period.  
6. Termination or a reduction of 100% after a first, second or third fault for a 
fixed period of six months or more. 
7. Termination or a reduction of 100% after a first, second or third fault for a 
minimum period of twelve months or more.  
8. Termination or a reduction of 100% after a first or second fault for a 
                                                
20 See Act on Active Social Policy, par. 36-38.  
21 See Act on Active Social Policy, par. 40. 
22 See Act on Active Social Policy, par. 41.  
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minimum period of six months or more 
9. Termination or a reduction of 100% after a first, second or third fault for a 
minimum period of three months or more 
10. Termination or a reduction of 100% after a first or second fault with and 
without a fixed period. 
11. Termination or a reduction of 100% after a first, second or third fault, for a 
fixed period.  
12. Termination or a reduction of 100% after a first, second or third fault with 
and/or without a fixed time period (i.e. immediate reparation of the fault is 
possible) and excluding those countries who have adopted a discretionary 
provision regarding the percentage of the sanction (i.e. up to 100%). 
13. Termination or a reduction of 100% after a first, second or third fault, with 
and/or without a fixed time period (i.e. immediate reparation of the fault is 
possible) and including those countries who have adopted a discretionary 
provision regarding the percentage of the sanction (i.e. up to 100%). 
14. Termination or a reduction of 100% after a first fault, with and/or without 
a fixed time period (i.e.       immediate reparation of the fault is possible) 
and including those countries who have adopted a discretionary provision 
with regard to the percentage of the sanction (i.e. up to 100%). 
15. Termination or a reduction of 80% or more for after a first fault.  
16. Termination or a reduction of 50% or more after a second fault, excluding 
those countries who have adopted a discretionary provision regarding the 
percentage of the sanction (i.e. up to 100%). 
17. Termination or a reduction of 50% or more after a first fault, excluding 
those countries who have adopted a discretionary provision regarding the 
percentage of the sanction (i.e. up to 100%). 
18. Termination or a reduction of 20% or more after a first fault, including 
those countries who have adopted a discretionary provision  regarding the 
percentage of the sanction (i.e. up to 100%). 
19. Termination or a reduction of 50% or more after a first, second or third 
fault, including those countries who have adopted a discretionary 
provision regarding the percentage of the sanction (i.e. up to 100%). 
20. Termination or a reduction of any kind excluding those countries who 
have legislated that benefits may only be reduced on the condition that if it 
will not endanger a living essential in providing security needed for a life 
of human dignity.  






Table 2: The scores on the sanction indicator 
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23  Assuming that recipients are not absent 50% or more.  
24  After a second fault: 50% reduction for 10 months, this is calculated as 100% reduction of 
5 months.  




Figure 1: Sanction Indicator  
 
 
Table 2 contains the score for each indicator of each member state. These 
scores are visualized in Figure 1. This figure shows that a number of 
countries share the same scores. As I intended to compare these scores with 
indicators related to characteristics of systems of social protection using the 
Spearman correlation (which compares the rankings of countries) it was 
necessary to further differentiate between countries with similar scores. For 
this purpose, I first examined the legislation of mitigation provisions. These 
are provisions ‘softening’ the sanction. I distinguished between three types 
of mitigation provisions: hardship clauses (that allow some benefits, 
eventually in kind, despite the imposition of a financial sanction) reparatory 
conditions (that allows for withdrawal of the financial sanction as soon as 
the sanctioned recipient complies with the work-related obligations) and 
good reason conditions (allowing the decision-maker not to impose the 
sanction in case of good reasons). As shown in Table 3, countries with 
similar scores had also legislated the same number of mitigation provisions 
in two cases. In these cases, I examined whether the legislation excluded 
specific components of the social assistance benefits from sanctioning. In the 
case of Belgium and France (both scoring 10 on the sanction index and 
legislating two types of mitigation provisions) Belgium received a higher 
ranking on the sanction indicator (revealing a harsher sanctioning system) 
compared to France because in France benefits are sanctioned for 50% 
(instead of 100%) where the household consists of more than one person. In 
addition, Poland was ranked higher compared to Ireland (both scoring 10 on 
the sanction index and legislating all three types of mitigation provisions) 
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and heating component. Table 4 shows the ranking on the sanction indicator 
based on this additional analysis.  
 
 
Table 3: Differentiating the scores 
Score 18 (number of 
mitigation 
provisions)  
Score 15 (number of 
mitigation 
provisions) 
Score 13 (number 
of mitigation 
provisions) 
Score 10 (number 
of mitigation 
provisions) 
Croatia     (0)  Estonia                (1) Luxembourg (2) Romania  (1) 
Slovenia   (1) Czech Republic  (2) Netherlands (3) Belgium   (2) 
Lithuania  (2)    France     (2) 
   Poland     (3) 
   Ireland     (3) 
 
 
Table 4: Rank on the Sanction Indicator 
Member State Rank on the sanction indicator 
Portugal 1 
Bulgaria 2 























5. Explaining the adoption of work-related sanctions 
 
For the European Union, work-related sanctions amount to incentives to 
participate in the labour market. However, there are many different 
instruments that can be used to activate beneficiaries of social assistance 
towards paid employment. Before I continue analysing the relationship 
between the height of work-related sanctions and the characteristics of the 
social protection systems, this section, first, examines some reasons 
explaining the preference for work-related sanctions (also called ‘the stick’) 
over enabling instruments (also called ‘the carrot’). 
 
Why do governments prefer the legislation of work-related sanctions over 
investments in enabling instruments, such as training programmes?  It could 
be hypothesized that governmental coalitions characterized with a left-wing 
social-economic orientation are more inclined to adopt relatively low work-
related sanctions compared to governmental coalitions characterized with a 
right-wing social-economic orientation. In order to investigate this 
hypothesis, I examined the political colour of the national governments two 
years preceding the date of the analysed sanctioning legislation (2013). 
Figure 3 shows whether the economic and social policies of each national 
government could be depicted as left-wing, neutral or right-wing. The colour 
red indicates a predominantly left-wing social economic orientation of the 
governmental coalition; green indicates a middle position regarding the 
social economic orientation of the government; blue indicates a right-wing 
social economic orientation of the government; grey indicates that no 
information was available in this regard. The dispersion of the colours 
among member states suggests that there is no relationship between 
governmental coalitions and the social-political orientation of the 
governmental coalitions. 26  This means that our hypothesis should be 
rejected. Moreover, in contrast to our expectations, the only trend we could 
specify is that the countries who scored high on the sanction indicator lists 
had a governmental coalition with a left-wing social-economic orientation.  
 
Possibly the adoption of work-related sanctions as an activation instrument 
is preferred over other instruments because it is less expensive. Hence, it 
could be hypothesized that member states with a low Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) are more inclined to adopt work-related sanctions compared 
to member states with a high GDP. Indeed, table 5 reveals a low-moderate 
                                                
26 The following database was used for this study:  C. Cruz, P. Keefer and C. Cartascini, 
Political institutions of the Inter-American Development Bank 
(https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/7408, accessed on 30 January 2018. 
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negative Spearman correlation between the ranking on the sanction indicator 
and the GDP (-0,482).  
 
However, a correlation between the GDP and the sanction indicator does not 
necessarily imply a causal relationship. The differences between sanctioning 
policies could also be explained by other factors which are also related to the 
GDP, such as the type of welfare state. Indeed, the sanction indicator also 
suggests a relationship between the height of the sanction and the welfare 
state type. For example, Table 4 shows that member states belonging to the 
post-Communist welfare state type, the former USSR type, and the 
Mediterranean type score relatively high on the sanction indicator (Portugal, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovenia, and Lithuania) while member states belonging 
to the conservative and social-democratic welfare state type rank relatively 
low (Denmark Germany Austria, Sweden, and Finland). In addition, member 
states belonging to the Anglo-Saxon welfare state type both score relatively 
high (the UK) and medium (Ireland). A possible relationship between the 
ranking on the sanction indicator and the welfare state type seems to be 
limited, however, to the welfare states ranked at the top and at the bottom of 
sanction indicator. Member states located in the middle range, then, belong 
to all six distinguished types of welfare states, except for the social 
democratic welfare state type (Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Romania, Belgium, France, and Poland).27  
 
More (qualitative) research needs to be done to establish why member states 
choose for high work-related sanctions. Yet, as mentioned above, the aim of 
this chapter is not so much to explain the differences in sanctioning policies 
but to compare the characteristics of the social policies and social protection 
systems of the member states that have legislated relatively high work-
related sanctions with those with relatively low work-related sanctions. This 






                                                
27 For the classification of welfare state types I draw on G. Bonoli, “Classifying welfare 
states”, Journal of European Social Policy Vol. 26, 1997, pp. 351-372; F.G. Castles and 
H. Obinger, “Worlds, families, regimes”, West European Politics Vol. 31, 2008, pp.  321-
344; G. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge, Polity, 
1999; H.J.M. Fenger, “Welfare regimes in Central and Eastern Europe: Incorporating 
post-communist countries in a welfare regime typology”, Contemporary issues and ideas 
in Social Sciences Vol. 3, 2007, pp. 1-30; E. Ferragina and M. Seeleib-Kaiser, “Welfare 
regime debate: past, present, futures?”, Policy & Politics 39 (4), pp. 583-611. 
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6. The sanction indicator compared to characteristics of national social 
policies  
 
From a social rights perspective, we are particularly interested in possible 
violations of access to basic social rights as a result of the sanctioning 
system. Tables 1 and 2 shows that all national social assistance legislations, 
except Finland, have legislated a sanction of 100% reduction or 
termination.28 This means that in almost all examined member states the 
income of recipients of social assistance may fall below the poverty line 
when the welfare recipients do not comply with work-related obligations.29 
This risk increases in those (eleven) member states where the benefits are 
normally reduced during a fixed period of at least one month after a first 
fault;30 and even more so in seven member states where the access to 
benefits are denied for six months or more.31Particular welfare recipients 
living in the latter member states seem to be at risk of falling below the 
poverty line. Depending on the generosity of the national system of social 
protection, this risk could be (partly) mitigated. This section explores the 
characteristics of national social policies of member states that have adopted 
(these) high work-related sanctions compared with those adopting relatively 
                                                
28  See element 13 of the sanction indicator.  
29  It should be noted though that both Finland and Sweden have stipulated that benefits may 
only be reduced on the condition that it will not endanger a living providing a security for 
living a life in dignity (see element 20 of the sancion indicator).  
30  See element 5 of the sanction indicator.  
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low work-related sanctions. To this end, this section analyses the 
relationship between the sanction indicator and the (1) governmental 
expenditures devoted to social protection as a ratio to the GDP; (2) reduction 
in the percentage of the risk of poverty rate due to social transfers (excluding 
pensions) and (3) public expenditure on Active Labour Market Policies 
(ALMP) as a percentage of the GDP.  
Table 5 shows a low-moderate negative Spearman correlation between the 
total expenditure of government devoted to social protection as a ratio to 
GDP (-0,487). This means that countries adopting relatively high work-
related sanctions tend to spend a smaller percentage of the GDP on social 
protection. It should be noted that expenditures to ‘social protection’ is not 
confined to expenditure on social assistance benefits of last resort; it also 
covers old age and sickness/healthcare benefits, benefits related to 
family/children, disability, survivors, and unemployment. Moreover, in 2014 
across the EU old age and sickness/healthcare benefits together accounted 
for 66,9 % of total social protection expenditure.32  
Yet, from a social rights perspective, we are particularly interested in the 
expenditures of member states (relative to their GDP) on minimum income 
benefits. In addition, since we focus on the legislation of work-related 
sanctions we are interested in minimum income benefits for people below 
the pensionable age. In this respect, the EU data on the reduction in the 
percentage of the risk of poverty rate due to social transfers seem to be more 
suitable, as these data are not only directly related to the access to minimum 
income benefits, but also excludes expenditures on pensions. Table 5 shows 
a moderate negative Spearman correlation with the height of the sanction 
indicator (-0,530). This means that in member states with relatively high 
work-related sanctions the poorest part of the population tends to benefit less 
from social transfers, compared to member states with low work-related 
sanctions (see Figure 3). Figure 3 shows that Germany, Poland and Romania 
are outliers. These countries score relatively low on the sanction indicator 
compared to what would be expected regarding the reduction of the risk of 
poverty due to social transfers in these countries. If we exclude them from 
the analysis, the Spearman correlation rises to -0,733.  
Finally and unsurprisingly, table 5 shows a high Spearman correlation 
between the sanction indicator and the public expenditure on Active Labour 
Market Policies (ALMP) such as training, employment incentives, sheltered 
and supported employment and rehabilitation as a percentage of GDP.33 The 
                                                
32  Eurostat, Stastics Explained. Social protection statistics, June 2017 
(http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Social_protection_statistics, 
accessed at 24 Februari 2018).   
33  These active measures are distinguished from ‘passive’ measures such as unemployment 
benefits. It should be noted that no data were available for Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania 
and the UK 
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enabling and motivating instruments seem to function as communicating 
vessels: member states spending relatively more on active labour market 
policies tend to impose lower work-related sanctions (see Figure 4).  
In sum, member states that have adopted high work-related sanctions tend to 
spend less money on social protection, in particular, regarding benefits and 
provisions that reduce the risk of poverty rate. In addition, the investments of 
these member states in enabling policies are considerably lower compared to 




Table 5 Spearman correlation social and employment policies 
 GDP (2015) Total expenditure 
of government 
devoted to social 
protection as a 
ratio to GDP 
(2015) 
Reduction in the 
percentage of the 
risk of poverty 




























Sources: Eurostat data (2015) and OECD (2015). 
                                                
34  Pensions are excluded. 
35  The data are restricted to active measures. There was no data available for Bulgaria, 




Figure 3: Ranking on the sanction indicator is higher in member states 






Figure 4: Ranking on the sanction indicator is higher in member states 




7. The adequacy of social assistance benefits 
From a social rights perspective, we are also interested in the question 
whether benefits of last resort are sufficient regardless of the imposition of a 
work-related sanction. Art. 34 (3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(ECFR) stipulates that  
“in order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognizes and 
respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent 
existence for all those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance with the 
rules laid down by Community law and national law and practices”.  
Art. 13 (1) of the European Social Charter (ESC) which lays down the right 
to social and medical assistance for anyone without adequate resources, has 
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been an important source for Art. 34 (3) of the ECFR.36 Moreover in the 
European context the ESC has been found the key legal instrument 
regulating social rights.37 This section considers, first, the extent to which, 
according to the supervising body of the ESC, the European Committee of 
Social Rights (ECSR), EU member states comply with the duties following 
from Art. 13 (1) ESC. Consequently, it analyses the relationship between the 
height of the work-related sanction and the extent to which member states - 
according to the ECSR - comply with the the duty to guarantee access to a 
minimum income in accordance with Art. 13 (1) ESC.38  
With respect to Art. 13 ESC, the ECSR asks member states regularly to 
provide information regarding their system of social assistance benefits, 
including the amount of the benefits granted to beneficiaries of social 
assistance. Based on this information, the ECSR reports whether it is 
sufficient, i.e. that it amounts to at least 50% of the median equivalized 
income. The last Conclusions of the ECSR on Art.13 ESC date from 8 
December 2017; 4 December 2015 and 6 December 2013. I examined the 
Conclusions in these years for all member states listed at the sanction 
indicator, except for Slovenia that neither signed nor ratified the ESC. In 
addition, during this period the ECSR did not report for Poland on Art. 13 
ESC.  
The main results are listed in Table 6. This table shows that only a minority 
of the ratifying states comply with the criterion set by the ECSR. If we look 
at the most recent report for each country then only six out of twenty 
countries meet this standard, namely: Belgium; Romania; and the UK 
(Conclusions December 2017); Luxembourg; the Netherlands; and Sweden 
(Conclusions 2013). With respect to two additional countries the ESCR 
stated that the amount of the benefits was not adequate for all groups (e.g. 
                                                
36  See the explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (OJ 2007/C 303/27).  
37  M. Mikkola, Social Human Rights of Europe. Karelactio Legisactio Ltd, Porvoo, 2010.  
38  Note that the right to a basic means of subsistence has been enshrined in a number of 
International Treaties. In addition to art. 34 (3) ECFR and Art. 13 ESC, the most 
important provisions are Art. 25 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
according to which  “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and well-being of himself and of his family”; Art. 27 (1) of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, which states that “States Parties recognize the right of every child to a 
standard of living adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social 
development”; Art. 9 and Art. 11 (1) and (2) of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR). Art. 9 ICESCR stipulates the right to social security. 
Point 16 of the General Comment to Art. 9 further states that at the expiry of the period of 
unemployment benefits, the social security system should ensure adequate protection, for 
example through a system of social assistance (General Comment No. 19, adopted 23 
November 2007 at the 39th session [doc.no. E/C.12.GC/19]). In case of unemployment, 
Art. 11(1) ICESCR recognizes “the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for 
himself and his family, including adequate food clothing and hauling and to the 
continuous improvement of living conditions”. 
 117 
immigrants, youth, pensioners, etc.) i.e. Austria and Finland (Conclusions 
2017). With respect to the other twelve countries the ESCR stated in their 
most recent Conclusions that the amount of benefit was inadequate. In the 
2013 and 2015 reports, the ECSR also used the word ‘manifestly inadequate’ 
for a few countries, namely: Croatia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania 
(however, in 2017, the ECSR reported that the social benefits in Romania 
were ‘adequate’) and Slovakia. It is remarkable that none of the first group 
of countries (qualified ‘adequate’, or ‘almost adequate’), with the exception 
of the UK, are ranked in the top ten of the sanction indicator. Conversely, all 
countries of the second group (qualified ‘manifestly inadequate’) belong to 
the top ten.39 In other words - and confirming the results of previous section 
- countries that legislate higher work-related sanctions are more likely to 
violate Art. 13(1) ESC regarding the amount of social benefit offered to its 
citizens.  
In order to establish a quantifiable relationship between the ranking on the 
sanction indicator and the compliance with art. 13 (1) ESC, I have quantified 
the qualitative results by rating the Conclusions of the ECSR between 2013 
and 2017, according to the qualification such as ‘adequate’ or ‘manifestly 
inadequate’, using rates between 1 and 5 points (see Table 7).40 Based on 
these ratings I calculated the Spearman correlation between the two 
variables. Table 8 shows a low-moderate Spearman correlation (0,489) 
between the ECSR Conclusion rating of the 19 remaining member states41 
and their listing on the sanction indicator. The UK, ranking third on the 
sanction indicator list, and which benefits were qualified ‘adequate’ is 
clearly an outlier. When we leave out the UK, we find a high-moderate 
Spearman correlation (0,661). 
The ECSR also considers reductions, suspensions, or terminations of the 
entitlement to social assistance due to a (work-related) sanction. The 
Conclusions suggest that, unless the state has adopted appropriate hardship 
clauses, work-related sanctions may contravene the right to minimum means 
of subsistence. In previous research, I have shown the adoption of hardship 
clauses is related to the ranking on the sanction indicator: countries ranked 
high on the sanction indicator tend to be less inclined to adopt hardship 
clauses compared to lower ranked countries.42  
                                                
39  Romania is put in the first group, because of the report of 2017. 
40  Czech Republic could not be rated, because the ECSR concluded in 2013 that it lacked 
information for a Conclusion on 13 ESC and in the years thereafter the ECSR did not 
examine this country. 
41  In addition to Slovenia (did not ratify the ESC) and Poland (the ECSR did not report on 
art. 13 (1) between 2013 and 2017), I had to leave out the Czech Republic, as this member 
state did not provide enough information to the ECSR (see Table 6). As a result 19 
member states were left out for the analysis.  
42 See note 4.  
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In sum, the conclusions of the ECSR are an important source for the 
assessment of the adequacy of social assistance systems. The analysis in this 
section has shown a relationship between countries ranking high on the 
sanction indicator lists and the adequacy of the social benefits according to 
the Conclusions of the ESCR. This means that the social benefits in these 
countries are more often judged as ‘not adequate’ compared to countries that 
have adopted relatively low benefits. The picture is worsened due to the fact 
that countries ranking higher on the sanction indicator tend to be less 
inclined to stipulate hardship clauses. It should be noticed, however, that 
only a minority of the examined member states meets the threshold set by 
the ECSR. This implies that regardless of the sanctioning policies, recipients 



























Table 6 Adequacy of benefits (Conclusions art 13 ESC, ECSR)43 
 2013 2015 2017 Rating 
AT Level of basic benefits 
falls between 40% and 
50% of the Eurostat 
median equivalised 
income. More 
information is needed 
regarding additional 
benefits. 
 The overall assistance 
may in some cases 
reach and even 
exceed 50% of the 
median equivalised 
income. However not 
adequate for all 
persons. 
3 
BE Inadequate for certain 
groups. 
 Adequate.44 2 
BG Manifestly inadequate.  Not adequate. 5 
CZ Not enough 
information.45 
   
DE Not enough information.  Not adequate. 4 
DK  Not adequate for certain 
groups. 
Not adequate for 
certain groups.46 
3 
EE Not adequate.  Not adequate. 4 
FI Not adequate for all 
groups.47 
 Not adequate for all 
groups. 
3 
FR  Not adequate. Not adequate. 4 
HR Manifestly inadequate.48   5 
IE Adequate.  Not adequate. 3 
IT Not adequate.  Not adequate. 4 
LT Manifestly inadequate.  Not Adequate. 5 
LU Adequate.   1 
NL Adequate   1 
PT Manifestly inadequate  Not adequate. 5 
RO  Manifestly inadequate. Adequate. 3 
SE Adequate.   1 
SK Manifestly inadequate.  Not adequate. 5 
UK Adequate.  Adequate. 1 
                                                
43  Appendix I contains the references to the Conclusions of the ECSR for each of these 
countries.  
44  The guaranteed income for the elderly is not granted to foreigners without resources 
unless they are covered by EU law or are nationals of States which have concluded 
reciprocity agreements with Belgium. 
45  Also, in 2010 the ECSR concluded that information was missing.  
46  The levels of social assistance paid to persons under 30 years of age and of integration 
allowance paid to single newly arrived foreigners and for Danish citizens who have not 
lived in Denmark for at least seven of the past eight years.  
47  The granting of social assistance benefits to foreign nationals from certain States Parties, 
legally residing in Finland, is subject to an excessive length of residence condition. 
48 Also, in 2010 the ECSR concluded that the benefits in Croatia were manifestly 
inadequate. See: http://hudoc.esc.coe.int/eng/?i=XIX-2/def/HRV/13/1/EN. 
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Table 7: Rating of the Conclusions of the ECSR 
Manifestly inadequate/inadequate 5 
Not adequate  4 
Not adequate for all or certain groups 3 
(manifestly) inadequate/adequate 3 






Table 8: Spearman Correlation Conclusions ECSR (Art. 13 ESC) and 
the ranking on the sanction indicator 
 Judgment of the 
level of social 
assistance benefits 
ECSR 
























                                                
49  Three member states are missing, because (1) Slovenia did not ratify the ESC; (2) the 
ECSR did not report for Poland with respect to Art. 13 ESC in the period 2015-2017; (3) 




The European Commission considers work-related sanctions exclusively as 
an incentive to work. In this article I have analysed work-related sanctions 
from a social rights perspective. As such, I have examined the legislation of 
work-related sanctions in the context of the broader system of social 
protection and the fundamental right to social assistance. This opened up the 
possibility of analysing financial sanctions beyond their instrumental 
function (i.e. ‘an incentive to work’).  
In general, the analysis confirms the hypothesis posed in the introduction. It 
has shown that member states that have legislated relatively high work-
related sanctions tend to spend less money on social protection, in particular, 
regarding benefits and provisions that reduce the risk of poverty rate. In 
addition, the investments of these member states in enabling policies (i.e. 
ALMP) are considerable lower compared to member states that have 
legislated relatively low work-related sanctions. Also, the access to the 
threshold of 50% of the median equivalised income is less well secured in 
member states that have adopted high work-related sanctions, compared to 
member states that have adopted low work-related sanctions.  
Based on the latter analyses the question could be raised whether work-
related sanctions really operate as an incentive to work in member states that 
have adopted relative high work-related sanctions. For example, it could be 
argued that the overall low level of social benefits already functions as an 
incentive to look for paid work. Indeed, regarding the level of benefits, it can 
be assumed that only people who are unable to find a paid job or secure their 
livelihood in another way will apply for social benefits. In addition, 
regarding the fact that these countries have adopted less enabling measures 
(ALMP) compared to member states that have legislated relatively low 
work-related sanctions, these sanctions are probably less often coupled to a 
duty to participate in training or work experience programme. Regarding 
these results, it could be assumed that in low sanctioning member states the 
financial sanction more often operates as an incentive to improve individual 
capabilities to (re-)integrate in the labour market compared to high 
sanctioning member states.   
It should be noted, though, that recipients of social assistance living in 
member states that have legislated rather low financial sanctions are also at 
risk of falling below the poverty line, as almost all member states (i.e. 
including low sanctioning member states) have legislated a 100% reduction 
or termination of the benefits in case of a work-related fault. Moreover, since 
the level of benefits are general higher in these countries (and as a result, 
more money is at stake) recipients of social assistance may feel more 
dependent on the welfare state manager and workfare supervisors. As a 
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result, these welfare recipients may become even more vulnerable to 
exercises of arbitrary power and/or violations of dignity when compared to 
welfare recipients living in member states that have legislated relatively high 
work-related sanctions.  
At the same time, the Conclusions of the ECSR on the implementation of 
Art. 13 ESC (which has been the inspiration of Art. 34 ECFR) are quiet 
alarming for most member states, particularly those member states that have 
legislated relatively high work-related sanctions. These Conclusions should, 
in my opinion, be an important reason for the European Commission to 
develop a genuine social rights perspective on Art. 14 of the European Pillar 
of Social Rights which seriously examines the amount of social assistance 
benefits in member states and which considers the extent to which work-



















































































































Appendix 2  
 
   Legislation that has been considered for this study 
 
 
Country Name Legislation  (date  and source) 
English translation (date and source) 
Austria Vereinbarung zwischen dem Bund und den Ländern gemäß Art. 15a B-VG über eine  
bundesweite Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung (Beschluss, 1-12-2010, STF: LGBI Nr 27/2011). 
Agreement between the Federal and State Governments about a nationwide demand-oriented  
minimum benefit  
(Decision of 1 December 2010. STF: LGBI Nr 27/2011). 
Wiener Mindestsicherungsgesetz (Gesetz, 31-8-2010, S 040-000). 
Vienna Act on Minimum Benefits (Law of 31 August 2010, S 040-000). 
Belgium Wet van 26 mei 2002 betreffende het recht op maatschappelijke integratie (26 mei 2002, nr.  
2002022557, p. 33610). 
Act concerning the right to social integration (Law of 26 May 2002, no. 2002022557, p. 33610). 
Bulgaria Закон за социално подпомагане  (Отразена деноминацията от 05.07.1999 г.) 
Social Assistance Act  (7 May 1999).  
Правилник за прилагане на закона за социално подпомагане (Приет с ПМС № 243 от 05.11.1998 г.). 
Regulation on the application of the Social Assistance Act (Decree No. 243 of 5 November 1998). 
Croatia Zajamčena minimalna naknada (24-12-2014, 157/2013). 
Social Welfare Act (Law of 24 December 2014, Official Gazette 157/2013). 
Czech 
Republic  
o životním a existenčním minimu (14-03-2006, 110/2006). 
 Minimum Income Support (Act of 14 March 2006, Act no. 110/2006). 
Denmark Lov om aktiv socialpolitik, lovbekendtgørelse nr. 1193,  
(Statutory act on active social policy, Consolidation Act no. 1193, of 13 November 2014).  
Lov om aktiv beskæftigelsesindsats (lovbekendtgørelse nr. 990, 12-9-2014). 
Statutory act on active employment policy (Consolidation Act no. 990, of 12 September 2014). 
Estonia Sotsiaalhoolekande seadus (RT I 1995, 21, 323, 1-4-1995). 
Social Welfare Act (RT I 1995, 21, 323, Act of 01.04.1995). 
Finland Asiakaslaki (Laki sosiaalihuollon asiakkaan asemasta ja oikeuksista (30.12.97/1412, Act of 30  
December 1997). 
(Social Assistance Act (Act of 30.12.1997/1412). 
Laki sosiaalihuollon asiakkaan asemasta ja oikeuksista (22.09.2000/812). 
Act on the Status and Rights of Social Welfare Clients (22.09.2000/812, Act of 22 September 2000). 
France Revenu de Solidarité Active (LOI n° 2008-1249 du 1er décembre 2008 généralisant le revenu  
de solidarité active et réformant les politiques d'insertion. 
Solidarity Income (Act no. 2008-1249 of 03.12.2008). 
Germany Grundsicherung (SGB II) (BGBI. I S. 2954, Gesetz vom 24.12.2003).  
(Basic insurance, BGB I S. 2954, Law of 24 December 2003). 
Ireland Consolidated Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 (Number 26 of 2005, Irish Statute Book). 
Italy Decreto Legislativo Disposizioni per il riordiono della normativa in materia di ammortizzatori  
sociali in caso di disoccupazione involontaria e di ricollocazione dei lavoratori disoccupati, in  
attuatzione della legge 10 dicembre 2014, n. 183. (04.03.2015 n. 22/2015). 
Legislative Decree Recordering of legislation regarding unemployment benefits in the event of 
 involuntary unemployed people reintegration, pursuant to Law 10 December 2014,  
no. 183 ( 04.03.2015 no. 22/2015).   
Lithuania Lietuvos Respublikos Piniginės socialinės paramos nepasiturintiems gyventojams įstatymas.   
(Nr. XI-1772, 2011-12-01,  
Žin., 2011, Nr. 155-7353 ,2011-12-20). 
Lithuanian Law on Social Assistance for low income families and single persons.  
 126 
Amending the law (no.XI-1772 of 1 December 2011, Official Gazette no. 155-7353  
of 20 December 2011).  
Luxem-bourg Revenu Minimum Garanti.( Loi du 29 avril 1999, Mémorial A no. 103). 
(Guaranteed Minimum Income, Act of 29-4-1999, Mémorial A no. 103) . 
Nether-lands Participatiewet (wet van 2 juli 2014, Stb. 2014,270). 
Participation Act (Act of 2 July 2014, Stb. 2014, 270). 
Poland Ustawa z dnia (12 marca 2004 r. o pomocy społecznej t.j. Dz.U. z 2015, r. poz 163). 
Social Assistance Act  (12.03.2004, Journal of Laws 2015, 163). 
Portugal Rendimento Social de Inserção (Lei n.º 13/2003 de 21 de Maio. 
Social insertion income regime (Act of 21 May 2003, no. 13/2003).  
Romania  Legea asistenţei sociale (Lege nr. 292 din 20 Decembrie 2011). 
Law on social assistance (20 December 2011, L292/2011). 
Legea privind venitul minim garantat (Lege  nr. 416/2001, din 20 iulie 2001). 
Law on the minimum income guarantee  (20 July 2001, L416/2001). 
Slovenia  Zakon o socialno varstvenih prejemkih (ZSVarPre) (13.07.2010, SOP 2010-01-3350). 
Law on Social Assistance (13 July 2010, SOP 2010-01-3350). 
Slovakia Pomoc v hmotnej núdzi (Platnosť od 12.12.2013, Zákon č. 417/2013 Z. z.). 
Benefits in material need (12 December 2013, 417/2013 Coll.). 
Sweden  Socialtjänstlagen (2001:453), 7-6-2001.  
Social Services Act ( 7 June 2001, 2001:453). 
UK Jobseeker’s allowance regulations 1996 (1 Feburary 1996, SI 1996/207) as  
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This contribution analyses the meanings and the possible roles of the right to 
work for a mature labour law that takes such a right seriously. In a historical 
perspective, the right to work has been denied or supported, according to the 
ruling ideology and the role of the State in society according to it. Now this 
right has been recognised as a human right, the most fundamental of social 
rights, but its justiciability is still at stake. Indeed, in recent times of 
neoliberal reforms in Europe, the right to work has been facing deep and 
diversified violations. And the challenges will be even more due to the 
current jobless economic recovery and transformation of capitalism through 





This contribution represents (in a partial and shortened way) some 
theoretical reflections on the impact that neoliberalism has had (and still has) 
on one of the first historical forms of (as well as one of the most important) 
labour rights recognised by positive law in Western countries, i.e. the right 
to work. The specific context on which these theoretical reflections focus is 
the European one, characterised by the so-called “Great Recession”1 – which 
generated from the 2007/2008 financial crisis in the US and then spread 
globally, bringing about in the European political mainstream the subsequent 
time characterised by austerity measures.2 The geographical characterisation 
of the present contribution reflects the theoretical background of its analysis, 
which is ‘strictly’ connected to values and principles affirmed in Europe 
during the 20th century. 
This chapter is structured as follows: firstly, a paragraph will rephrase the 
meanings and dimensions of the right to work, while also underlining its 
main restrictions. Then, the major changes due to the neoliberal paradigm in 
the implementation of this right will be quickly analysed. Finally, some 
                                                
1  D. B. Grusky, B. Western, and C. Wimer (eds.), The Great Recession, Russell Sage 
Foundation, 2011. 
2  T. Callan, C. Leventi, H. Levy, M. Matsaganis, A. Paulus, and H. Sutherland, “The 
distributional effects of austerity measures: a comparison of six EU countries”, 
EUROMOD Working Paper, No. EM6/11, 2011. 
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theoretical suggestions will be considered in order to bring the right to work 
at the centre of gravity of labour law systems. 
 
 
2. The right to work: an ambiguous entitlement to re-conceptualize 
 
The right to work is a controversial and ambiguous right, yet it is one of the 
most important entitlements among the so-called ‘social rights’. In a 
capitalist economy based on mass production of goods and service, 
employment is a central key in order to access to social inclusion. For these 
reasons, some authors have considered the right to work as “the first of the 
social rights”,3 which are based on the concept of “social person, that lies 
not only in opposition to the authoritarian experience of fascism but that 
overcomes definitely – in the perspective of the substantial equality and the 
promotion of ‘equal freedom’ of citizens – the very legal tradition of the 
Liberal State”.4  
There are different notions of the right to work, therefore the main contents 
of this entitlement can be inflected in different ways. It primarily aims at 
fighting one of the greatest social problems created by the modern 
industrialisation, which is the peculiar social condition of weakness of being 
outside of the labour market known as unemployment.5 In these terms, the 
first immediate concept of the right to work is the right to get a job. If we 
consider the traditional structure of a right, this creates a positive entitlement 
on the person who holds the right that is completed by a negative entitlement 
on another subject in form of a duty or obligation. While transposing this 
traditional structure to the right to work, we should argue that it is a right 
which implies a positive entitlement for the right-holder (the job seeker) to 
be recruited against a sort of negative counterentitlement on someone else 
other than the right-holder who, on her side, “shall” recruit the job seeker. 
Now, it is clear that this reconstruction does not fit into any plausible 
Western implementation of the right to work. Indeed, we need to stress our 
focus on a central element of such a structure: who has the duty to recruit a 
job seeker? And since it is undoubted that everyone holds the right to work, 
who has the duty to make sure that each citizen gets a job?  
                                                
3  S. Giubboni, “Il primo dei diritti sociali. Riflessioni sul diritto al lavoro tra Costituzione 
italiana e ordinamento europeo”, WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”. INT – 46/2006, p. 
5. 
4  S. Giubboni, “Il primo dei diritti sociali. Riflessioni sul diritto al lavoro tra Costituzione 
italiana e ordinamento europeo”, WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”. INT – 46/2006, p. 
3. 
5  R. Salais, N. Baverez, and B. Reynaud, L'invention du chômage: histoire et 
transformations d'une catégorie en France des années 1890 aux années 1980, PUF, 1986. 
 131 
In the social constitutions that were born in the 20th century, generally this 
duty has been put on the State’s shoulders. However, is it really possible to 
define such a counterentitlement as a duty? And in which terms, as a moral 
or a legal obligation? 
 
2.1. Different meanings and major restrictions 
 
In his famous article of 1981, Bob Hepple argues that the right to work “may 
indicate, first, a right against the State; secondly, a right against the 
employer; and, thirdly, a right against workers and trade unions”.6  
In the first case, Hepple defines the right against the State as the “right of the 
individual requiring the State to maintain a full employment policy, to 
protect the opportunity of every worker to earn his living in an occupation 
freely entered upon, to establish and maintain free employment services for 
all workers, and to provide and promote vocational training”7. He then refers 
to the main legal sources that endorse this sense of the right, such as, for 
instance, Art. 1 of the European Social Charter, Art. 4 of the Italian 
Constitution and Art. 40 of the U.S.S.R. Constitution of 7 October 1977.  
As Hepple underlines, the right to work with a corresponding duty on the 
part of the State to provide a job for everyone has its prototype in the droit 
au travail of the Preamble of the French Constitution of 1848,8 which was 
supported by socialist Louis Blanc but hardly contested by liberal 
conservative Alexis de Tocqueville9 and sarcastically labelled by Karl Marx 
as a “pious wish”10 – even though he acknowledges this right as a “power 
over capital”11.  
In this ideological framework, it is relevant to remember that, mainly due to 
Louis Blanc, the right to work was implemented through the famous 
‘ateliers nationaux’ (national workshops), organizations that were structured 
                                                
6  B. Hepple, “A Right to Work?”, Industrial Law Journal, 1981, p. 69. 
7  B. Hepple, “A Right to Work?”, Industrial Law Journal, 1981, p. 69. 
8  The VII paragraph affirms: “La République doit protéger le citoyen dans sa personne, sa 
famille, sa religion, sa propriété, son travail, et mettre à la portée de chacun l'instruction 
indispensable à tous les hommes; elle doit, par une assistance fraternelle, assurer 
l'existence des citoyens nécessiteux, soit en leur procurant du travail dans les limites de 
ses ressources, soit en donnant, à défaut de la famille, des secours à ceux qui sont hors 
d'état de travailler. - En vue de l'accomplissement de tous ces devoirs, et pour la garantie 
de tous ces droits, l'Assemblée nationale, fidèle aux traditions des grandes Assemblées qui 
ont inauguré la Révolution française, décrète, ainsi qu'il suit, la Constitution de la 
République”. 
9  A. de Tocqueville, Contre le Droit au Travail, Les Belles Lettres, 2015 (new edition). 
10  K. Marx, ‘The Class Struggles in France: 1848 to 1850, in David McLella (ed.), Selected 
Writings, OUP, 1977, p. 569. 
11  K. Marx, ‘The Class Struggles in France: 1848 to 1850, in David McLella (ed.), Selected 
Writings, OUP, 1977, p. 569. 
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in a sort of military way and provided jobs for unemployed people in Paris 
after the 1848 Revolution. As these workshops did not immediately show 
any major results, they lasted only a few months. They were shut down 
because of the excessive burden on fiscal system, at that time still depending 
on taxpayers from rural areas, whose disappointment was increasing. 
Nonetheless, despite their short life, the experience of the ateliers nationaux 
is symbolic. The mechanism of these workshops definitely needed some 
improvement, but as soon as this operation became a tax issue, one of the 
biggest limitation of the right to work became clear: the cost of public 
investments to provide jobs and its impact on public budget. Therefore, even 
historically, it is directly evident that the right to work against the State has 
one major restriction in the limit of resources available in a certain fiscal 
system. But beyond this usual rhetoric, there is a phenomenon that seems to 
be oddly forgotten or underestimated: if more employment is created, the 
taxpayers' base grows, which means that the regime will distribute the tax 
burden from which resources for the employment measures are guaranteed 
on a larger number of subjects, reducing, as a consequence, the individual 
burden.  
As for the right to work against the employer, Bob Hepple points out three 
aspects: the engagement, the right to be given work and the termination of 
employment.  
As for the engagement, the right to work implies, in a negative form, first of 
all a prohibition of discrimination on any subjective grounds, like sex, 
ethnicity, religion etc. In a positive form, it may bring about compulsory 
forms of employing a certain group of (vulnerable) workers. The best 
example for the latter case is the quota system for disabled employees that 
countries like Germany and Italy adopt.12 Another constraint on employers’ 
prerogative to hire at their will may be the so-called ‘imposable workforce’ 
that had been in force in Italy for almost a decade in the aftermath of World 
War II.13 According to Legislative decree n. 929/1947, containing rules on 
the full employment of agricultural workers, in the provinces and areas of 
particular agricultural unemployment, it could be possible to fix the 
maximum compulsory loading of working days per hectare to be introduced 
to the various categories of agricultural and forestry enterprises. As a result 
of this determination, concerned entrepreneurs were obliged by the Prefects 
                                                
12  On this topic, see “The Right to Work of Persons with Disabilities: National Experiences 
in the EU and International Context”, Revista Derecho Social y Empresa, Suplemento 
numero 1, Abril 2015; in particular, see the contributions J. Brockman and M. Banafsche, 
“Integration and participation of disabled persons in the labour market – The legal 
instruments in German Law”, pp. 76-108; and P. Digennaro, “Right to work and 
placement of disabled in the labour market: The Italian legal framework”, pp. 143-180. 
13  M. D’Alessio, “Evoluzione del collocamento e mercato del lavoro in agricoltura”, 
Mercato del lavoro e agricoltura, 2012, pp. 13-47. 
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(local representatives of the Central Government) to employ the exact 
number of workers indicated for the province. In 1958, the constitutionality 
of the law was questioned in the light, above all, of the freedom of enterprise 
protected by Art. 41 of Italian Constitution.14 So, the clash between this 
freedom and the right to work that the law at issue aimed to implement in an 
administrative way, ended with the decision of the Constitutional Court 
according to which an obligation on the employers to hire a certain number 
of workers resulted in a disproportionate violation of the constitutional 
freedom of enterprise.15 In this sense, the freedom of enterprise is considered 
in terms of freedom of entrepreneurs to decide upon inter alia also the 
dimension of the staff employed in their business; therefore, an external 
pressure on employers in form of obligation to hire a certain number of 
agricultural workers was to be considered an unproportioned burden on the 
business freedom as recognised by the Italian Constitution. 
Through this case on the Italian experience about mandatory recruitment in 
agriculture, a second major restriction on a general level is now evident: the 
potential conflict of the right to work with the entrepreneurial prerogatives 
and the succeeding balancing made by case law in the light of the 
proportionality principle. 
As for the termination of employment, it is undoubted that there is a strong 
association between the principle of employment stability and the right to 
work. To this regard, the concept of unfair dismissal has been introduced as 
a legal restriction to the free will of the employers to dismiss their 
employees. Managerial prerogatives are thus restricted in a way that all 
dismissals must be based on just causes or justified motive (i.e., personal or 
economic grounds). However, the main problematic aspect on this matter for 
the legislature seems to be more likely the sanctions in case of unfair 
dismissal; legal systems in Europe have usually two main sanctions: 
compensation and reinstatement. The rationale of this normative approach 
can be found in the social responsibility of the employer, who shall respect 
the freedom and dignity of the employee also during the termination of the 
employment contract. Many more reflections can be done on the importance 
of reinstatement as a deterrent for the employer and a positive support for 
the freedom of the employee during the employment relationship, but 
unfortunately the short room for this contribution cannot permit such a 
useful digression. In these terms, the right to work can be understood as a 
positive freedom, in the sense that it constitutes the “guarantee of formal and 
substantial equality of the persons in relationship to the available 
                                                
14  F. Galgano, ‘Art. 41’, Commentario della Costituzione, 1982, p. 4; P. Cavaleri, Iniziativa 
economica privata e costituzione “vivente”: contributo allo studio della giurisprudenza 
sull'Art. 41 Cost., CEDAM, 1978. 
15  Constitutional Court n. 78 of 16 December 1958. 
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employment, an equality that means a balance concurrence among the 
persons and safety from the abuses connected to personal qualities, in both 
the labour market and in the employment relationship”.16 
Beside the third meaning of the right to work against the trade unions, which 
is not object of any discussion in this chapter, nevertheless another meaning 
can be added to the fundamental categorization made by Bob Hepple; this 
takes into consideration the right to work as a right of freedom. According to 
this notion, indeed, everyone should not be forced to work or to choose a 
specific work against her will. This freedom, which is protected by the 
explicit prohibition of forced or compulsory labour17, is directly addressed 
against the State or any other public authorities.  
 
2.2. The lack of justiciability 
 
The right to work is a peculiar right, because it is not freestanding but its 
exercise (i.e. its fulfilment) depends from the legislature and the 
organizational apparatus created in order to satisfy it. Unlike the freedom of 
association, the right to work is not fulfilled by the simple abstention of law, 
on the contrary it requires the public authority to intervene and drive the 
labour market towards a certain direction. In this way, it is a social right of 
the kind that is structured as an entitlement to ask for a positive action from 
the State. It represents also “a fundamental right of freedom of the human 
being that expresses itself in the choice and in the way of exercise of a 
working activity”18 . 
Nevertheless, the recognition of this right as a fundamental one is not an 
issue, as many international laws and national constitutions recognize it;19 its 
ambiguity lies indeed in its effectiveness or, even more, in its justiciability.  
Can an employer be forced to hire one person? Or can that very same person 
sue the employer or the State if they fail to offer her a suitable job?  
The right to work has functioned in modern Welfare State as a duty of the 
State to organize and implement policies and instrumental bodies, according 
to the different levels of competence and responsibility in which the public 
leverage acts, aiming to achieve the goal of full employment. There is no 
                                                
16  M. D’Antona, “Il diritto al lavoro nella Costituzione e nell’ordinamento comunitario”, 
now in M. D’Antona, Opere, vol. I, Scritti sul metodo e sulla evoluzione del diritto del 
lavoro. Scritti sul diritto del lavoro comparato e comunitario, B. Caruso e S. Sciarra 
(eds.), Milano, 2000, p. 268. 
17  See the ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) concerning Forced or Compulsory 
Labour, considered as one of the four core labour standards by the 1998 ILO Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up. 
18  Italian Constitutional Court, case n. 45 of 1965 (translated by the author).  
19  V. Mantouvalou (ed.), The Right to Work: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives, Hart 
Publishing, 2015. 
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legal room for individual claiming but a political request towards the State to 
put in place opportune actions on supply and, above all, demand of labour. 
To this regard, two elements were fundamental during the aftermath of 
World War II: Fordism and Keynesianism. Both of them were based on a 
social bargaining between capital and labour that made sure, through a 
mutual support, that no one of the parties would have aimed to destroy the 
other party. Full employment as a political goal and decent levels of wage as 
a social purpose accepted by employers and employees’ organisations were 
fundamental tools to boost economic growth through the consumption of 
goods produced by the big industry. This alliance guaranteed to Western 
countries surprising levels of wealth (the economic boom) distributed in a 
balanced way, and a strengthening of democratic institutions, even within 
the factories, with the spread of workers’ right of representation, 
participation and conflict. Fordism and Keynesianism are now dissolved.20 
And inequalities of wealth distribution have been constantly rising.21 
The effectiveness of the right to work has been put deeply in trouble, indeed, 
perfectly represented by the growing figures of unemployment in last 
decades, has been jeopardised also by the radical shift in the political, social 
and economic paradigms brought about by neoliberalism. 
 
 
3. The neoliberal version of the right to work 
 
As Saad-Filho and Johnston affirm in the opening on their book published 
more than 10 year ago, “we live in the age of neoliberalism”.22 According to 
David Harvey, “neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political 
economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be 
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within 
an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, 
free markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an 
institutional framework appropriate to such practices. The state has to 
guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also set 
up those military, defence, police and legal structures and functions required 
to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the 
proper functioning of markets.”23 
Whether we define neoliberalism just as a theory of political economic 
practices or even, in a wider perspective, a totalizing paradigm of men and 
                                                
20  R. B. Reich, Aftershock: the next economy and America's future, Vintage Books, 2013. 
21  See the famous T. Piketty, Le capital au XXIe siècle, Le Seuil, 2013. 
22  A. Saad-Filho and D. Johnston, Neoliberalism: A critical reader, University of Chicago 
Press, 2005, p. 1. 
23  D. Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, OUP, 2005, p. 2. 
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society (i.e. an ideology!), the ways it has been affecting labour law for the 
last decades are nevertheless severe. The neoliberal recipe as we have been 
facing in in Europe is based on government’s expenditure cuts, especially on 
social systems, wage deflation, decrease of taxes on property, reforms of 
labour market in order to introduce massive doses of flexibility. This cluster 
of different actions represents almost the opposite of the Keynesian recipe, 
which on its hand called for public investments, increase of taxes for the 
richer and stimulation of the aggregate demand.  
Despite the manifest incapability of forecasting the financial catastrophe of 
2007/2008 and the subsequent decade of economic crisis in form of 
stagflation – which should have warned in the first place about the feasibility 
of such an economic theory, neoliberalism was even more boosted in the 
wake of the crisis by the plans of the so-called ‘Troika’ for countries asking 
financial help (like, for instance, Spain, Portugal and Greece), or suggested 
reforms for countries in struggle (such as France or Italy). 
Despite the economic recovery, the unemployment rates still remain quite 




Figure 1. Unemployment rates EU-28 EA-19 US and Japan seasonally 




As young people were among the most vulnerable groups of persons to be 
hit by the crisis, in 2012, the General Conference of the ILO issued a 
resolution in 2012, “The Youth Employment Crisis: A Call for Action”, 
which suggested to take a multi-pronged approach with measures to foster 
pro-employment growth and decent job creation through macroeconomic 
policies, employability, labour market policies, youth entrepreneurship and 
rights to tackle the social consequences of the crisis, while ensuring financial 
and fiscal sustainability. This report highlighted that the full employment 
should be a key objective of macroeconomic policies and that economic, 
employment, education and training, and social protection policies require 
being effectively coherent and coordinated; moreover, it suggested that pro-
employment macroeconomic policies should support stronger aggregate 
demand and improve access to finance, through labour-intensive public 
investment in large-scale infrastructure and public employment schemes in 
order to generate new decent employment opportunities while meeting social 
needs and improving infrastructure. 
But these principles have been scarcely implemented, since they openly 
question the neoliberal dogma. If one wants to trace the main elements that 
characterise the neoliberal shift in labour law approach towards the right to 
work, these could be: the unilateral supply-side employment policies, the 
heavy conditionality of the so-called active labour market policies, and the 
decrease of firing costs.  
While evidence shows that we seem to face a jobless recovery,24 the main 
employment policies still focus only on the supply-side of the labour market. 
According to the current mainstream rhetoric, the problem to solve is the 
mismatch between the offer and the demand of work; therefore, the best 
policies to be implemented shall not aim to increase the employment 
demand (through public investments, for example) but to improve the 
employability of jobseekers and unemployed persons. Here comes the 
activation as the keystone of the all neoliberal approach to labour market 
inclusion, which goes along with a certain moral characterisation: if 
someone is not able to find a job, then it is her fault; hence, that person must 
activate herself in order to much better fit the requests of the market. This 
peculiar sense of morality shifts the responsibility of being unemployed in 
an indirect way on unemployed persons rather than on the State or on the 
employers. In this sense, neoliberal employment policies are also always 
accompanied by the principle of conditionality, according to which 
unemployment benefits should be recognised only if the unemployed person 
has gone through certain strictly programmed activities. Often, especially for 
                                                
24  See International Labour Organization Report, Global Employment Trends 2014. Risk of 
a jobless recovery?, International Labour Office, 2014. 
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long-term unemployed, the refusal of any job whatsoever or wherever it 
comes from (even hundreds of kilometres away from home) is a conditio 
sine qua non for being still enrolled into employment programs. These 
restrictions implied in conditionality may bring about problems of conflict 
against the right to work in its dimension of freedom to get a job that suits 
one’s interests, ambitions and working ability. Moreover, the general 
rhetoric behind such schemes of active labour market policies may transcend 
even the first major dimension of the right to work against the State: on one 
side, the State seems not be required anymore to fulfil the goal of full 
unemployment or to act at any macroeconomic level, on the other side the 
burden of finding a job is completely shifted on unemployed people’s 
shoulders, creating on them not only legal obligations but also a sort of 
moral guilt for their condition of being unfit to the market’s needs. 
Another big scarf on labour law created by neoliberal reforms is represented 
by the general weakening of employment protection, above all in case of 
unfair dismissals. One of the best example comes from Italy. The recent 
reforms package, called “Jobs Act”,25 has heavily flexibilised Italian labour 
market, intervening in many fields, from the legislation about fixed-term 
contracts (which now foresees no grounds for contracts up to 36 months, 
with a limitation of 20% of the total staff, and a maximum of 8 extensions in 
three years), apprenticeship, tasks, posting of workers and other strong 
aspects of the employment protection;26 but the acme of this program has 
been reached with the introduction in 2015 of the contratto a tutele 
crescenti, literally translated as the employment contract at increasing 
protections. It is not really a new employment contract, but rather the reform 
provides a new discipline on remedies in case of unlawful dismissal – which 
had been already reformed (for the worse) in 2012 during the Monti 
Government27 – for the newly recruited employees. Indeed, according to this 
new scheme, everyone employed after March 2015, in case of unfair 
dismissal will receive a compensation not subject to social security 
contribution for an amount equal to two months of total salary for each year 
of seniority, from a minimum of four to a maximum of twenty-four months; 
reinstatement is now possible only in case of discriminatory, void or orally 
                                                
25  V. Speziale, “Le politiche del lavoro del Governo Renzi: il Jobs Act e la riforma dei 
contratti e di altre discipline del rapporto di lavoro’”, WP CSDLE “Massimo D’Antona”, 
2014, p. 1. 
26  S. Cucciovino, “Il sistema sanzionatorio del contratto a termine e della somministrazione 
di lavoro dopo il Jobs Act”, Giornale di diritto del lavoro e di relazioni industriali, n. 
148, 2015, pp. 611-623. 
27  V. Speziale, “La riforma del licenziamento individuale tra diritto ed economia”, Rivista 
Italiana di Diritto del  Lavoro, 3, 2012, p. 521. 
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ordered dismissal.28 The result is an inherent instability of this contract that 
is formally open ended but in substance can be always terminated in any 
time the employers want (they just need to evaluate in advance if the firing 
cost will be feasible or not). It is not by chance that the new rules 
subsequently brought about a sharp increase of dismissals.29 The employers 
got two benefits out of this reform: on the one hand, dismissals are less 
restricted and cheaper than before, which gives them the certainty in the cost 
of each dismissal; on the other hand, employers gain a major power in the 
relationship with the employees, since the deterrent force of reinstatement in 
case of unlawful dismissal has become now only a very rare hypothesis. In 
fact, employees to whom the “Jobs Act” is applicable can hope for 
reinstatement only if they manage to prove the presence on any 
discriminatory intent in the dismissal (and everybody is aware of how often 
it is impossible to prove it).  
So, even though the result of this reform is a deep deterioration of working 
conditions and employment protection, the economic rationale behind this 
reform of labour law is to overcome the duality of the labour market created 
by the gap between the very protected insiders and the very weak outsiders. 




4. Taking the right to work seriously 
 
The way a certain legal system recognises and conceives the right to work 
tells a lot about the idea of legal system itself (rectius, the State) and 
citizenship enshrined in its economic and social constitution. 
There is a historical link between the right to work and the status of 
citizenship as reaffirmed after the political and cultural revolutions of 19th 
century. If we consider the French constitutions after 1789, we can realize 
that work is meant not only as an instrument to earn the resources that are 
necessary to face needs and wills but also as a mean to become a full citizen 
of the République, as seen above.31 
                                                
28  E. Ghera, D. Garofalo (eds.), Le tutele per i licenziamenti e per la disoccupazione 
involontaria nel Jobs Act 2. Commento ai decreti legislativi 4 marzo 2015, nn. 22 e 23, in 
attuazione della legge 10 dicembre 2014, n. 183, Cacucci Editore, 2015. 
29  Osservatorio sul Precariato, Dati sui nuovi rapporti di lavoro, Monthly Report January-
December 2017. See also R. Ciccarelli, ‘Jobs Act, aumentano i licenziamenti, giù i 
contratti stabili’, il Manifesto, 28 April 2017. 
30  U. Romagnoli, “Il diritto del lavoro nel prisma del principio di uguaglianza”, in M. Napoli 
(ed.), Costituzione, Lavoro, Pluralismo Sociale, Vita e Pensiero, 1998, p. 33.  
31  See paragraph 2.1. 
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In a certain way, also the reference to the work that is cherished in Art. 1 of 
Italian Constitution – according to which “Italy is a democratic Republic 
funded on work” – endorses the meaning of work as a right of citizenship, 
i.e. a right that gives to human beings the possibility of full enjoyment of 
citizens that are all free and equal.32 This idea is a concept of the State that is 
structured on the principle of the rule of law and calls against the remaining 
of the feudal system based on the privileges rather than on rights and duties, 
as it used to be under the monarchy. 
A very authoritative Italian labour law scholar, Massimo D’Antona, in his 
last work before that the appalling violence of Red Brigades took his life 
away, reflects on the right to work to be “taken seriously" by elevating it to 
“its aspired-to status as the cardinal norm of the labour law system”.33 
D’Antona analyses the nature of the right to work in the European countries 
that are different from the national (Italian) context: the right has kept its 
link with growth and wealth but, on the other side, it has lost its historical 
link towards the concept of stability of work, or the idea of uniformity of the 
labour market. As he explains, “(a)lthough it maintains its axiological and 
perspective valence, the right to work, both as an expectation and as the right 
to have a job, seems to be shifting its centre of gravity towards the “being” 
or “person”, which means that such a right needs to be updated “as a 
guarantee of being rather than having”.34  
Pushing this line of reasoning even further, the lack of justiciability of the 
right to work can be compensated by the idea of empowerment of workers’ 
freedom enclosed in the concept of capabilities and its framework aiming to 
personal and professional self-realisation.35 
Nevertheless, as a commentator of D’Antona’s reflections notices, “with its 
soft law in employment policies; with its austerity that hits many working 
people or jobseekers; with its promises to transform stable employment in 
employability, Europe throws out from the windows the right to work that 
has been walked in through the door. In other words, if a ‘right’ is reduced to 
a ‘principle’, it is easy to be compressed by conditionings made up as 
                                                
32  L. Mengoni, Fondata sul lavoro: la Repubblica tra diritti inviolabili e doveri inderogabili 
di solidarietà, Vita e pensiero, 1998, now in L. Mengoni, Il lavoro nella dottrina sociale 
della Chiesa, M. Napoli (ed.), Vita e pensiero, 2004; G. Loy, “Una repubblica fondata sul 
lavoro’”, Giornale di Diritto del Lavoro e di Relazioni Industriali, n. 122, 2009,pp. 197-
238. 
33  M. D’Antona, “The Right to Work in the Italian Constitution and in the European Union”, 
W.P. C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona” N.1/2002, p. 2. 
34  M. D’Antona, “The Right to Work in the Italian Constitution and in the European Union”, 
W.P. C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona” N.1/2002, p.10. 
35 On this vast topic, see R. Salais and R. Villeneuve (eds.), Europe and the Politics of 
Capabilities, Cambridge University Press, 2005; and more recently R. Rogowski, E. 
Salais and N. Whiteside (eds.), Transforming European Employment Policy: Labour 
market transitions and the promotion of capability, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011. 
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dogmas carved in stone, whereas they are nothing else than precise political 
choices”.36 
The right to work is the most important social right because it protects not 
only the patrimonial interests related to the work as an economic or financial 
value (the resources to conduct a life that should be free and decent), but 
above all the social citizenship, which means the inherent dimension of 
human beings as social animals protected in their struggle to get a meaning 
for their activities, or for their lives in the society. To this regard, the right to 
work can be translated into the right to a decent work.37  
With the increasing fragmentation of the labour market, due to the rise of 
non-standard form of employment contracts – sometimes at the limit of 
exploitation, such as many cases of zero-hour contracts – or the expansion of 
autonomous collaborations (even though often it is just false self-
employment) that is connected to the so-called ‘gig economy’ or ‘platform 
economy’, being active in the labour market does not necessarily mean 
anymore that working people would enjoy fair and decent terms and 
conditions of work or an equitable remuneration. Indeed, if we look at this 
new reality, we will see that the vast majority of the new jobs are precarious 
and low paid.38 This means that unemployment is not anymore the only 
problem that endangers social inclusion and wealth equality. 
 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
In the age of neoliberalism, in which the ideology of the total market39 
prevents the State to intervene in the economy through any kind of 
macroeconomic policy, and the capital is rapidly going into a deep and 
irreversible transformation driven by the development of digitisation and 
automation, the right to work, without any meaningful judiciary tool of 
enforcement and justiciability, shows all its 18th century limitations, 
especially in not being able to fight against the persistent jobless growth and 
the exploitation of working people. 
                                                
36  M. Rusciano, “Il pensiero di Massimo D’Antona sul diritto al lavoro”, WP CSDLE 
“Massimo D’Antona.IT – 216/2014. 
37  D. P. Ghai (ed.), Decent work: objectives and strategies, International Labour 
Organisation, 2006. 
38  J. Webster, “Microworkers of the Gig Economy: separate and precarious”, New Labor 
Forum, Vol. 25. No. 3, 2016, pp. 57-64; V. De Stefano, “The Rise of the Just-in-Time 
Workforce: On-Demand Work, Crowdwork, and Labor Protection in the Gig-Economy”, 
Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, Vol. 37, Issue 3, pp. 471-504. 
39  A. Supiot, L’Esprit de Philadelphie. La Justice Sociale face au Marché Total, Seuil, 
2010. 
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However, if the right to work ‘gives up’, there will be the urgent need to 
rethink not only the labour law systems but, more radically, other grounding 
instrument to affirm and consolidate the citizenship in society. 
New studies on the probable not so far away technological mass 
unemployment to which the rise of robots and algorithms seems to condemn 
the future generations40 are only improving the urgency of considering the 
issue right now. This new fashion of preoccupations, indeed, does only 
change a bit the main questions interrogating all the stakeholders. 
If employment can be casual, low paid and precarious, or if we do not need 
to work anymore because a machine can work (better) for us, then what else 
other than work will make us still being free and equal citizens in a 








                                                
40  Inter alia, P. K. McClure, ‘”You’re Fired,” Says the Robot: The Rise of Automation in 
the Workplace, Technophobes, and Fears of Unemployment’, Social Science Computer 
Review, 2017, pp. 1-18. 
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Blurred boundaries between work and leisure 
A German perspective 
 
Reinhard Singer, 





Digitilisation revolutionised the way enterprises work and has already 
profoundly changed working conditions. Employees can be assigned flexibly 
and are able take up work from anywhere in the world making use of 
smartphones and cloud-solutions. Employees increasingly run the danger of 
being exposed to the phenomenon of constant availability. While 
employees’ opinions as regards these developments differ – some find them 
challenging, others welcome the new opportunities facilitated by digitisation 
– Working Time Law is put to the test. 
German as well as European Working Time Law strictly distinguish between 
the categories of working time and rest periods. Times of constant 
availability are generally to be considered as compulsory resting time. Issues 
arise because the European Working Time Directive (WTD) requires that 
rest periods have to be granted uninterruptedly. Even the smallest of 
interruptions amount to working time, having the effect that rest periods 
begin anew after each interruption. The authors argue that activities can, 
however, only be considered to be working time if they are attributable to 
employers. To attenuate the dangers of constant availability, the German 
legislator could make further use of the freedoms provided for by the WTD 
that allow social partners to flexibly regulate working time and rest periods. 
This would eliminate the current grey area to a certain extent while 
respecting employees’ interests. 
The authors further argue that current Working Time Law does not 
adequately acknowledge employees’ individual rights. Employees have a 
right to unavailability as well as a right to working time flexibility backed by 
constitutional fundamental rights. Legislators should introduce regulation to 
emphasise these rights. The German legislator could, for example, provide 
room for derogations from otherwise mandatory working time provisions in 






1.  Working time and digitalisation 
 
1.1. The influence of technological advances on working processes 
 
The developments of the world wide web allow for working models in which 
resources can be allocated and combined flexibly across borders and 
companies.1 Cloud-solutions and mobile applications enable employers to 
integrate employees into workflows anytime, anywhere. To the same extent, 
central monitoring of work processes ceases to be important. Employees run 
the risk of exceeding the agreed working hours as employers’ focuses turn 
from locally and temporally predetermined workflows to specific outcomes 
of work.2 The Japanese phenomenon of "karoshi", death by overwork, 
shows that this development can have devastating consequences for 
employees. A study conducted by the Japanese government found that in 
2015 alone, 93 people died or attempted to commit suicide for this reason. 
The Swiss newspaper Neue Züricher Zeitung reported of a 27 years old man 
who died of a heart attack in 2016 after he, supposedly, worked up to 122,5 
hours of overtime in a single month.3 A recent example from Poland, where 
several deaths resulting from overwork sparked massive protests against the 
underfunded Polish Health Service, demonstrates that the phenomenon of 
"karoshi" has long arrived in Europe.4 
 
1.2. Advantages and disadvantages of temporally and locally “delimited” 
work 
 
The temporal and local “delimitation”5 of work blurs the borders between 
work and leisure.6 This development is judged differently by employees.7 
While quite a few are critical of the mingling of work and their private 
sphere, advocates of mobile reachability see it as an advantage that they can 
better reconcile work and private life by means of such work models.8 It has 
                                                
1 R. Krause, Gutachten zum 71. Deutschen Juristentag, C.H.Beck, 2016, B 19. 
2 R. Krause (fn. 1), B 17 f. 
3 https://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/karoshi-bewegt-die-gemueter-japan-
arbeitet-sich-zu-tode-ld.123890 [accessed 22 February 2018]. 
4 https://www.deutsche-apotheker-zeitung.de/news/artikel/2017/10/17/polnische-aerzte-im-
hungerstreik [accessed 22 February 2018]. 
5 R. Krause (fn. 1), B 18 fn. 64 with further references as regards this term (in German 
“Entgrenzung”). 
6 R. Krause (fn. 1), B 18. 
7 Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS), Weißbuch Arbeiten 4.0 
(https://www.bmas.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/PDF-Publikationen/a883-
weissbuch.pdf?__blob=publicationFile [accessed 22 February 2018]), 2017, p. 73. 
8 BMAS, Mobiles und entgrenztes Arbeiten 
(https://www.bmas.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/PDF-
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also long become common for employers to make a healthy work-life-
balance a key promise of employee recruitment.9 
 
 
2. Constant availability and working time law 
 
2.1. Legal status of employees in European and German working time 
law 
 
In Germany, the law on working time is regulated by the Working Time 
Directive (Dir. 2003/88/EG, short WTD) and the German Working Time Act 
(Arbeitszeitgesetz, short ArbZG). Primary goal of both regulations is the 
protection of workers’ health and safety.10 Both European and German law 
also aim to flexibilise working hours, with the ArbZG recognising both 
objectives as being of equal importance11, while the WTD expressly makes 
flexibilisation subject to the compliance with the principles of protecting the 
safety and health of workers12. 
 
2.1.1. Working time and restp as categories of working time law 
 
Working Time Law prominently distinguishes between working time13 and 
rest periods14. The distinction is of particular importance with regard to the 
limitation of the working day to eight hours, § 3 1 ArbZG, and the 
mandatory rest period of at least eleven hours, § 5 subs. 1 ArbZG. Due to the 
fact that the latter has to be granted "uninterruptedly", grave practical 
problems arise15: An employee who communicates with his employer in the 
evening at 11:00 pm, by making a phone call or writing an e-mail, is barred 
from resuming his or her work at 10:00 am, as the nightly activity qualifies 
as work. Even the shortest work-related activity is categorised as working 
time and leads to an end of the rest period, which begins anew after each 
                                                                                                              
Publikationen/a873.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 [accessed 22 February 2018]), 
2015, p. 14. 
9 Self-attributions such as "We want motivated and committed employees. We support you 
in reconciling family and work because we think a balancing work and private life is 
important. " (https://www.siemens.de/jobs/arbeiten_bei_siemens_de/moderne-
arbeitswelten/seiten/home.aspx, in German [accessed 17 March 2017]) have long become 
part of employee advertising. 
10 Cf. recital 11 WTD and § 1 no. 1 ArbZG. 
11 § 1 no. 1 ArbZG. 
12 Cf. recital 15 WTD. 
13 Cf. Art. 2 no. 1 WTD and § 2 subs. 1 1 ArbZG. 
14 Cf. Art. 2 no. 2 WTD as well as § 5 ArbZG. 
15 L. Stärker, Kommentar zur EU-Arbeitszeit-Richtlinie, Linde, 2006, 60 f.; U. Baeck and M. 
Deutsch, ArbZG Kommentar, C.H.Beck, 3rd ed. 2014, § 5 par. 13. 
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interruption. Only in narrowly confined cases does the law allow deviations 
from § 5 subs. 1 ArbZG. § 5 subs. 2 and 3 ArbZG allow for contractual 
reductions of the rest period by one or two hours respectively, but only in 
certain industries (eg. hospitals, broadcasting, livestock breeding). Also, 
according to § 7 subs. 1 no. 3, subs. 2 no. 1 and 2, subs. 2a ArbZG collective 
agreements or company agreements may allow for shortened rest periods. In 
addition, under certain conditions, the supervisory authority can grant 
exemptions from § 5 subs. 1 ArbZG, § 15 subs. 1 no. 3 and 4, subs. 2 
ArbZG. With the exception of § 7 subs. 2a ArbZG, all reductions are 
required to be balanced out within a specific or to-be-specified period. 
Seeing that these consequences conflict with the flexibility required by 
modern working life, it has oftentimes been argued that activities outside of 
the conventional working hours should not be qualified as working time. 
Seeing that the categories of working time and rest periods are established 
and in principle irrefutable, these attempts must to be deemed problematic. 
According to the judicature of the CJEU (medical) on-call duty has to be 
qualified as working time because employees are required to remain apart 
from their family and social environment.16 Conversely, in constellations in 
which workers must be constantly available, but without being obliged to be 
present – so-called stand-by duty – only the time spent on the actual 
provision of services should be regarded as working time.17 Accordingly, the 
case law of the German Federal Labour Court (BAG) is such that so-called 
work readiness and on-call duty18 are characterised by the fact that the 
employer may determine the whereabouts of the employee19. In the case of 
on-call duty, the employee does not necessarily need to be at his work place, 
but must be able to commence his full work activity immediately20 if called 
upon by the employer. 21  If the whereabouts are not specified by the 
employer, in other words if the employee is free to choose the place where 
he is staying and where he will perform his tasks, the activity is categorised 
as stand-by, not on-call, duty. 22  Times of stand-by duty are generally 
                                                
16 CJEU NJW 2003, 2971, 2974 (Jaeger) (= Case C-151/02 [2003] ECLI:EU:C:2003:437). 
17 CJEU NZA 2000, 1227, 1230 (SIMAP) (= Case C-303/98 [2000] ECR I-7997). 
18 Cf. as regards the different categories R. Wank, “Facetten der Arbeitszeit”, Recht der 
Arbeit, 2014, 285, 287. 
19 Note, however, that according to § 18 subs. 1 no. 1 ArbZG, the ArbZG does not apply to 
executive employees in the sense § 5 subs. 3 German Federal Works Constitution Act 
(BetrVG). 
20 BAG NZA 2007, 1108, 1109. 
21 M. Kock in C. Rolfs, R. Kreikebohm et al. (eds.), BeckOK Arbeitsrecht, C.H.Beck, 43rd 
ed. 2017, § 2 ArbZG par. 6. 
22 M. Kock (fn. 21), § 2 ArbZG par. 10; R. Buschmann and J. Ulber, Arbeitszeitgesetz, 
Bund-Verlag, 8th ed. 2015, § 2 ArbZG par. 21; R. Falder, “Immer erreichbar – 
Arbeitszeit- und Urlaubsrecht in Zeiten des technologischen Wandels”, Neue Zeitschrift 
für Arbeitsrecht, 2010, 1150, 1151. 
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considered as rest periods unless the employer actually calls for the 
employee’s work. Only if this is the case, the time period is qualified as 
working time.23 
 
2.1.2. Constant availability and categories of working time law 
 
The phenomenon of constant availability of employees puts these categories 
to the test. In contrast to (medical) on-call duty constantly available 
employees generally remain in their home environments and might actually 
act on their own initiative when reading and immediately answering e-mails. 
Only seldom do employers and employees enter into explicit contractual 
arrangements as regards constant availability. Rather, the phenomenon is 
characterised by a mélange of subliminal expectations on the part of 
employers and an anticipatory obedience of employees, whereby the 
circumstances differ considerably from one case to another. 
 
a) Is constant availability a case of on-call duty? 
The essence of constant availability is its general leisure character. It is 
therefore to be categorised either as on-call duty (working time) or stand-by 
duty (in principle rest time, working time if called upon). According to the 
judicature of the BAG, stand-by duty and on-call duty are distinguished on 
the basis of the time left to take up work. The BAG argues that strict 
confines as regards the time in which work has to be taken up, lead to an 
indirect determination of the whereabouts of employees.24 It is therefore 
sometimes argued that mobile availability has to be regarded as on-call duty, 
if employees are expected to react within a short period of time.25 This 
distinction on the basis of the time remaining to take up work can, however, 
not be applied to cases of constant availability.26 While it is true that 
employees faced with delimited forms of work carry the means necessary to 
take up work and therefore their “workplace” with them27, the BAG adopted 
the temporal criterion in a case where an employee was severely restricted in 
how he spent his time off work because he had to actually show up at his 
permanent workplace if called upon28. In another case, where an employee 
was required to carry a mobile phone, but could perform tasks remotely, the 
                                                
23 BAGE 95, 210, 214; R. Wank, “Facetten der Arbeitszeit”, Recht der Arbeit, 2014, 285, 
287. 
24 Cf. BAG NZA 1992, 560. 
25 R. Buschmann and J. Ulber (fn. 23), § 2 par. 26. 
26 With reference to the judicature of the BAG also critical R. Krause (fn. 1), B 37 f. 
27 Insofar one has to agree with R. Buschmann and J. Ulber (fn. 23), § 2 par. 26. 
28 BAG NZA 1992, 560. 
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BAG found that this would constitute stand-by duty.29 Seeing that employees 
can devote themselves to leisure activities and only have to do work for the 
employer if necessary, this classification has to be applied to constant 
availability as well. Constant availability is therefore a case of stand-by 
duty.30 This is also in line with the criteria the CJEU set out when assessing 
medical on-call duty.31 The decisive factor is therefore whether the employee 
must remain apart from his family and social environment (on-call duty) or 
not (stand-by duty). 
 
b) Constant availability as own category between on-call duty and stand-
by duty? 
The aforementioned categorisation is dissatisfactory as employees are also 
strained during stand-by duty and therefore suffer from a loss of recreational 
value.32 It has therefore been proposed to introduce a new category into 
working time law set between on-call duty and stand-by duty, working time 
and rest periods, in order to set specific limits to delimited work of 
employees. 33  Such a proposal is worth considering, but would require 
changes to the WTD, as the directive only distinguishes between working 
time and rest periods. The CJEU has repeatedly stated that the Member 
States are bound by the European Law definition of working time and that 
the terms "working time" and "rest period" are therefore not at the discretion 
of the Member States.34 However, the WTD provides several provisions 
which Member States can make use of to allow derogations from the strict 
set of rules. Member States can, for example, allow derogations on account 
                                                
29 BAGE 95, 210, 213 f. – Consider, however, that the court decided on a particular form of 
stand-by duty regulated by a collective agreement (§ 15 subs. 6b BAT). There, on-call 
duty is defined as follows: “[The employee is required to], at the employer's request, stay 
at a location specified by the employer in order to take up work on call of the employer.” 
(BAGE 90, 210, 212). This specific on-call duty is, however, congruent with the 
understanding of on-call duty outlined in this paper. 
30 This corresponds with the prevailing opinion in German-speaking literature, cf. R. Krause 
(fn.1), B 38; R. Falder, “Immer erreichbar – Arbeitszeit- und Urlaubsrecht in Zeiten des 
technologischen Wandels”, Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht, 2010, 1150, 1151; W. 
Kohte, “Arbeitsschutz in der digitalen Arbeitswelt”, Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht, 
2015, 1417, 1423; R. Wank, “Facetten der Arbeitszeit”, Recht der Arbeit, 2014, 285, 288 
f.; M. Jacobs, “Reformbedarf im Arbeitszeitrecht”, Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht, 
2016, 733, 735 f. 
31 CJEU NJW 2000, 1227, 1230 par. 50 (SIMAP); NZA 2003, 2971, 2974 par. 65 (Jaeger). 
32 R. Krause (fn. 1), B 46; W. Kohte, “Arbeitsschutz in der digitalen Arbeitswelt”, Neue 
Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht, 2015, 1417, 1423. 
33 Sceptical G. Thüsing, “Digitalisierung der Arbeitswelt - Impulse zur rechtlichen 
Bewältigung der Herausforderung gewandelter Arbeitsformen”, Soziales Recht, 2016, 87, 
98. 
34 CJEU NJW 2003, 2971, 2973 (Jaeger); EuZW 2006, 121, 123 (Dellas) (= Case C-14/04 
[2005] ECR I-10279). 
 149 
of the specific characteristics of the activity concerned, Art 17 WTD, or 
place certain derogations at the disposal of the social partners, Art 18 WTD. 
The German legislator has not made full use of these clauses and could 
therefore develop a more flexible national Working Time Law.35 
 
c) Attribution of activities performed by employees 
Nonetheless, if employees do work outside their regular working hours by 
writing job-related e-mails or making phone calls, the question arises 
whether these activities should qualify as work even if they were not 
initiated by the employer. 
Art 2 no. 1 WTD and § 2 subs. 1 ArbZG define working time as the time 
from the beginning to the end of work excluding breaks. The recently 
introduced § 611a subs. 1 1 BGB defines “work” – in accordance with the 
common definition adopted by the BAG – as the provision of services in 
personal dependence, bound by instructions and determined by others. The 
phrases following this definition show the importance of the criterion of 
"dependency" to the concept of work: Employees are those "who essentially 
cannot freely specify their work and determine their working hours" (§ 611a 
subs. 1 3 BGB). When assessing whether activities amount to “work” in the 
sense of Working Time Law, this definition has to echo. Thus, it is not 
sufficient that an employee works for the employer. Rather, a certain activity 
must be the specific result of the employee's dependency on the employer. 
Otherwise, employees could bar themselves from working by deliberately 
interrupting rest periods. This would allow them to unilaterally abandon 
their contractual obligations, which would contradict the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda.36 
In this respect, a first distinction must be made in such a way that only those 
activities qualify as “work” in the sense of Working Time Law that are also 
attributable to the employer. It is argued that activities do not amount to 
working time if the employee works "voluntarily".37 This criterion, however, 
is, from a practical point of view, not satisfactory. An employee will 
regularly be driven by a motivation related to the employment relationship – 
for example to fulfil a burdensome obligation in order to create spare time at 
                                                
35 In this respect, M. Jacobs demands that this leeway is taken use of, M. Jacobs, 
“Reformbedarf im Arbeitszeitrecht”, Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht, 2016, 733, 737. 
36 Coming to essentially the same conclusion R. Schlegel, “Grenzenlose Arbeit”, Neue 
Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht-Beilage, 2014, 16, 19; C. Frhr. v. Buddenbrock and J. 
Manhart, “Erreichbarkeit rund um die Uhr?”, Schnellbrief für Personalmanagement und 
Arbeitsrecht, 2014, 93, 94; M. Jacobs, “Reformbedarf im Arbeitszeitrecht”, Neue 
Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht, 2016, 733, 735. 
37 Cf. in particular H. G. Wisskirchen Wisskrichen and J. P. Schiller, “Aktuelle 
Problemstellungen im Zusammenhang mit ‘Bring Your Own Device’”, Der Betrieb, 
2015, 1163, 1167. 
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a later point in time or to promote his career development.38 Seeing that 
employees are driven by an ambiguous blend of intrinsic and extrinsic 
motives, legally certain attributions based on the distinction between 
voluntary and involuntary action are hardly possible. Rather, an objective 
criterion39 is needed to discern activities initiated by the employer from 
activities performed independently by employees. It is by all means 
appropriate to attribute such activities to employers, which constitute a 
reasonable and proportionate reaction to an employer's conduct. Note that 
such a conduct could also come in the form of an omission to act on part of 
an employer. In order to classify an omission as causal, the due care standard 
of § 130 subs. 1 OWiG (German Federal Law on Misdemeanours) can be 
applied. If employers do not adequately fulfil their duties to supervise and 
organise their operation, employees can reasonably feel provoked to work 
during their spare time – to a reasonable and proportionate extent. Therefore, 
in both cases, active causation as well as implied toleration of off-duty work, 
employees' activities must be classified as working time – as long as an 
activity is attributable. Employers can, however, attain legal certainty if they 
impose clear rules on the availability of employees during their spare time. 
In cases where an employer did everything reasonable to prevent employees 
from working during their spare time and employees nonetheless work 
without specific inducement, they perform activities that cannot be 
considered working time because these activities can clearly not be 
attributed to the employer.40 
 
d) Consequences, in particular with regard to rest periods 
As far as activities cannot be attributed to an employer, these activities do 
not count against the daily working time in the sense of § 3 ArbZG, Art 6 
WTD respectively. Furthermore, they do not interrupt the minimum rest 
period of eleven hours per day required by § 5 subs. 1 ArbZG and Art 3 
WTD. 
If an activity can be attributed, protective regulations do apply. Attributable 
activities count against the daily maximum working time and interrupt 
compulsory rest periods. Therefore, considering the wording of § 5 subs. 1 
ArbZG and Art 3 WTD, demanding an "uninterrupted" or “consecutive” 
                                                
38 R. Falder, “Immer erreichbar – Arbeitszeit- und Urlaubsrecht in Zeiten des 
technologischen Wandels”, Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht, 2010, 1150, 1151 f. 
39 The concept of “attribution” is also considered by M. Jacobs, “Reformbedarf im 
Arbeitszeitrecht”, Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht, 2016, 733, 735 and R. v. Steinau-
Steinrück, “Smartphone versus Arbeitsrecht”, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift-Spezial, 
2012, 178 to assign activities to the category of working time. 
40 Drawing similar conclusions R. Schlegel, “Grenzenlose Arbeit”, Neue Zeitschrift für 
Arbeitsrecht-Beilage, 2014, 16, 19; M. Jacobs, “Reformbedarf im Arbeitszeitrecht”, Neue 
Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht, 2016, 733, 735. 
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rest period of at least eleven hours, even short-term activities – be it reading 
an e-mail, answering a customer's query or a phone call – interrupt the rest 
period with the consequence that it has to be entirely re-granted after the end 
of the respective activity. In light of this, part of the German-speaking 
literature proposes that marginal activities should not be considered an 
interruption of rest periods41, with the consequence that an employee could 
resume his work early in the morning even though he answered a short 
phone call the evening before. This view is supported in particular by the 
rationale behind § 5 subs. 1 ArbZG and the WTD, which is to protect 
employees from health impairments provoked by overexertion and to 
provide an opportunity to recover.42 Marginal activities during the evening 
hours do not seriously jeopardise these aims, so that a convincing argument 
can be made that rest periods enjoyed before and after a marginal 
interruption can in fact be added up, with the result of an “uninterrupted” 
rest period of at least eleven hours. It is argued that such an interpretation 
would not violate the wording of § 5 subs. 1 ArbZG and would merely 
require a teleological interpretation of the provision.43 
Considering the detriments to legal certainty, however, such a de minimis 
provision would not be sensible.44 After all, how to determine whether 
answering an e-mail is still a minor activity? The declaration as minor or 
marginal crucially depends on whether an employee is faced with tasks that 
cause stress and endanger the recreational effects of leisure. In this respect, 
proposals that try to set definite time limits45 are inadequate to solve the 
dilemma, since an impairment of recreation does not solely depend on the 





                                                
41 A. Bissels and I. Meyer-Michaelis, “Arbeiten 4.0 - Arbeitsrechtliche Aspekte einer 
zeitlich-örtlichen Entgrenzung der Tätigkeit”, Der Betrieb, 2015, 2331, 2333; A. Bissels, 
C. Domke and G. Wisskirchen, “BlackBerry & Co.: Was ist heute Arbeitszeit?”, Der 
Betrieb, 2010, 2052, 2054; G. Thüsing, “Digitalisierung der Arbeitswelt - Impulse zur 
rechtlichen Bewältigung der Herausforderung gewandelter Arbeitsformen”, Soziales 
Recht, 2016, 87, 98. 
42 V. Vogt, “Einwirkungen von Smartphones auf Arbeitsverhältnisse”, Steuerberater 
Woche, 2012, 765, 767; M. Jacobs, “Reformbedarf im Arbeitszeitrecht”, Neue Zeitschrift 
für Arbeitsrecht, 2016, 733, 737; cf. also recital 2 of the WTD. 
43 Even more radical M. Jacobs, “Reformbedarf im Arbeitszeitrecht”, Neue Zeitschrift für 
Arbeitsrecht, 2016, 733, 737, who argues that minor interruptions usually do not run 
against the protective purposes of the ArbZG. 
44 R. Krause (fn.1), B 35 und B 42 f; R. Falder, “Immer erreichbar – Arbeitszeit- und 
Urlaubsrecht in Zeiten des technologischen Wandels”, Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht, 
2010, 1150, 1152 f.; R. Buschmann and J. Ulber (fn. 23), § 2 par. 23. 
45 Cf. R. Krause (Fn. 1), B 46, who proposes a time limit of 15 minutes. 
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2.2. Employees' rights between flexibilisation and health protection 
 
2.2.1. The right to unavailability as a fundamental right 
 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights grants employees the right to 
working conditions which respect their health, safety and dignity, Art 31 
CFR, in particular the right to a limitation of maximum working hours as 
well as rest periods (Art 31 subs. 2 CFR). The rights granted by the 
provision are genuine rights, not mere principles (in the sense of Art 52 subs. 
5 no. 2 CFR) used for interpretation.46 A right to a limitation of working 
time can also be deduced from the German constitution (Grundgesetz). The 
right to physical integrity (Art 2 subs. 2 1 GG) and in particular the right to 
the protection of privacy, which is based on a general right of personality 
("Allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht", Artt 2 subs. 1, 1 subs. 1 GG), 
consequently call for a limitation of maximum working hours.47 The general 
right of personality also applies in Civil Law matters 48  and obliges 
employers to exercise their managerial prerogatives considerately. 
A legal footing for restrictions to employers’ rights provide §§ 241 subs. 2, 
315 subs. 1 and 618 BGB. The obligation to consider employees’ interests 
also follows from the protective role of fundamental rights.49 Fundamental 
rights do not only limit public authorities from exercising their rights in an 
excessive manner, but also contracting parties if the protection of another 
party necessitates so. When a party has unilateral powers, as is undoubtedly 
the case with respect to employers’ managerial rights vis-à-vis employees, a 
need for protection is indubitably evident. In line with this, the BAG has 
found that the definite maximum of permissible working time is reached 
where "a workload no longer compatible with human capacity"50 is required 
from an employee. However, the protection of personal rights already calls 
for restrictions below this threshold. 
 
                                                
46 H. D. Jarass, Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union – Kommentar, C.H.Beck, 
3rd ed. 2016, Art. 31 par. 2. 
47 BT-Drs. 12/5888, 24; U. Baeck and M. Deutsch (fn. 15), § 5 par. 2; R. Anzinger and W. 
Koberski, Arbeitszeitgesetz – Kommentar, dfv Fachmedien Recht und Wirtschaft, 4th ed. 
2014, Einf. par. 2, § 5 par. 3. 
48 U. Di Fabio in T. Maunz, G. Dürig et al. (eds.), Grundgesetz – Kommentar, 81. EL 
September 2017, Art. 2 GG par. 163. 
49 C.-W. Canaris, “Grundrechte und Privatrecht”, Archiv für die Civilistische Praxis, 184 
(1984), 201, 210 ff; R. Singer, “Tarifvertragliche Normenkontrolle am Maßstab der 
Grundrechte?”, Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht, 1995, 611, 621; id., “Vertragsfreiheit, 
Grundrechte und der Schutz des Menschen vor sich selbst.”, JuristenZeitung, 1995, 1133, 
1136 ff; cf. the conflicting German case-law, which in principle only assumes an indirect 
effect of fundamental rights in private law, BVerfGE 7, 198, 203 ff. 
50 BAGE 38, 69, 81. 
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The German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) emphasised in its case-
law that individuals enjoy a self-determined area of private life into which 
they can retreat and remain unmolested.51 On this basis, employees must in 
principle be granted a "right to unavailability" 52  outside their working 
hours. 53  An effective protection of employees' privacy requires a 
fundamental distinction between a work and a private sphere, the latter of 
which must in principle be shielded against interferences from employers. 
Limitations to the general right of privacy can only be justified where 
compelling reasons exist, such as to prevent severe damage or where an 
activity is imperatively necessary for the performance of contractually owed 
work.54 In practice, taking the rights of the works council to codeterminate 
internal regulations on availability outside normal working hours into 
consideration (§§ 87 no. 2, 3 German Federal Works Constitution Act 
(BetrVG)), it is advisable to conclude company agreements that limit 
availability to cases of urgent operational requirements and set a maximum 
number of days on which workers are required to be available outside of 
their work hours55 while also stipulating times in which employees may 
remain offline. Agreements between employers and employees (in 
companies without a works council) are subject to a control whether they 
constitute unfair terms, § 310 subs. 4 2 BGB (see also Art 3 subs. 1 Directive 
93/13/EECO). Such clauses must imperatively ensure that employees' health 
is sufficiently protected. A term that requires employees to be constantly 
available, is in principle unfair. 56  Insofar as this is necessary for the 
protection of employees' privacy, the content of company agreements is also 
subject to control under German Law, § 75 BetrVG.57 Therefore, the right to 
privacy must be respected even within such collective agreements. 
 
2.2.2. Right to working time flexibility 
 
The ArbZG is constructed in such way that flexible working time 
arrangements can generally not be achieved. The law, for example, prohibits 
                                                
51 BVerfGE 35, 202, 220; 79, 256, 268. 
52 R. Krause (fn. 1), B 32. 
53 Reaching the same conclusion using arguments based on civil law dogmatics R. Krause 
(fn. 1), B 52 ff. 
54 R. Richardi in R. Richardi, H. Wißmann et al. (eds.), Münchener Handbuch zum 
Arbeitsrecht, Band 1 Individualarbeitsrecht, C.H.Beck, 3rd ed. 2009, § 12 par. 40. 
55 Cf. for example the Austrian ArbZG: 10 days a month; cf. also R. Krause (fn. 1), B 46 fn. 
200. 
56 For illustrative suggestions that could be used in labour contracts cf. R. Schlegel, 
“Grenzenlose Arbeit”, Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht-Beilage, 2014, 16, 21 f. 
57 U. Preis in R. Müller-Glöge, U. Preis and I. Schmidt, Erfurter Kommentar zum 
Arbeitsrecht, C.H.Beck, 18th ed. 2018, § 310 BGB par. 9; BAG NZA 2001, 462, 464; 
2006, 563, 565.  
 154 
a mutual contractual agreement according to which parents are allowed to 
leave office early in order to pick up their children from school, to then 
spend time with them, to afterwards dedicate another two hours to work 
activities in the evening and to return to their workplace the following 
morning. Yet, it is precisely this flexibility that those employees who are 
interested in a healthy work-life balance and who want to reconcile work, 
leisure and family, call for. 
 
a) Mandatory working time law and protection from oneself 
According to the concept of the German ArbZG, working time regulation 
law is generally mandatory. This follows from an e contrario reading of the 
opening clause of § 7 ArbZG, that allows for derogations in collective and 
company agreements, as well as the protective purpose of working time 
norms.58 This restriction of the freedom of contract, which basically amounts 
to protecting employees from themselves59, exists for good reasons. Due to 
their structural weakness, employees run the danger, that, under the pressure 
to enter into an existential employment contract, contractual stipulations 
attempt to wrest from them the regulatory achievements that ensure 
reasonable working times and rest periods. 
In addition, the protection from self-inflicted harm is in particular justified, 
where it is doubtful whether the exercise of freedom is the result of a "free" 
decision or where third party or community interests require interventions. 
Good arguments can be made that employees are not fully capable of 
estimating the long-term medical consequences of sacrificing rest and 
recovery.60 There is also a public interest in maintaining the "general labour 
force"61, as sick and overburdened workers will eventually burden social 
security systems. The duty to wear helmets and to fasten seatbelts when on 
public roads, for instance, is based on these exact considerations.62 
 
b) Disproportionality of absolute limitations to private autonomy 
On the other hand, it seems disproportionate to prohibit even rational and 
balanced arrangements to flexibly allocate working time, or to only allow 
                                                
58 BAG v. 28.10.1971 – 2 AZR 15/71; with further argumentation R. Falder, “Immer 
erreichbar – Arbeitszeit- und Urlaubsrecht in Zeiten des technologischen Wandels”, Neue 
Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht, 2010, 1150, 1151 f. 
59 R. Singer, “Tarifvertragliche Normenkontrolle am Maßstab der Grundrechte?”, Zeitschrift 
für Arbeitsrecht, 1995, 611, 625 f.; id., “Vertragsfreiheit, Grundrechte und der Schutz des 
Menschen vor sich selbst.”, JuristenZeitung, 1995, 1133, 1137. 
60 Cf. as regards the duty to wear helmets and to fasten seatbelts R. Singer, 
“Vertragsfreiheit, Grundrechte und der Schutz des Menschen vor sich selbst.”, 
JuristenZeitung, 1995, 1133, 1140. 
61 R. Anzinger and W. Koberski (fn. 56), Einf. par. 2. 
62 R. Singer, “Vertragsfreiheit, Grundrechte und der Schutz des Menschen vor sich selbst.”, 
JuristenZeitung, 1995, 1133, 1140.  
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derogations where collective agreements allow for them. This would entirely 
prevent consensual solutions to flexibilise working time and rest periods in 
companies that are not bound by collective agreements. Both the WTD and – 
to a lesser extent – the German ArbZG exempt certain groups of employees 
from the strict working-time regime or allow deviating regulations in 
collective agreements. This demonstrates that the protection of employees' 
health does not enjoy absolute precedence. There is no reason why 
agreements that offer alternative concepts to rigid working hours and rest 
periods to allow better ways to reconcile work and family life should be 
prohibited, as long as they guarantee equivalent recreational periods and 
appreciate the health of employees. The structural weakness of employees 
does not require a complete negation of the freedom of contract, but only 
justifies the prevention of inappropriate working conditions. This 
corresponds with the objective of the control of unfair terms in employment 
contracts (§§ 310 subs. 3, subs. 4 2 BGB) and the case law of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court in regard to the protection of self-determination 
in cases of structural weakness.63 Contractual stipulations are only invalid as 
far as they are "unusually onerous", meaning obviously inappropriate, for 
the vulnerable party. 
By postulating that employees could not, in any case, waive rights afforded 
by stipulations of the ArbZG due to the "protective character of working 
time norms"64, the BAG shows utter disregard for these strict conditions set 
out for restrictions to the constitutionally guaranteed principle of private 
autonomy. There are no compelling reasons why workers who are interested 
in flexible working hours cannot voluntarily and in agreement with their 
employer (and possibly the works council) opt for an individual working 
time model, insofar as their interests – in particular the protection of their 
health – are taken into due consideration. So-called “knowledge workers” 
who interrupt their work in the afternoon (in order to take care of their 
children, for example) and resume work in the evening have already enjoyed 
part of their mandatory rest period.65 That these employees need another – 
"uninterrupted" – rest period of eleven hours is not necessarily the fact, if, in 
total, the mandatory rest period is granted and overexertion is ruled out. 
 
                                                
63 BVerfGE 81, 242 (255 f. – commercial agent), 89,214 (232 – guarantee), BVerfGE 103, 
89, 111 and BVerfG NJW 2001, 2248 (both regarding a waiver of alimony); cf. also R. 
Singer, “Das Sozialmodell des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs im Wandel“, in S. Grundmann, 
M. Kloepfer et al. (eds.), Festschrift 200 Jahre Juristische Fakultät der Humboldt-
Universität zu Berlin, De Gruyter, 2012, 981, 994 f. 
64 BAG v. 28.10.1971 – 2 AZR 15/71 (par. 17). 
65 A. Bissels and I. Meyer-Michaelis, “Arbeiten 4.0 - Arbeitsrechtliche Aspekte einer 
zeitlich-örtlichen Entgrenzung der Tätigkeit”, Der Betrieb, 2015, 2331, 2333. 
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These considerations regarding the proportionality of restrictions of private 
autonomy, cannot only be based on German constitutional law but also and 
analogously on European Law. The restrictions to the freedom of occupation 
entailed by the WTD must be measured against the guarantee of Art 15 CFR. 
That is, whether they are justified by overriding reasons relating to public 
interest and, in particular, whether they are capable to attain the objectives 
pursued by them while also not going beyond what is necessary to achieve 
these objectives.66 Although the restriction on the maximum working time 
and the guarantee of a consecutive rest period is generally adequate to ensure 
the intended protection of workers' health, the measures go beyond the 
objective if workers are deprived of adequately flexible working time 
models. 
 
2.3. Deliberations on necessary reforms 
 
2.3.1. Re-thinking the "rest period" 
A general reduction of the rest period or piecing together a rest period over a 
reference period 67  is prohibited. 68  Under the current WTD, national 
legislators are also barred from introducing a de minimis rule, under which 
marginal activities would not interrupt a rest period.69 The wording of Art 3 
WTD, which requires a "consecutive" rest period, offers no room for 
interpretation. It is also unlikely that the legal framework set by the EU will 
change in the foreseeable future. Over the past 15 years, all reform efforts 




                                                
66 CJEU [1995] ECR I-4165 (Gebhard). 
67 Apparently demanded by A. Bissels and I. Meyer-Michaelis, “Arbeiten 4.0 - 
Arbeitsrechtliche Aspekte einer zeitlich-örtlichen Entgrenzung der Tätigkeit”, Der 
Betrieb, 2015, 2331, 2333. 
68 R. Krause (fn. 1), B 47; W. Kohte, “Arbeitsschutz in der digitalen Arbeitswelt”, Neue 
Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht, 2015, 1417, 1423. 
69 R. Krause (fn. 1), B 46 f. 
70 M. Jacobs, “Reformbedarf im Arbeitszeitrecht”, Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht, 2016, 
733, 734; this is also the consensus among German Labour Law scholars, cf. R. Wank, 
“Neues in Arbeitszeitrecht und Arbeitsschutzrecht? – Bericht vom 2. Deutschen 
Arbeitsrechtstag”, Recht der Arbeit, 2016, 172; at this point it should not be glossed over 
the fact that the latest reform efforts by EU bodies resulted in an "interpretive" 
communication of the European Commission 
(http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=13085&langId=en [accessed 23 March 
2018]), which essentially summarises CJEU case-law on the WTD since 1993. 
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2.3.2. Specific provisions only applying to certain groups of 
employees 
The German legislator has not yet made full use of the opening clause of Art 
17 WTD which allows derogations on account of the specific characteristics 
of the activity concerned. So-called “executive employees”, however, are 
exempted from the application of the ArbZG, § 18 subs. 1 no. 1 ArbZG. But 
due to the reference to § 5 subs. 3 BetrVG, the protective purpose of which 
is entirely different from the purposes pursued by Working Time Law, and 
the narrow interpretation of the BAG of said provision, the exemption falls 
short of the regulatory freedoms afforded by the WTD.71 The problem of en 
masse violations of mandatory rest periods concerns predominantly 
employees with independent decision-making power, that is to say not only 
those who are considered "executive employees" by the ArbZG. If these were 
excluded from the scope of the ArbZG, a significant proportion of activities 
performed outside of normal working hours could be legalised, eliminating 
the current legal grey area. 
Art 17 subs. 1 WTD even allows for further derogations beyond these 
groups of employees. While it is true that the CJEU adopted a very narrow 
interpretation of the provision, demanding that an employee’s working time 
as a whole cannot be measured, predefined or determined by the employee72, 
a systematic analysis of the wording of Art 17 subs. 1 WTD ("particularly") 
shows that employees, who do not have independent decision-making 
powers, but whose working hours are also not measured, can, as a matter of 
fact, be exempted from protective regulations of the WTD. In view of the 
reservation clause that requires to take due regard for the general principles 
of the protection of the safety and health of workers, such an interpretation is 
virtually compelling. Art 17 subs. 1 WTD grants wide discretion to 
introduce manifold, also selective, derogations from otherwise mandatory 
protective regulations. Completely depriving employees who work below 
the management level of the protection afforded by § 5 subs. 1 ArbZG 
would, however, undoubtedly reach too far. Moderate and narrowly 
defined73 liberalisations on the other hand are certainly possible – especially 
when taking the best interests of employees into consideration. 
 
                                                
71 M. Henssler and S. Lunk, “Leitende Angestellte und das Arbeitszeitrecht – Betrachtungen 
de lege lata und de lege ferenda”, Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht, 2016, 1425, 1427 f. 
72 Case C-484/04 ECR I-7492 (Commission/United Kingdom), par. 20. 
73 Prerequisites could be the requirement of an explicit opt-in by the employee combined 
with a right to withdraw without any sanctions at any time, mandatory compensation 
periods and an employer's duty to keep up-to-date records similar to the provision of 
Art 22 subs. 1 lit. d) & e) WTD. 
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2.3.3. Flexibility based on collective agreements 
Even when maintaining, without exception, the mandatory nature of working 
time law, the legislator should exhaust the framework that the WTD 
provides as regards arrangements in collective agreements. After all, there is 
a consensus that there is a principle demand of employees to organise time 
and place of their work activities more flexible.74 Although the German 
Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS) does not see a need 
to adapt the legal framework, it nevertheless points to the opportunity to 
offer flexible working conditions through company and collective 
agreements. 75  However, in view of the limited options for divergent 
collective bargaining arrangements offered by the ArbZG when compared to 
Art 18 WTD, the German legal framework appears to be insufficient to 
ensure a sensible degree of flexibility. The possibility afforded by § 7 
ArbZG to shorten rest periods does in principle offer an opportunity to meet 
employees' desires for more flexible working hours.76 But even a rest period 
that has been shortened to nine hours poses challenges to young families. 
Therefore, the German legislator should make further use of the opening 
clause of Art 18 WTD that allows for wider derogations in collective 
agreements than currently found in § 7 ArbZG. One could, for example, – as 
Krause suggested in his expert opinion for the 71st German Lawyers' Forum 
(Deutscher Juristentag) – revamp § 7 subs. 1 no. 3 ArbZG which currently 
requires that the "nature of the work conducted" demands a reduction of the 
rest period.77 A reduction of the rest period by up to two hours could for 
example also be allowed "at the request of the worker". The proposal – that 
is also supported by the BMAS – to allow collective agreements which 
stipulate that minor interruptions do not lead to a new start of a rest period, 
but only reduce it from eleven to nine hours, should also be followed 
through. This would at least legalise activities immediately before and after 
core working times.78 Art 18 WTD is also open to flexible working time 
                                                
74 Cf. inter alia BMAS (fn.7), 119 ff.; R. Krause (fn. 1), B 81 ff.; G. Thüsing, 
“Digitalisierung der Arbeitswelt - Impulse zur rechtlichen Bewältigung der 
Herausforderung gewandelter Arbeitsformen”, Soziales Recht, 2016, 87, 101; H. Lüthge, 
“Arbeiten 4.0: Arbeitszeitgesetz auf dem Prüfstand”, Schnellbrief für 
Personalmanagement und Arbeitsrecht, 2017, 41; djb Kommission für Arbeits-, 
Gleichstellungs- und Wirtschaftsrecht, “Konzept für ein Wahlarbeitsgesetz”, Zeitschrift 
des Deutschen Juristinnenbundes, 2015, 121; cf. also p. 9 of the policy paper of the SPD 
(Social Democratic Party of Germany) parliamentary group, 
http://www.spdfraktion.de/system/files/documents/2016-2-
23_arbeiten_4_0_positionspapier_spd-bundestagsfraktion.pdf, in German [accessed 23 
March 2018]. 
75 BMAS (fn.7), 119. 
76 BMAS (fn.7), 121; reaching the same conclusion R. Krause (fn. 1), B 45. 
77 R. Krause (fn. 1), B 45. 
78 R. Krause (fn. 1), B 46. 
 159 
models that ensure an adequate protection of employees and are agreed upon 
by the social partners. 
 
 
3. Key findings 
 
1. Times of constant availability can be assigned to the category of 
stand-by duty and are thus generally to be considered rest periods, 
which begin anew after each interruption. However, rest periods are 
only interrupted if an employee's activity is attributable to the 
employer. That is the case if an employee could, taking the overall 
circumstances of the contractually owed work into consideration, 
reasonably feel provoked to work. 
2. Derogating from provisions of the ArbZG to the effect that rest 
periods do not have to be granted "uninterruptedly", is, in light of 
the current European framework, only possible if this is provided for 
in collective agreements. Greater flexibility can only be achieved if 
the German legislator makes use of the opening clause of Art 18 
WTD and extends the opportunities of the social partners. 
3. Employees have a "right to unavailability" outside their regular 
working hours. In the interest of balancing the interests of both 
employees and employers, statutory or collective regulations should 
be imposed that set clear limits to availability. 
4. The protection of health pursued by Working Time Law is in 
conflict with workers' widespread desire for flexible working 
conditions. 
5. Flexible working time models come into conflict with the mandatory 
nature of Working Time Law. However, the protection from oneself 
only requires a prohibition of inappropriate contractual conditions. 
Further restrictions are disproportionate. 
6. The mandatory nature of rigid working time legislation should not 
inhibit working time models that promote the reconciliation of 
family, leisure and work and at the same time do not jeopardise 
employees' health and safety. Art 17 subs. 1 WTD provides room for 
derogations from otherwise mandatory working time provisions, 




















































The re-configuration of working time in times of crisis:  







By drawing links between the subject of working time, on one hand, and the 
role of both collective bargaining and public short-term work schemes 
(public STW schemes), on the other, this contribution seeks to analyse the 
development of working time in the EU from a comparative perspective 
(Italy, Denmark and Spain), considering both EU law and domestic 
legislation and collective bargaining trends in this field. In doing this, this 
contribution highlights three objectives of working time: workers´ health and 
safety protection for workers; employers´ and employees´ flexibility, 






This contribution seeks to analyse the development of working time in the 
EU from a comparative perspective (Italy, Denmark and Spain), considering 
both EU law and domestic legislation and collective bargaining trends in this 
field. In particular, within the context of the current economic crisis 
(notwithstanding differences between Member States), this paper will draw 
links between the subject of working time, on one hand, and the role of both 
collective bargaining and public short-term work schemes (public STW 
schemes), on the other.1 
This study will take into account both EU and domestic regulation, from a 
comparative perspective, by focussing on the Italian system and discussing 
two relevant examples worthy of comparative analysis: the Danish system, 
which has showed its capacity to deal with the economic crisis through, 
among other things, a re-configuration of working time, and the Spanish 
system, which has one of the highest unemployment rates in the EU and, 
consequently, is in great need of reform. Relevant aspects of the Spanish and 
                                                
1 European Commission, Short time working arrangements as response to cyclical 
fluctuation, European Economy, Occasional papers, June 2010, n. 64, 18. Such schemes 
cover “benefits compensating for the loss of wage or salary due to formal short-time 
working arrangements, and/or intermittent work schedules, irrespective of their cause, and 
where the employer/employee relationship continues”: definition covering sub-category 
8.2 of the Eurostat LMP database. 
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Danish systems will be analysed in order to point out the main similarities 
to, and differences from, the Italian system.2 
When it comes to working time, three features or objectives should be 
highlighted at the outset: (i) working time as a way to ensure health and 
safety protection for workers; (ii) working time as a way to ensure a better 
level of flexibility in favour of both employers and employees; (iii) working 
time as a way to deal with unemployment. These three aspects have 
interacted over the years, and have influenced the European and domestic 
debates on working time. At the same time, each of these aspects have been 
influenced differently by the crisis. 
 
 
2. EU Law and working time 
 
At the end of the 1980s, “reduction of working-time and greater flexibility of 
working-time” could be considered “two poles around which the political 
debate” was “taking shape.”3 
This debate led to the adoption of Directive 93/104/EC in 1993, which 
aimed at laying down “minimum health and safety requirements of the 
organization of working time.”4 This Directive was based on the legal 
framework offered by Article 137.2 TEC5, according to which it was 
adopted by the Council of the European Union, in cooperation with the 
European Parliament, to regulate certain aspects of the organization of 
working time.  
                                                
2 The paper follows a functional comparative approach. See A. Peters, H. Schwenke, 
“Comparative Law Beyond Post-Modernism”, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, Vol. 49, Is. 4, 2000, p. 800-834. 
3 C. Purkiss, E. Verborgh, “Preface”, in R. Blanpain, E. Köhler (eds.), Legal and 
Contractual Limitations to Working-Time in the European Community Member States, 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Kluwer 
Law and Taxation Publishers, 1988. 
4 The original Treaty of Rome did not recognise to the European authorities specific 
powers to intervene in the working time issue. But a general goal to promote close co-
operation in employment and working conditions between Member States was set by 
article 118, then by article 140 TEC and today by article 156 of the consolidated version 
of the TFEU. Moreover, art. 120 indicated that Member States “shall endeavour to 
maintain the existing equivalence between paid holiday schemes”, (then, article 142 TEC, 
and today, article 158 of the consolidated version of the TFUE). 
5 Art. 137.1. TEC. With a view to achieving the objectives of Article 136, the Community 
shall support and complement the activities of the Member States in the following fields: 
…working conditions… 
Art. 137.2. To this end, the Council may adopt, by means of directives, minimum 
requirements for gradual implementation, having regard to the conditions and technical 
rules obtaining in each Treaty establishing the European Community. 
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In essence, the Directive introduced minimum requirements with respect to 
daily rest (11 consecutive hours per 24-hour period), minimum breaks (per 
every 6 hours of work), a weekly rest period (a minimum uninterrupted rest 
period of 24 hours, plus the aforementioned 11 hours’ daily rest), maximum 
weekly working time (48 hours, as an “average working time”), annual leave 
(paid annual leave of at least four weeks), night and shift work, and patterns 
of work. It also provided some definitions, such as that of “working time”, 
which it defined as “any period during which the worker is working, at the 
employer’s disposal and carrying out his activity or duties, in accordance 
with national laws and/or practice.”6  
This definition of working time is “considered to be an autonomous concept 
of European Union law, meaning that MSs are not allowed to apply any 
other definition of working time in their legislation (see e.g. ECJ, Jaeger, 9 
September 2003, C-151/02).” 7 Over the years, the Court of Justice has 
affirmed this definition. 8  
With regard to ways to regulate working hours, some scholars have pointed 
out that “protective legislation in the traditional sense sets minimum 
standards, while the main source of implementation of, and regulation in 
addition to, these standards is collective bargaining at various levels 
(national, inter-industry, industry wide and enterprise-wide).”9 
Indeed, the Directive – which sets minimum standards – is supposed to 
facilitate or permit the application of collective agreements made by social 
partners to improve protection; at the same time, it is not supposed to affect 
Member States’ right to apply, or introduce, a regulation more favourable to 
the protection of the health and safety of workers. 
The minimum requirements may also be improved upon by law and/or 
collective agreements in cases, and under the conditions, prescribed by the 
directives (e.g. for specific characteristics of activity, in case of imminent 
risk, etc.).  
                                                
6 Directive 93/104/EC, Art. 2. 
7 C. Lang, S. Clauwaert, I. Schömann, “Working Time Reforms in Times of Crisis”, ETUI 
Working Paper, No. 4, 2013, p. 6.  
8 On the “working time” definition the Court of Justice has progressively specified some 
elements: Judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-303/98, Sindicato de Médicos de 
Asistencia Pública (Simap) v Conselleria de Sanidad y Consumo de la Generalidad 
Valenciana: The Court has given a ruling on the application to medical staff assigned to 
primary health care teams of certain aspects of the Directive 93/104/EC. See also Pfeiffer 
v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut eV (2005) C-397/01-403/01; 
Personalrat der Feuerwehr Hamburg v Leiter der Feuerwehr Hamburg Case C-52/04; 
Nicole Wippel v Peek & Cloppenburg GmbH & Co. KG, C-313/02; etc. 
9 R. Blanpain, “General Report”, in R. Blanpain, E. Köhler (eds.), Legal and Contractual 
Limitations to Working-Time in the European Community Member States, European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers, 1988, p. 20. 
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With regard to weekly working time, it must be understood as the average 
working hours over the course of a reference period of 4 months. This period 
can be extended to up to 6 months. Moreover, Member States can allow 
collective agreements or agreements concluded between the two sides of 
industry to set reference periods of no greater than 12 months “for objective 
or technical reasons or reasons concerning the organization of work”.10  
The minimum standards set by the Directive are regulated by statute all over 
the EU, apart from Denmark, “where collective bargaining provides a 
functional equivalent”, and Britain.11 
As mentioned, Directive 93/104/EC was adopted to cope with the need to 
strengthen the workers’ protection of health and safety within the working 
relationship: indeed, both an excessive working time duration and specific 
ways to carry out the job, such as night and shift work, can affect workers’ 
health and safety.  
In those years in which the Directive was adopted, trade unions agitated for a 
reduction of working time for reasons going beyond questions of health and 
safety. Indeed, a reduction in working time could serve to redistribute 
available work, thus promoting employment. 
Three years after the adoption of Directive 93/104/EC, in 1996, the 
European Parliament adopted a Resolution inviting Member States to reduce 
working time. The Resolution was based on a survey, the outcomes of which 
showed that European workers were willing to work fewer hours, even if 
this could imply a salary reduction.12 This could also be understood to be an 
indication that workers value an effective work-life balance.  
The survey highlighted the relationship between reducing working time and 
increasing work productivity. At the same time, the Socialist Group in the 
European Parliament supported a proposal seeking recognition of the 
benefits of reducing working time to below 40 hours per week, taking 
inspiration from a project promoted by the French Socialist Party.13 This 
trend influenced the policy of several Member States toward a reduction in 
weekly working hours.  
While trade unions supported this, companies lobbied for more flexible 
working time, a goal that had partially already been reached through the 
                                                
10 Directive 93/104/EC. 
11 H. Compston, “Social partnership, welfare state regimes and working time in Europe”, in 
B. Ebbinghaus, P. Manow (eds.), Comparing Welfare Capitalism. Social policy and 
political economy in Europe, Japan and the USA, Routledge, London, 2001, p. 130. 
12 D. Anxo (eds.), Working time: Research and development, 1995 – 1997, A review of 
literature (1995-1997) commissioned by the European Commission and the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, European 
Commission - Employment and social affairs, 1998. 
13 P. Ichino, L.Valente, “L’orario di lavoro e i riposi”, Artt. 2107-2019, Il Codice Civile, 
Commentario Schlesinger, Giuffrè Ed., 2012, p. 13-16. 
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introduction of “average working time” (Directive 93/104/EC), which 
provides – as abovementioned - that maximum working hours must be 
calculated within a period of 4, 6 or 12 months; due to the long time period 
over which averaging calculations are made, the potential exists for periods 
in which work is much more highly concentrated. Moreover, a wide scope of 
circumstances in which the legislation in the field may be waived has also 
contributed to increase flexibility.  
For some scholars, working hours flexibility may be considered to be an 
opportunity not exclusively for companies, but also for workers, to support 
individual autonomy. According to this position, individuals should have the 
ability to adapt working time to their needs, toward a sort of 
individualisation of working hours. Such individualisation was supposed to 
have been “the outcome of new ways of managing working time.”14 Yet 
providing this increased scope may have also run the risk of frustrating the 
protection goal introduced by legislation, recognising excessive possibilities 
to waive the rules.15 
Within the wider concept of individualization, in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
the goal of achieving a balance between work and personal life began to be 
considered to be of crucial interest in the working time debate. 
At the end of the 1990s, the Council highlighted the need to modernise those 
guidelines relating to working hours that had been contained in the original 
European Employment Guidelines. This was to be carried out by means of 
both law and collective bargaining, and to be achieved through “flexible 
working arrangements… achieving the required balance between flexibility 
and security”16 and “the adaptation of employment legislation, reviewing 
where necessary the different contractual and working time arrangements.”17  
Further, according to the EU guidelines, working time was not seen merely 
in relation to companies’ flexibility, but also as a way to increase investment 
                                                
14 A. Supiot, M. E. Casas, J. De Munck, P. Hanau, A. Johansoon, P. Meadows, E. Mingione, 
R. Salais and P. van der Heijden, Transformation of Labour and Future of Labour Law in 
Europe - Final Report for the European Commission, June 1998, p. 269: “Surveys 
confirm growing individualisation of working time and a substantial reduction in the 
proportion of employees who have the same pattern every day or work the same number 
of days every week”, 269. See also A. Supiot : “Temps de travail: pour une concordance 
des temps”, Droit Social, 1995, p. 145-154: English version as “On-the-Job Time: Time 
for Agreement”, The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1996, p. 195-212; Italian version as “Alla ricerca della 
concordanza dei tempi (le disavventure europee del "tempo di lavoro")”, Lavoro e diritto, 
Vol. 1, 1997, p. 15-34. 
15 P. Ichino, L.Valente, “L’orario di lavoro”. See also M. Roccella, D. Izzi, Lavoro e diritto 
nell’unione europea, Cedam, 2010, p. 145.  
16  Council Decision of 19 January 2001 on Guidelines for Member States´ employment 
policies for the year 2001. 
17  Council Decisions of 12 July 2005 on guidelines for the employment policies of the 
Member States (2005/600/EC). 
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in human capital through better education and skills. This was to be made 
possible by “easing and diversifying access for all to education and training 
and to knowledge by means of working time organisation, family support 
services, vocational guidance and, if appropriate, new forms of cost 
sharing.”18 
In 2003, the Directive 2003/88/EC systematized the previous regulation and 
abrogated the Directives 93/104/EC and 2000/34/EC (the latter of which 
concerned certain aspects of the organisation of working time to cover 
sectors and activities excluded from the 1993 Directive).  
 
a) Recent trends 
In recent years, at least up until the crisis, the working time debate has 
started to change. Trade unions, supporting working time reduction, have 
increasingly seen their power eroded, while employers “have been pushing 
for working time extensions without offering compensation. Working time 
statistics show indeed that the trend of previous years toward working time 
reduction has been reversed in a number of European Countries.”19 
In the three countries under analysis, collective bargaining has been crucial 
for regulating working time, yet, at the same time, industrial relations have 
been characterized by increasing tensions in recent years.20 
Thus, whereas in the initial phase trade unions highlighted the reduction of 
working time as a primary concern, they then had to defend “the 
achievements of previous years”, and the “working time issue has become a 
major source of disagreement and conflict”21. 
The economic recession, which started at the end of 2008, produced a 
considerable reduction in available work, especially in the manufacturing 
sector. This lack of work increased employers’ need for flexible measures in 
order to be competitive. Companies also needed to avoid losing workers 
with professional experience, and to be ready for any possible economic 
upturn. At the same time, workers needed to keep their work, or at least to be 
supported by benefits until they could re-enter the LM.22  
                                                
18 Council Decisions of 12 July 2005 on guidelines for the employment policies of the 
Member States (2005/600/EC). 
19 M. Keune, “Collective bargaining and working time in Europe: An overview”, in M. 
Keune and B. Galgóczi, (eds.), Collective bargaining on working time: Recent European 
experiences, Brussels, European Trade Union Institute ETUI, 2006, p. 9; see also M. 
Weiss, “Job Security: a Challenge for EU Social Policy”, in N. Countouris, M. Freedland, 
Resocialising Europe in a Time of Crisis, Cambridge Un. Press, 2013, p. 278 ff. 
20 M. Keune, “Collective bargaining and working time”, p. 18. 
21 M. Keune, ‘Collective bargaining and working time”, p. 9. 
22 S. Spattini, “Il funzionamento degli ammortizzatori sociali in tempo di crisi: un confronto 
comparato”, Diritto relazioni industriali, Vol. 3, 2012, p. 670 ff. By adopting flexible 
measures employers can also avoid to face dismissal costs.  
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The increased flexibility called for by companies, and thus working time 
deregulation, was bolstered by a proposal to revise the Directive, which also 
included an explicit 60-hour weekly limit.23 In December 2011, after two 
stages of consultation in March 2010 and December 2010, the cross-industry 
social partners at the EU level began negotiations on a review of the 
Working Time Directive, which ended without an agreement in December 
2012.24  
As Lang, Clauwaert and Schömann put it, “in December 2012, negotiations 
between the social partners stalled when the Executive Committee of the 
ETUC noted that the “final offer” from the employers was not sufficiently 
balanced25”, but rather aimed only to reduce costs and achieve greater 
flexibility. 
The weakening of trade unions, the insistent call for flexibility by 
companies, the lack of an agreement to revise the directive, the economic 
crisis and the high unemployment rate across the EU have led to an increase 
in collective bargaining aimed at activating the possibilities for 
flexibilization provided by the directive. At the same time, flexibilization has 
also been achieved through unilateral decision-making and, in some cases, 
even by working time reduction supported by public finances through STW 
schemes.  
In particular, according to 2014 ILO research on “the use of working time-
related crisis response measures during the Great Recession”, there have 
been two primary ways to introduce working-time flexibility requested 
during the crisis: (i) work-sharing schemes, with specific domestic 
characteristics and public subsidies; and (ii) “working-time adjustments 
based on unilateral or bilateral decisions taken at the level of the firm, with 
or without a framework of collective agreements, but in either case without 
public financial support.”26   
                                                
23 Eurofound Research, Revisions to the European working time directive: recent Eurofound 
research, Background paper, 2008. See also D. Gottardi, F. Guarriello (eds.), M. 
Roccella, Manuale di Diritto del Lavoro, Giappichelli Ed., 2015, p. 329. See also F. 
Vandenbroucke, C. Barnard, G. De Baerem A European Social Union after the Crisis, 
Cambridge University Press, 2017. 
24 Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, Industrial Relations in 
Europe 2012, 2013, 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=it&pubId=7498&type=2&furtherP
ubs=yes 
25 C. Lang, S. Clauwaert, I. Schömann, “Working Time Reforms”, p. 6.  
26 A. Kümmerling, S. Lehndorff, “The use of working time-related crisis response measures 
during the Great Recession”, Conditions of work and employment series, Vol. 44, 2014, 
International Labour Organization. The research points out the lack of information 
especially with regard to the second type of measures, and also with regard to the small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs), p. 7, 8. 
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With regard to the flexibilization of working time in the absence of STW 
access, even in these times of trade unions’ declining influence, the 2015 
ILO Report on “Labour Protection in a Transforming World of Work” 
highlighted the idea of flexibilization of working time in favour of workers, 
and not just of companies. In particular, referring to Golden27 , the report 
affirms that “flexible working is a variation of an employee’s normal 
working pattern, and includes part-time work, flexitime, job-sharing, and 
working from home (telework). Innovative working-time arrangements such 
as flexitime and compressed workweeks, if properly structured, can be 
mutually advantageous for both workers and enterprises.28” At the same 
time, because of fluctuations in the market, new forms of contract, without 
any fixed working time, have been increased across EU countries, increasing 
the levels of precariousness for workers.29 Such developments cannot be 
considered a good basis for achieving a healthy work-life balance. 
In this regard, the impact of telework/ICT-mobile work (T/ICTM) on the 
world of work has recently been taken into consideration by a study carried 
out by the Eurofound that also concerned its effects on working time, 
performance, work–life balance, and health and well-being. The study notes 
that “implementing flexible working time arrangements relate...” also “...to 
the improvement of working conditions – more specifically, ways in which 
workers can reconcile work and personal life.” 30 
 
b) Public short-time working schemes (public STW schemes) 
Since the 1990s, the EU has emphasised the need for Member States to 
guarantee their financial sustainability.31  In the context of the current 
economic crisis, public expenditure for STW schemes and unemployment 
benefits have increased considerably, putting under intense pressure the 
Member States’ public finance. EU Institutions have continued to stress the 
need to reduce public debt and social systems costs.32  
                                                
27 L. Golden, “The Effects of Working Time on Productivity and Firm Performance: A 
Research Synthesis Paper”, ILO, Conditions of Work and Employment Series, No. 33, 
2012. 
28 ILO, “Report VI. Labour protection in a transforming world of work. A recurrent 
discussion on the strategic objective of social protection (labour protection),” 
International Labour Conference, 104th Session, 2015, p. 34: 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@relconf/documents/meetingdocu
ment/wcms_358295.pdf 
29 ILO, “Report VI”, p. 34. 
30 ILO, “Report VI”, p. 10. 
31 Modernising and Improving Social Protection in Europe, COM (97) 102 final, 
12.03.1997; Extraordinary European Council Meeting on Employment, Luxembourg, 20 
and 21 November 1997 Presidency Conclusions; Council Resolution of 22 February 1999 
on the 1999 Employment Guidelines, A Concerted Strategy for Modernising Social 
Protection, COM (99) 347 final, 14.07.1999. 
32  See the EU Recommendations to Member States since 2011: 
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The aforementioned 2014 ILO 33  research noted that, during the crisis, 
companies adopted measures that they were already familiar with and that 
they had already theretofore been applying, i.e. over the previous ten or 
twenty years. At the same time, since the beginning of the economic 
recession, the eastern European Member States have, for the first time, 
adopted legislative measures to reduce working time.34  
But this trend can be considered common in the OECD countries, too. In 
particular, research shows that, from the beginning of the crisis, STW has 
been employed in respect over 4.5 million workers across the OECD, albeit 
with considerable differences from one county to another.35  
Moreover, the context of this increase in STW – meaning lower wages for 
workers and increasing public expenditure – has been characterized by a 
complex picture; as was highlighted by Lang, Clauwaert and Schömann, “on 
the ground of responding to the economic crisis, labour law reforms have 
been adopted in various EU Member States in recent years”, downsizing 
labour law standards in order to introduce greater LM flexibility. 36 
STWs have been applied during the crisis in order to reduce working time, 
and thus to support companies when their customers cut their orders. In this 
way, companies could keep their workforce and be ready to respond to the 
economic recovery. In particular, “these arrangements allow companies to 
preserve human capital and skills that will be necessary in the recovery 
phase. Further, employers reduce potential costs related to personnel 
turnover, dismissal, recruitment process, and training”.37 At the same time, 
the reduction of working hours has been financed through public support in 
the different Member States. This enabled workers to retain their position 
and save a part of their wage, even for the hours they didn’t work. 
STW are also valuable in that they “maintain social peace and cohesion in 
that employers and employees share the impact of the downturn”38 and can 
                                                                                                              
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/documents/documents-and-reports/subject/monitoring-
progress/index_it.htm 
33 A. Kümmerling, S. Lehndorff, “The use of working time-related crisis”, p. 4. 
34 V. Glassner, M. Keune, P. Marginson, “La contrattazione collettiva in tempo di crisi”, 
Diritto relazioni industriali, Vol. 2, 2012, 296 ff.  
35 A. Hijzen, S. Martin, “The Role of Short-Time Work Schemes during the Global 
Financial Crisis and Early Recovery: A Cross-Country related Analysis”, OECD Social, 
Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 144, 2012, p. 6. 
36 C. Lang, S. Clauwaert, I. Schömann, “Working Time Reforms”, p. 5.  
37 M. Tiraboschi, “Labor Market Policies to Tackle the Crisis and Sustain the Economic 
Growth in EU: Models and Solutions”, in Lera 63rd Annual Proceedings, 2011: 
http://www.bollettinoadapt.it/old/files/document/14077TiraboschiProcee.pdf, p. 22 ff., in 
particular p. 33. 
38 M. Tiraboschi, “Anti-crisis Labour Market Measures and their Effectiveness between 
Flexibility and Security”, in M. Tiraboschi, Labour Lawand Industrial Relations in 
Recessionary Times The Italian Labour Relationsin a Global Economy, Adapt University 
Press, Adapt Labour Studies e-Book series n. 3, 2012:, p. 22 ff., in particular p. 32. 
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work as a “flexible tool for governments that are able to somehow control 
the adjustment of the labour market”.39 Scholars highlighted the fact that 
such positive outcomes corresponded to improving the macroeconomic 
situation of Member States and of the EU as a whole because the use of 
STW schemes functioned as an automatic stabiliser.40 But researchers also 
pointed out that: (i) such an outcome was achieved only if companies 
accessed STW when they actually needed to; however, in the case of 
companies accessing STW without being in need of it, this could affect the 
system in a negative way, and could correspond to a reduction in 
productivity of the system at the macroeconomic level; (ii) the 
“discretionary” component of the STW, i.e. the prerequisites to access to 
such schemes, play a crucial role in the STW’s effectiveness from a 
macroeconomic perspective: the more accessible they are, the less effective 
the STW scheme is in reducing the unemployment rate.41 In this last respect, 
Brey and Hertweck recently estimated that where access to STW schemes 
has been lower, the positive impact of such schemes on the unemployment 
rate has been more significant: by way of illustration, the “peak uptake rate” 
in Denmark was 0.48, whilst the success ratio stood at 151%; peak uptake in 
Spain was 0.79, with a success ratio of 137%; and peak uptake in Italy was 
2.49 with a success ratio of 87%.42 
Thus, it is important to highlight that STW schemes can be useful, but only 
to the point at which they cease to be needed; beyond this point, companies 
should be able to deal with the effects of the crisis using own resources.  
However, as Brey and Hertweck note, according to Boeri and Brecker, there 
has been “a sizable amount of deadweight loss during the Great Recession,” 
43  i.e. a loss of economic efficiency. Thus, on the one hand, the use of STW 
schemes helped to preserve jobs and supported workers during the crisis. On 
the other hand, continuing to use such schemes could have slowed the 
recovery in terms of quality and quantity of jobs.44 
At the same time, in 2012, Clauwaert and Schömann45 highlighted that 
Member States had adopted a number of reforms, which introduced changes 
                                                
39 M. Tiraboschi, “Anti-crisis”, p. 28. 
40 A. Balleer, B. Gehrke, W. Lechthaler, C. Merkl, “Does short-time work save jobs? A 
business cycle analsysis”, IZA DP, No. 7475, 2013. 
41 A. Hijzen, S. Martin, “The Role of Short-Time Work Schemes”. 
42 B. Brey, M. S. Hertweck, “The Extension of Short-Time Work Schemes during the Great 
Recession: A Story of Success?”, Working Paper Series – University of Konstanz – 
Department of Economics, No. 5, 2016, p. 21. 
43  B. Brey, M. S. Hertweck, “The Extension of Short-Time Work Schemes”, p. 1. See: T. 
Boeri, H. Bruecker, “Short-time work benefits revisited: Some lessons from the Great 
Recession”, Economic Policy, Vol. 26, Iss. 68, 2011, pp. 697–765.  
44 A. Hijzen, S. Martin, “The Role of Short-Time Work Schemes”. 
45 S. Clauwaert, I. Schömann, “The Crisis and National Labour Law Reforms: a Mapping 
exercise”, ETUI Working Paper N. 4, 2012.  
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in labour law, including in working time, “using the crisis as an excuse”.46 
Thus, for some scholars, the expansion of STW schemes “primarily 
benefited large firms using short-time work recurrently to deal with seasonal 
fluctuations.” 47 Furthermore, unnecessarily accessing public resources also 
tends to bring the legitimacy of such access into question.  
In this light, it seems necessary to draw a crucial distinction: (i) for 
companies in need, i.e. for companies that would actually not be able to cope 
with extraordinary market conditions, the use of STW schemes tends to 
work as a useful tool aiding recovery; (ii) for companies not “in need”, a 
reduction of working time should imply a serious rethinking of the 
company’s organization. 
Moreover, the idea that STW schemes shouldn’t be an ordinary tool for 
regulating the economy has been highlighted since the 1980s by Mark 
Freedland, according to whom the government (he referred to the UK, 
specifically) has “a large number of other more significant regulators of the 
labour economy at its disposal.” 48 Furthermore, the use of STW schemes 
could be attacked by the European Commission “as amounting to a 
distortion of competition.” 49 
At the same time, Freedland notes that such subsidising seems “more 
acceptable” to the European Commission because it can avoid redundancies. 
Another advantage is that such schemes bring together employment law, 
collective bargaining and social security law by making them converge on 
“the protection of the employee against loss of income when he is placed on 
short time”. 50 
However, if we think about EU employment policy of the past two decades, 
and the goal of achieving both security and flexibility, i.e. the flexicurity 
goal that the Member States have adopted in following the European 
Employment guidelines, the massive use of STW can be considered a “step 
back toward job security”51 and “problematic for flexicurity”, as Astrid 
Sanders puts it. In particular, STW schemes can be problematic if they are 
not linked to activation initiatives, as in the majority of cases in the EU 
Member States.  
 
                                                
46 C. Lang, S. Clauwaert, I. Schömann, “Working Time Reforms”, p. 6.  
47 P. Cahuc, S. Nevoux, “Inefficient Short-Time Work”, VOX CEPR´s Policy Portal, 14 
September 2017. They refer in particular to the French situation. 
48 M. Freedland, “Leaflet Law: the Temporary Short Time Working Compensation 
Scheme”, Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 9, 1980, p. 254 ff. In particular p. 255. 
49 M. Freedland, “Leaflet Law: the Temporary Short Time Working”, p. 255. 
50 M. Freedland, “Leaflet Law: the Temporary Short Time Working”, p. 256. 
51 A. Sanders, “The Changing Face of ´Flexicurity` in times of austerity?”, in N. Countouris, 
M. Freedland, Resocialising Europe in a Time of Crisis, Cambridge Un. Press, 2013, p. 
314 ff., in particular p. 322. 
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3. Working time in Italy 
 
In Italy, the power to limit working hours is granted by the constitution, 
according to which the maximum length of the working day is set by law.52 
Initially, Law n. 473/1925 fixed the maximum working hours to 48 hours per 
week, with the possibility of overtime53 of 2 hours per day, and 12 hours per 
week. Then, the Italian system developed increasingly toward a reduction in 
working time, such as in several other EU countries. This reduction was 
achieved, in particular, through the collective bargaining of the 1980s: trade 
unions supported reductions in working time in order to make available 
more work opportunities for all workers;54 the economic situation of those 
years also allowed important reductions to be achieved through paid leave. 
Then, Law n. 196/1997 set normal working hours at 40 hours per week.  
In particular, since the end of 1980s and during the 1990s, working time has 
been viewed as a means of offering flexibility to employers and avoiding 
collective dismissals. 
Furthermore, in 1991, a law55 was adopted seeking to institute measures to 
recognize public benefits to workers in the case of temporary lack of work or 
collective dismissal.56 The cassa integrazione was systematically instituted 
as a benefit available to companies in specific circumstances in order to pay 
workers in certain cases of temporary lack of work.57 According to several 
                                                
52 Article 36.2 of the Italian Constitution.  
53 Overtime is “hours worked beyond the legal work week”. Definition from A. Supiot, M. 
E. Casas, J. De Munck, P. Hanau, A. Johansoon, P. Meadows, E. Mingione, R. Salais and 
P. van der Heijden, Transformation of Labour and Future of Labour Law in Europe - 
Final Report for the European Commission, June 1998, p. 232. 
54 This idea was launched by France to promote a reduction of working hours: soon it has 
been adopted also in other countries, such as Italy. B. Hepple, “Diritto del lavoro e crisi 
economica: lezioni della storia europea”, Giornale di diritto del lavoro e relazioni 
industriali, Vol. 123, 2009. 
55 Legge n. 223/1991. 
56 In specific, in the case of temporary lack of work and in case of unemployment. 
57 The Law n. 223/91 regulated the cassa integrazione straordinaria (cigs) and introduced 
the indennità di mobilità. These two measures are applied to companies with more than 
15 workers in the 6 months previous the presentation of the application. The cigs 
application should include the company program to face the social consequences coming 
from the lack of work. The cigs is used in extraordinary situations, such as restructurings, 
reorganizations or conversions business. In case of temporary lack of orders or a hard 
situation on the market, not depending on the company or on the workers, the company 
can apply for the cassa integrazione ordinaria (cigo), regulated by the Law n. 167/1975 
(legge 20 maggio 1975, n. 164). 
In case of collective dismissal of at least 5 persons within 120 days, for objective reasons, 
there is a specific procedure. Then, the dismissed worker can access to the benefit of 
indennità di mobilità, if she/he: (i) has been hired by the company at least for one year; 
(ii) has worked by the company at least six months. The procedure for both the mobilità 
and the cassa integrazione straordinaria involves the trade unions. 
 173 
scholars, this measure, which is a type of public SWT scheme, has often 
been misused,58 i.e. without real need, simply to save companies’ money.  
Since the 2000s, developments in the regulation of working time have 
exhibited different tendencies from earlier decades: regulation has become 
more fluid and flexibility has been extended.  
The Legislative Decree n. 66/200359 transposed the Directives 93/104/EC 
and 2000/34/EC. Meanwhile, several new typologies of contract were 
introduced in Italy, with relevant effects on working time, especially in 
terms of increasing flexibility.  
Indeed, high numbers of typologies of atypical contracts and increasing 
possibilities to sign temporary contracts characterize the Mediterranean 
countries and their “flexicurity at the margin”, i.e. models very different 
from the Scandinavian ones, especially in terms of security granted to 
workers.60 For example, with regard to part-time work, the law was changed 
in Italy in 200361 via the possibility to introduce elastic and flexible clauses 
through the individual contract. These “elastic clauses” allow working hours 
to be increased, while “flexible clauses” allow an employer to change start 
and finish times of an employee’s working day (e.g. a shift from 8 am to 12 
am could be shifted to 2 pm to 6 pm). 
At the same time, the fixed term contract has been significantly modified. In 
this regard, the recent legislation is particularly relevant. A 2012 law62 
introduced the possibility of signing a first contract without the need for any 
                                                                                                              
The indennità di mobilità is a social security benefit of one, two or three years depending 
on the age of the beneficiary. It amounts to 80% of previous income from employment of 
the last six months, up to a maximum of € € 971,71 or, € 1.167,91 pre-tax, per month. 
The reform n. 92/2012 modified the legislation: the indennità di mobilità will be 
gradually replaced by the Aspi. The Law 10 December 2014, n. 183, and the following 
Legislative Decree, has now replaced the Aspi with the new Naspi and introduced further 
modification in the field. 
58  S. Renga, La tutela contro la disoccupazione, Collana Dottrina e Giurisprudenza 
sistematica di diritto della previdenza sociale, Utet, 1997, p. 22; R. Garofalo, 
“Ammortizzatori sociali e occupabilità”, Diritto delle relazioni industriali, Vol. 3, 2006, 
pp. 671-689; F. Liso, “Gli ammortizzatori sociali. Percorsi evolutivi e incerte prospettive 
di riforma”, in P. Curzio (eds.) Ammortizzatori sociali, regole, deroghe, prospettive, 
Cacucci Editore, 2009; A. Di Stasi, “Gli ammortizzatori sociali tra "il cielo delle idee" e 
le più recenti novità legislative. Una introduzione”, Rivista giuridica del lavoro e della 
previdenza sociale, Vol. 2, 2011, 339-358, 344; F. Carinci, “Provaci ancora Sam: 
ripartendo dall’art. 18 dello Statuto”, Rivista Italiana di Diritto del Lavoro, Vol. 1, No. 3, 
2012; etc. 
59   Such Decree has been partially modified by further Decrees.  
60   F. Carinci, “Provaci ancora Sam”. 
61   Decreto Legislativo n. 276/2003. This possibility was subordinated, before this change, to 
the eventual regulation introduced by collective bargaining: M. Brollo, “Le flessibilità del 
lavoro a tempo parziale e i differenti equilibri fra autonomia collettiva e autonomia 
individuale”, Argomenti di diritto del lavoro, 2002, pp. 723-759. 
62   Legge n. 92/2012. 
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reason proving the temporary nature of the contract. A 2014 law63 provided 
that no reason proving the temporary nature of the contract is needed to sign 
a temporary work contract up to 36 months. This has been presented by the 
Italian government as an important measure to cope with unemployment, but 
it could also increase job insecurity and downsize workers’ rights.64  
In February 2015, the Italian government issued several legislative decrees 
to implement Law 10 December 2014, n. 183; the contratto unico was 
adopted, a contract with lower guarantees in comparison to traditional open-
ended contracts, including in terms of protection in case of dismissal. This 
aspect makes the contratto unico similar to a temporary work contract rather 
than an open-ended contract. 
During the economic crisis, from the end of 2008, Italy has continued using 
the cassa integrazione and increased the adoption of another similar 
measure: the contratto di solidarietà. This measure has been used 
increasingly in recent years. Such a measure may be adopted in specific 
collective agreements that are signed at the company level. This kind of 
agreement allows the working time of workers to be reduced, and covers 
hours that are not worked, with benefits covering a percentage of the lost 
wage.  
The contratti di solidarietà have been backed in recent years by the State – 
and also by social partners – as a preferable measure to the cassa 
integrazione. In this way, the Government aims to guarantee working time 
reduction oriented toward an effective recovery of the company. As a matter 
of fact, the contratto di solidarietà implies the greater involvement of the 
company in planning its production activity than do other kinds of STW. 
Moreover, the wage-percentage available to workers in case of contratto di 
solidarietà was increased during the crisis (from 60% to 80%). 
During the crisis, special kinds of public SWT schemes have been adopted 
in order to guarantee benefits for workers that are not covered by benefits: 
they are named ammortizzatori in deroga. Such measures seek to provide 
protection to workers who terminate their benefits or who didn’t have access 
to any protection in case of unemployment and/or temporary lack of work. 
One should note that all the public SWT schemes in Italy are conditional on 
activation duties oriented toward enabling workers to enhance their 
professional profiles. Spain has adopted similar legislation, but in both cases 
                                                
63   Decreto Legge n. 34/2014, amended and transformed into the Legge n. 78/2014 
64  F. Carinci, “Jobs Act, atto I. La legge n. 78/2014 fra passato e futuro”, Working Paper 
ADAPT, No. 164, 2014. Moreover, the maximum length of temporary work, i.e. 36 
months, could be easily extended throughout collective bargaining even at the company 
level. 
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the problem remains the inefficiency of national public employment 
services.65  
The current economic crisis has strengthened the thesis that the reduction of 
working hours could be a valid measure to deal with unemployment, an idea 
that was common in the 1990s.  Ferrante suggested achieving this goal 
through public SWT schemes linked to adequate training and activation 
initiatives. At the same time, Ferrante highlighted the need to take into 
consideration the impact of reductions in working time on pensions.66 
However, this proposal doesn’t address the problem of companies using 
public SWT schemes merely in order to save money and reduce costs.  
Nevertheless, public SWT schemes have traditionally played a crucial role in 
Italy’s public macroeconomic policy.67 Moreover, for specific sectors they 
are recognised as a means to integrate low wages.68  
At the same time, it seems nowadays to be crucial to take into consideration 
the need to ensure the stability of public finances and to limit public 
expenditure: as a matter of fact, the total hours covered by public SWT 
                                                
65 F. Liso, “Brevi appunti sugli ammortizzatori e sui servizi all’impiego nel Protocollo del 
23 luglio 2007”, in A. Perulli (eds.), Le riforme del lavoro. Dalla legge finanziaria 2007 
al protocollo sul Welfare, Halley Editrice, 2007. P. 113; A. Alaimo, Il diritto sociale al 
lavoro nei mercati integrati. I servizi per l’impiego tra regolazione comunitaria e 
nazionale, Giappichelli, 2009; F. Liso, “Servizi all’Impiego”, in Enciclopedia giuridica 
Treccani, 2007, pp. 1-10; F. Liso, “Appunti sulla trasformazione del collocamento da 
funzione pubblica a servizio”, in R. De Luca Tamajo, M. Rusciano, L. Zoppoli (eds.), 
Mercato del lavoro: riforma e vincoli di sistema, Editoriale scientifica, 2004; F. Liso, “I 
servizi all’impiego”, in D. Garofalo, M. Ricci, Percorsi di diritto del lavoro, Cacucci, 
2006; F. Liso, “Collocamento. I) Diritto del lavoro”, (update), in Enciclopedia giuridica 
Treccani, 1988, pp. 1-24; S. del la Casa Quesada, “Políticas activa y políticas pasivas de 
empleo: la respuesta de la protección por desempleo ante la crisis económica”, in Susana 
del la Casa Quesada, María Rosa Vallecillo Gámez (eds.), Empleo, mercado de trabajo y 
sistema productivo: el reto de la innovación en políticas de empleo, Editorial Bomarzo, p. 
214; R. Ballester, “European Employment Strategy and Spanish Labour Market Policies”, 
Jordasas de Economía Laborar - Working Papers, No. 14, 2005. Department of 
Economics, University of Girona, pp. 1-31, in particular p. 13, 14; M. Á. Malo, “Labour 
market policies in Spain under the current recession”, Discussion Paper of the 
International Labour Organization, International Institute for Labour Studies, Vol. 211, 
2010, p. 69 ff. 
66 V. Ferrante, “Recenti evoluzioni nella disciplina degli ammortizzatori sociali: fra 
sostegno alla riduzione dell’orario e generalizzazione delle tutele”, Diritto relazioni 
industriali, Vol. 4, 2009, p. 918 ff. 
67 N. Lafranconi, “La Cassa integrazione guadagni come strumento di politica economica e 
sociale”, Previdenza Sociale, 1966; M. Cinelli, La tutela del lavoratore contro la 
disoccupazione, Franco Angeli, 1982; G. G. Balandi, Tutela del reddito e mercato del 
lavoro nell’ordinamento italiano, Giuffrè, 1984; O. Mazzotta, “Diritto del lavoro” in G. 
Iudica, P. Zatti (eds.) Trattato di Diritto Privato, Giuffrè, 2008, p. 803; etc.  
68 F. Liso, “I trattamenti di disoccupazione. Riflessioni critiche”, Rivista italiana di diritto 
del lavoro ,Vol. 1. 1995, pp. 339-360, see 341; P. Bozzao, La tutela previdenziale del 
lavoro discontinuo, Giappichelli, 2005, p. 105. 
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schemes increased from 245,589,683 in 2005, to 915,470,123 in 2009, to 
more than one billion in 2012, 2013 and 2014.69 
Even the work-life balance dimension has been discussed in Italy and this 
has resulted in important achievements, both in terms of legislation and 
collective bargaining: the possibility of shaping working time to personal 
needs has indeed been expanded. The problem, however, remains a lack of 
effectiveness or utilisation of such an opportunity, probably due to a 
weakening of the trade unions’ role and the lack of a labour market culture 
supporting companies’ to make organisational changes to improve work-life 
balance.  
With regard to flexibility in favour of employees, one relevant legislative 
achievement is represented by Article 9 of the Law 53/2000, which 
introduced the possibility of modifying the working time of a worker in 
order to achieve a balance between work and personal life, within an 
ambitious project to adapt the “times of the cities” (of available services, 
shops, offices, etc.) to the needs of people and families70 . This very 
significant project has still not achieved adequate results.71 For this reason, 
Government, companies’ associations and trade unions signed an agreement 
in 2011 to support work-life balance policies through flexible working hours 
and other family-friendly measures, with the main aim of supporting female 
employment.72 
In 2015, the Legislative Decree n. 151/2001 for parental leave and other 
tools to support maternity, paternity and work-life balance was modified in 
order to strengthen those rights addressed to parents.73 In order to achieve 
                                                
69 The numbers refer to the granted hours in case of cassa integrazioni guadagni ordinaria, 




70 A. R. Tinti, “Conciliazione e misure di sostegno. Sulle azioni positive di cui all’art. 9 
della legge n. 53/2000”, Lavoro e diritto Vol 23, No. 2, 2009, pp. 173 ff.; D. Gottardi, 
“Lavoro di cura. Spunti di riflessione”, Lavoro e Diritto, No. 1, 2001, pp. 121 ff.; etc. 
71  The lack of adequate results is evident from the low number of granted projects: just 54 
granted projects on February 2009: 
http://www.politichefamiglia.it/media/50843/ammessi%20febbraio%202009.pdf; just 61 
on February 2008: 
http://www.politichefamiglia.it/media/48775/progetti%20feb08%20per%20decreto.pdf; 
just 73 on June 2008: 
http://www.politichefamiglia.it/media/49396/tabella%20progetti%20finanziati%20giugno
%202008.pdf;  
just 91 granted projects on October 2008: 
http://www.politichefamiglia.it/media/49958/tabella%20dei%20progetti%20ammessi%20
a%20finanziamento%20ott2008.pdf 
72 Trilateral Agreement, 8 of March 2011 “Azioni a sostegno delle politiche di conciliazione 
tra famiglia e lavoro”: see http://www.governo.it/backoffice/allegati/62688-6620.pdf  
73 Legislative Decree n. 80/2015. 
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this goal, a decree has been recently adopted providing a tax cut for those 
employers who managed to reach agreement with relevant trade unions 
and/or company workers’ representatives to adopt measure to improve work-
life balance.74 
 
3.1. Collective bargaining: the chemical industrial sector 
 
Legislative Decree n. 66/2003 provides for a wide range of opportunities to 
waive legislation in the field of working hours regulation, such as the setting 
of the period of time to count average working time, daily rest, breaks, etc. 
In Italy, this opportunity has been extensively exploited in collective 
bargaining.  
Developments in working hours regulation of the past decade in the 
chemical industrial sector would seem to provide a fruitful exemplar of 
changes in working hours regulation in general, since this sector is one of the 
most advanced in Italy in terms of collective bargaining. Moreover, 
collective bargaining in this sector is influenced by multinational companies, 
especially in the pharmaceutical sector, and is characterized by a highly-
developed industrial relations systems that is able to introduce innovative 
outcomes via collective bargaining75.  
Working time accounts or time banking schemes allow for greater flexibility 
in the management of working hours: workers work more when work 
demand is high, and work less when demand is low. Normally, measures of 
this kind are considered to be tools that create “win-win situations”, because 
they provide benefits for both employers and employees. Workers may use 
time-banking schemes in order to balance work with their personal lives, 
while companies may use these schemes to cope with fluctuations in 
demand. This “ambiguity”, however, can lead to two different outcomes: a 
“win-win” situation or a conflict between firms and employees76. Thus, 
individual time-banking accounts are actually often used by companies to 
face market fluctuations. In Denmark, 77% of all firms signed agreements 
with trade unions on varying weekly working hours, but the average within a 
one-year period does not exceed 37 hours.77 
Since the 1990s, collective bargaining in the industrial chemical sector has 
changed its approach to overtime: the national sectorial agreement warned 
that (i) overtime work should be used carefully and (ii) social partners 
                                                
74 In order to put into effects the Legislative Decree n. 80/2015, the Government adopted a 
decree on 14. September 2017 which recognised the mentioned tax cut on social 
contributions. 
75 For example, the national collective agreement of the chemical sector has introduced 
working time accounts from the 90s. 
76 A. Kümmerling, S. Lehndorff, “The use of working time-related crisis”, p. 18, 19. 
77 A. Kümmerling, S. Lehndorff, “The use of working time-related crisis”, p. 23. 
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should evaluate alternative possibilities to avoid its application. In 1996, this 
approach changed, moving toward the increased use of overtime through 
agreements at the company level. 
Working time accounts had already been introduced in the 1996 national 
collective agreement of the Italian chemical sector, as a means to convert 
overtime hours into days of rest, to be used compatibly to the company’s 
needs. The worker may choose to use 50% of their overtime hours as rest 
days (to be placed in a time-banking account), with the other 50% to be paid; 
or all as rest days; or all to be paid.  
Moreover, this sector, as others (e.g. the textile sector) is characterized by a 
reduction in working hours, achieved through additional days of paid leave. 
In this case, it is the company that decides on the allocation of the leave days 
and the adjustment of working hours (average weekly working time: 37 
hours and 30 minutes). 
In case of vocational training of workers, the agreement of 2002 specified 
that adjustments in working hours were to be adopted. 
The agreement of 2006 (reaffirmed by the most recent agreement of 2015) 
set normal working hours by averaging a worker’s working hours over a 12 
month period, using the opportunity offered by Directive 2003/88 EC to 
waive the limit of four months (six if stated by law). Thus, the chemical 
sector demonstrated its capacity to offer flexibility to social partners.  
Currently, increasing power has been accorded to companies to intervene in 
the field of working hours, even when these would temporarily derogate 
from national agreements. However, this power remains contained within 
the framework stated by the national agreement, which can shape precise 
rules. Moreover, any derogation must be agreed between social partners. In 
this context, Article 8 of Decree Law n. 138/2011 – which amended and 
transformed into Law n. 148/2011 – introduced the possibility of allowing 
agreements at company levels that waive both the national agreement and 
the law in specific matters, which include working hours. On the other hand, 
national agreements cannot waive the law, even in the specific fields 
enumerated in Article 8, which is considered to constitute an excessive 
interference in the autonomy and independence of social partners.78 Article 8 
is oriented toward individualization and deregulation of labour law, and not 
only in the realm of working time. For this reason, Perulli believes that it 
would be necessary to create a supranational “frame of reference” in which 
companies can operate according to shared and harmonized rules.79  
                                                
78 V. Leccese, “Il diritto sindacale al tempo della crisi. Intervento eteronomo e profili di 
legittimità costituzionale”, Giornale di diritto del lavoro e relazioni industriali, No. 4, 
2012. 
79 A. Perulli, “La contrattazione collettiva ‘di prossimità’: teoria, comparazione e prassi”, 
Rivista Italiana di Diritto del Lavoro, Vol. 4, 2013, pp. 918 ff. 
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Recently, the national agreement for the industrial chemical sector provided 
employees with the ability to transfer a part of their personal time-banking 
accounts to co-workers, e.g. in order to support those parents who must care 
for children with particular health problems.80 
 
 
4. Some aspects of the Spanish working time regulation 
 
Spain can be considered a “state driven flexibility” system, i.e. one in which 
a crucial role in working time is played by the State, legislator, or governing 
body.81 
A reduction in working hours may be achieved with or without the 
involvement of collective agreements between trade unions and companies, 
and is “often accompanied by temporary job guarantees under the imminent 
threat of redundancies.”82 
Before 2012, the legislation provided social partners with the possibility of 
reaching flexible working hours by means of collective agreements. In 2012, 
the newly-elected Spanish government adopted a royal legislative decree, n. 
3/201283, which applied to industrial relations, collective dismissal, and 
collective bargaining. This reform was adopted without trade unions 
involvement, and without taking into consideration the recommendations of 
an agreement signed by the social partners no more than 20 days before 
issuing the decree.84  
The new regulation weakened the mechanism of negotiation and opened 
wide the possibility for unilateral employers’ decisions with regard to 
                                                
80 Agreement to re-contract the National Agreement for the Chemical Industrial Sector, 
signed the 15. October 2015 and in force since the 1st January 2016 till the end of 
December 2018. 
81 K. Bishop, “Working time patterns in the UK, France, Denmark and Sweden”, Labour 
Market Trends, Office for National Statistics, 2004, p. 114. It is also interesting to 
highlight that in Spain the transposition of the Directive 93/104/EC was done in an 
unusual short time, as an opportunity to reduce the rigidity of the law in the field. Some 
scholars think that the transposition followed the letter of the Directive; some others think 
that the Directive has been misunderstood in some aspects. See G. Ricci, “El tiempo de 
trabajo en España entre tradición y actualidad”, Working Paper Centre for the Study of 
European Labour Law "Massimo D’Antona", No. 4, 2002, p. 23. See also M. A. Castro 
Argülles, “La incidencia de las directivas comunitarias en la Reforma laboral”, Revista 
Española de Derecho del Trabajo, 1998, 889. 
82 A. Kümmerling, S. Lehndorff, “The use of working time-related crisis”, p. 14. 
83 Real Decreto Ley n. 3/2012. 
84 A. Baylos Grau, “El sentido general de la reforma: la ruptura de los equilibrios 
organzativos y colectivos y la exaltación del poder privado del empresari”, Revista de 
Derecho Social, Vol. 57, 2012, pp. 9-18, 10; M. E. Casas Baamonde, Rodríguez-Piñero, 
M. Bravo-Ferrer, F. Valdés Dal-Re, “La nueva reforma laboral”, No. 5, 2012, Relaciones 
Laborales. 
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several aspects of the labour contract, strengthening companies’ managerial 
powers.85  
Some months before the issuing of the 2012 decree, the agreement on 
employment and collective bargaining (II Acuerdo para el Empleo y la 
Negociación Colectiva86) allowed for significant increases in the internal 
flexibility of working hours. This could be achieved by general collective 
labour agreements between trade unions and companies that explicitly 
determined the distribution of working hours. This distribution could also be 
function as an alternative to overtime and temporary contracts. The 
agreement on employment and collective bargaining also provided for the 
management of a high percentage of working time by employers, although 
employers were required to provide justification for this. Then, royal 
legislative decree n. 3/2012 provided employers with the ability to take over 
management of the spread-over without reasons justifying these changes in 
working hours. According to the decree, 5% of daily hours were able to be 
allocated in a flexible way during the year; this percentage has since been 
increased to 10%.87  
With regard to part-time work, a possible agreement may be signed between 
the employer and the employee: according to this agreement the part-time 
worker may work extra hours88 (horas complementarias ordinarias) within 
specific limitations. This is possible in the case of open-ended contracts 
only. A 2013 decree89 allowed for extra working hours in both cases of 
open-ended and fixed-term contracts, but contracts must be for at least of 10 
hours of work per week, averaged across one year. It is possible to make 
such an agreement in respect 30% of normal working hours, and this may 
increase to 60% through collective agreements.  
Notwithstanding eventual agreements on extra working hours, in the case of 
an open-ended part-time contract90, the employer may request additional 
working hours (15%, which may be increased to 30% through collective 
agreements); the worker is free to refuse or accept such a request (horas 
complementarias extraordinarias o adicionales). 
This regulation shows an effort on the part of the Spanish social partners and 
government to guarantee more flexibility. However, the regulations offer the 
                                                
85 F. Ferrando García, “El reforzamiento del poter de direction tras la reforma laboral de 
2012”, Revista De Derecho Social, Vol. 61, 2013, p. 72. 
86 This Agreement has been signed between social partners on the 25th of January 2012.  
87 F. Ferrando García, “El reforzamiento del poter de direction”, pp. 74-77. 
88  These extra working hours are not considered overtime, which remains a different 
regulatory scheme. 
89 Real Decreto Ley n. 16/2013. 
90  In this case the part-time contract should be of minimum 10 weekly hours as an average 
in one year.  
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possibility of achieving increased flexibility through employers’ unilateral 
decisions, increasing their managerial powers. 
Furthermore, these changes do not seem to be oriented toward work/life 
balance, as they do not consider personal workers’ needs91; rather, they are 
focused on employers’ flexibility.  
 
 
5. Some aspects of the Danish working time regulation 
 
Denmark is considered a “negotiated flexibility” system, in which “actual 
working time is set by bargaining between workers and enterprises”. In 
particular, Denmark traditionally regulates working time by collective 
agreements between parties in the labour market.92 Thus, there is no general 
law on working hours, with the exception of a few statutory rules.  
The Work Environment Act provides that an employee is entitled to 11 
hours of rest within a period of 24 hours. The rest time can be reduced to 8 
hours in case of shift work and agricultural work, in particular cases such as 
force majeure, accidents, etc., and in cases determined by the Ministry of 
Labour, also by means of collective agreements. In any case, a compensating 
period must be provided. The Work Environment Act also states that an 
employee is entitled to a weekly day off and night time off: the day off work 
should be on Sunday, but it can be postponed and substituted with another 
day off, if such postponement is considered necessary for the nature of work, 
or for protective reasons, or for reasons of care of human beings, animals or 
plants. With regard to daily working hours, the 1919 collective agreements 
introduced the 48-hour week, with a maximum of 8 hours per day. However, 
collective agreements may allow for longer daily working hours.93 
In 2002, the Danish Parliament approved a law on part-time work in order to 
foster agreements to support part-time work at enterprise-level, regardless of 
collective agreements already in place. At the same time, the act provides 
protection against possible pressures to accept part-time work94.  
                                                
91 J. López Gandía, “Los contratos formativos y a teimpo parcial tras la reforma laboral de 
2012”, Revista de Derecho Social, Vol. 57, 2012, p. 85, 94-98. 
92 R. Blanpain, “General Report”, in R. Blanpain, E. Köhler (eds.), Legal and Contractual 
Limitations to Working-Time in the European Community Member States, European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers, 1988, p. 19. See also: J. Kristiansen, The growing conflict between 
European uniformity and national flexibility, Denmark, Djørf Publishing, 2015. 
93 O. Hasselbalch, Labour Law in Denmark, Djøf, Wolters Kluwer, 2010, pp.113-115. 
94 O.Hasselbalch, Labour Law, pp.113-115. The number of women in part-time jobs 
remained stable from 2000 till 2006, with 35,8%. Men employed in part-time work 
represent 13,6% in 2006, a percentage that increased by 3,4 from 2000 to 2006. 
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A need to reduce working hours may be also based on a shortage or on 
customers’ orders. In this case, the employer can reduce working hours (i.e. 
introduce work-sharing, arbejdsfordeling)95. 
Average weekly working hours have slightly decreased in Denmark from 35 
hours in 2000 to 34.5 hours in 2006, making the working week in Denmark 
one of the “shortest formal working weeks in Europe equivalent to around 
1,600 hours a year per worker against a 1,800-hour European average.”96 
The 2013 OECD Economic Survey on Denmark shows that people in this 
country work 1,546 hours a year, less than the OECD average of 1,765 
hours. Some 2% of employees work very long hours, a percentage much 
lower than the OECD average of 9%, with 3% of men working very long 
hours compared with just 1% for women.97 
During the crisis in Denmark, companies made an attempt to avoid 
dismissals: they adopted work-sharing and training measures. In particular, 
trade unions called for the extended use of training as a measure to avoid 
mass redundancies.98 Moreover, holiday shutdowns have been a “significant 
measure” for Denmark, used especially in the past by large companies and 
now used extensively by Danish small and medium enterprises (SMEs).99 
This kind of measure is reported from automobile manufacturers and 
suppliers in Spain, too. In Italy, holiday shutdowns are compulsory in order 
to access cassa integrazioni and contratti di solidarietà: however, all 
holidays must be planned.  
 
 
                                                
95 O. Hasselbalch, Labour Law, p. 116. 
96 M. Ballebye, H. Ourø Nielsen, “Working time in the European Union: Denmark”, 2009, 
Observatory: EurWORKDate, Oxford research, http://eurofound.europa.eu  
 In 2004 Bishop showed that shows that 45 % of all employees work 37 hours per week, as 
an average over a period of 6 or 8 weeks, in some cases 6 months. In this country 47 % of 
men and 43 % of women report 37 hours per week as the usual working time. This result 
is considered a direct outcome of the 1987 agreement in the metal working industry that 
then spread to other sectors: K. Bishop, “Working time patterns in the UK, France, 
Denmark and Sweden”, Labour Market Trends, 2004, Office for National Statistics, pp. 
114, 116, 119. 
97 OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Denmark 2013, OECD Publishing, 2014: 
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/economics/oecd-economic-
surveys-denmark-2013_eco_surveys-dnk-2013-en#page1  
98 I. Stuvoy, C. Jørgensen, “Tackling the recession: Denmark”, Eurofound, European 
Monitoring Centre on Change, 2009: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emcc/erm/studies/tn0907020s/dk0907029q.htm 
99 A. Kümmerling, S. Lehndorff, “The use of working time-related crisis”, p. 16. See also C. 
Jørgensen, “Increase in holiday shutdowns due to recession”, Eurofound, European 
Observatory of Working Life, 2013: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2009/07/articles/dk0907031i.htm 
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6. The different dimension of working hours: further remarks and 
conclusion 
 
As discussed, above, working time regulation developed toward different 
goals, which have interacted over the years and driven the European and 
domestic debate on working time. These goals may be summarized as 
follows: (i) ensuring a higher level of protection of the health and safety of 
workers; (ii) ensuring a higher level of flexibility for both employers and 
employees; and (iii) dealing with unemployment.  
Directive 93/104/EC100 aimed at ensuring a higher level of protection of the 
health and safety of workers by limiting working time. At the same time, 
protection of the health and safety of workers is a fundamental factor to be 
considered by social partners in evaluating whether it is possible to waive 
the working time regulation in favour of flexibility. Indeed, Directive 
93/104/EC – then Directive 2003/88/EC – has been crucial to the 
introduction of important opportunities to achieve flexibility by providing 
the chance to waive legislation and by determining working time as an 
average taken over a period of 4, 6 or 12 months. 
Thus, working time is a means of ensuring a better level of flexibility for 
both employers and employees. With regard to flexibility in favour of 
employees, work should be adapted “to the worker, in particular in the 
context of working time”.101 This may be achieved through measures geared 
toward work/life balance, such as paid leave, special working time, part-time 
contracts, etc. Part-time work can facilitate the reconciliation between 
occupational and personal life; however, it is traditionally not prevalent in 
the Mediterranean countries102.  
Flexibility for employers has been called for, in particular, during the current 
economic recession and has been achieved throughout domestic laws and 
collective bargaining. At the same time, employers have at their disposal a 
broad power to sign atypical work contracts and, regarding part-time, to 
propose elastic and flexible clauses. 
Common measures are adopted in the countries under analysis through 
collective bargaining in order to reduce working time: holiday shutdowns, 
                                                
100  Directive 2003/88/EC codified the previous legislation, without introducing innovations, 
and replaced Directives 93/104/EC and 2000/34/EC. 
101 A. Supiot, M. E. Casas, J. De Munck, P. Hanau, A. Johansoon, P. Meadows, E. Mingione, 
R. Salais and P. van der Heijden, Transformation of Labour and Future of Labour Law in 
Europe - Final Report for the European Commission, June 1998, p. 542.  
102 From the Eurostat data it is possible to highlight the evident differences in terms of part 




banking accounts, and shaping of weekly working hours. Public SWT 
schemes are also commonly adopted in the three Member States. 
Hence, during the crisis, the reduction of working time has been oriented 
both toward ensuring a higher level of flexibility in favour of employers and 
toward dealing with unemployment by avoiding dismissals. This reduction 
has often been connected to public subsidies. Italian and Spanish legislation 
passed during the crisis has attempted to implement and boost training 
initiatives linked to benefits provided in case of lack of work. But a lack of 
efficiency in the Italian and Spanish public employment services has 
frustrated this attempt. Thus, it may be noted that mere legislative reforms 
cannot be fully effective, especially if they do not take into account 
traditional domestic problems. Cultural aspects are extremely relevant and 
can, moreover, impact on the implementation of rules. Further, it should be 
noted that the recognition by Governments of the pivotal role of social 
partners in facing the crisis is a factor that has characterized the Danish 
response, but not those of Italy and Spain. In this regard, in Italy, we can 
speak of “rigetto sindacale”103 and in Spain of “depreciación del papel del 
sindicato”104, i.e. the Government does not recognise the role of the unions.  
In Spain, flexibility during the crisis has been achieved by law – allowing 
employers’ unilateral decisions and increasing the employers’ managerial 
power – and by collective bargaining. Recent legislation in both Italy and 
Spain aims at deregulation supported by government, often without 
considering social partners’ positions, especially those of trade unions. In 
Denmark, on the other hand, social partners play a pivotal role in the labour 
market and in companies.105 
During the crisis, companies’ need for flexibility seems to have been 
particularly favoured, whereas flexibility in support of work-life balance 
seems to have been more difficult to achieve. Together with internal 
                                                
103  F. Carinci, ‘“Provaci ancora Sam”, p. 3. 
104 A. Bylos Grau, “El sentido general de la reforma”, p. 17. 
105 A. Tangian, “Not for bad weather: flexicurity challenged by the crisis”, ETUI Policy 
Brief, N. 3, 2010, European Economic and Employment Policy, pp. 2, 75; K. Madsen, 
“Activation Policy in Denmark”, Centre for Labour Market Research, Aalborg 
University, Denmark, Paper for presentation at conference on activation policy, Korea 
Labor Institute, Seoul, 2009, pp. 4, 17; K. Madsen, “Flexicurity in Danish – A Model for 
Labour Market Reform in Europe?”, in Flexicurity – a European Approach to Labour 
Market Policy, Intereconomics March/April, 2008; G. Färm, H. Jørgensen, P. Palshøj, 
“Nordicmodel.info: The story of active societies based on welfare and justice” published 
by the Joint Committee of the Nordic Social Democratic Movement (SAMAK) together 
with The Social Democratic group in the Nordic Council and the Danish Social 
Democrats, 1st edition, Copenhagen, June 2006: 
http://s-dialog.dk/default.aspx?site=nordicmodel&func=article.view&id=161473; 
Flaschel P., Greiner A., Luchtenberg S., “Labor Market Institutions and the Role of Elites 
in Flexicurity Societies”, Review of Political Economy, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2012, pp. 103-129, 
in particular p. 104.  
 185 
flexibility, i.e. flexibility within the company organization, companies have 
also largely use SWT schemes in order to achieve even greater levels 
flexibility, in their own interests. Yet studies show that an excessive use of 
SWT schemes can be unproductive at the macroeconomic level if they are 
used merely to address companies’ ordinary needs. 
Other problems in using SWT schemes include, on one hand, a decrease in 
workers’ wages and, on the other hand, threats to the stability of public 
finances and the potential for blow-outs in public expenditure. 
Thus, attention should be turned toward possible ways in which companies 
can give back advantages gained from public SWT schemes, in terms of job 
creation during periods of business success. Indeed, this field of policy 
would help lay the groundwork for a sustainable society: in this sense, the 
Danish system may be an effective paradigm to look to. Meanwhile, in the 







































































































































Contractualization of Social Rights and Actors in the LM:  







Recently, an increasing number of EU Member States have started to link 
the right to access unemployment benefits to the duty to be “active”. This 
phenomenon can be seen as a “contractualization of social rights” and entails 
a number of doctrinal and practical issues that tend to raise many questions 
and debates. This contribution aims to analyse such processes in three MSs: 
Denmark, Italy, and Spain. Despite normative and LM differences, 
regulation of the conditionality between unemployment benefits and ALMP 
show similar tendencies in these three MSs.  This paper will analyse the 
main legislation in the field, highlighting the relevance of the idea of 
contractualization in active and passive LMP and its limits, as well as the 
resulting changing role of selected LM actors, such as social partners, work 





A gradual reshaping of the welfare systems in many of the European Union 
('EU') Member States ('MSs') began as early as the 1990s. Since then, access 
of people/workers to social protection has been made increasingly 
conditional upon activation initiatives. Indeed, recent reforms in a number of 
EU MSs have expressly linked the right to access unemployment benefits to 
the duty to be “active”, i.e. the duty to participate in training initiatives and 
work-orientation schemes and to accept suitable job offers from a public 
employment service ('PES'). This conditionality between unemployment 
benefits and the duty to be active can be interpreted as a form of, or an 
attempt at, “contractualization of social rights”.1 Such a concept was crucial, 
in particular,  to the New Public Management (NPM), a policy introduced in 
the United Kingdom by the Thatcher government, beginning in the 1980s, 
with the aim of modernising the public sector in line with a neo-liberal 
framework.2 According to such an approach, social rights become the object 
                                                
1  M. Freedland, P. Craig, C. Jacqueson, N. Kountouris, Public Employment Services and 
European Law, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 330. 
2   A. Tickell, J. A. Peck, “Social regulation after Fordism: regulation theory, neo-liberalism 
and the global-local nexus”, Economy and Society, Vol. 24(3), 1995, pp. 357-386.  
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of a contract between citizens, in their role as beneficiary/client, and the 
public administration.3 However, as will be discussed, contractualization 
appears to be inconsistent both with the constitutional framework of the 
three MSs under analysis and with EU goals.  
This work will therefore analyse common and divergent aspects of the 
contractualization phenomena in three MSs – Denmark, Italy, and Spain – 
and will highlight how contractualization has influenced the role of crucial 
LM actors. In particular, the idea of contractualization of social rights has 
influenced the development of the institutions and actors that provide 
unemployment benefits and activation policies. Therefore, it is important to 
analyse this process in light of the crucial roles of these institutions and 
actors, to ensure that the social, civil and political rights of citizens are 
respected. 
This contribution will analyse the main legislation in the field and the 
importance of contractualization in active policies and unemployment 
benefits, as well as the resulting changing roles of social partners, work 
agencies, employment services, and national social security institutions. The 
paper will take into consideration the specific characteristics of the three 
countries, emphasising the convergence between them on one hand and, on 
the other hand, the differences that still exist. 
It would seem to be important to take into consideration the MSs’ systems in 
order to compare a best practice example with two systems characterized by 
an effort aimed at improving LM efficiency. In fact, Denmark has been 
considered to be a best practice model in Europe in ALMPs in recent years, 
and has a highly-developed welfare system; Spain has one of the highest 
unemployment rates in the EU, and has implemented a number of reforms to 
address this problem in the last decade, while Italy has recently introduced 
social assistance for the uninsured unemployed (people who have never paid 
national insurance contributions) and for those unemployed who have not 
reached the minimum contributory requirements to access unemployment 
benefits. This new assistance tool is the reddito di inclusione, and is 
conditional upon specific activation programs. 
As will be shown, despite these differences, the active and passive LMPs of 
the three MSs display similar tendencies. Nonetheless, such tendencies are 
developing in their domestic contexts, characterised by specific issues.  
Within the current context, according to which the economic crisis remains 
an ongoing problem for several MSs, the social protection systems of these 
EU MSs have been put under intense pressure. High unemployment rates 
and the need to support an increasing number of people, economically and 
socially, have required governments to increase spending on social 
                                                
3 M. Barzelay, The New Public Management: Improving Research and Policy Dialogue, 
University of California Press, 2001. 
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protection.  At the same time, EU institutions very often stress the need to 
ensure stability of public finances and to limit public expenditure.  
Thus, it seems important to highlight that the concept of contractualization 
of social rights reflects the transition from welfare state systems to workfare 
systems, primarily oriented toward reducing public debt and social security 
expenditure.4   
The legislation of several MSs started to promote this transition at the 
beginning of the 21st Century: from that time onward the relationship 
between unemployed citizens and public institutions has started to be seen as 
a sort of quid pro quo. Thus, unemployment benefits would be assigned to 
unemployed people only if the latter accepted the obligation to be active by 
signing a contract or declaration. Meanwhile, private bodies were called 
upon to play different roles in this changing legal framework.  
At the same time, contractualization itself remains up for debate, especially 
in the context of the constitutional legal framework of the three MSs, as I 
will show in the next section. 
 
 
2. The limits of the contractualization approach 
 
Before analysing the relationship between changing rules governing 
institutions and LM actors and the tendency toward contractualizing social 
rights, it is necessary to refer to the constitutional framework in the three 
MSs under analysis with regard to both activation duties and rights to 
unemployment benefits, in order to highlight some of the limits of the 
contractualization approach.  
The Danish, Italian and Spanish Constitutions guarantee social protection to 
those affected by unemployment. This is particularly important to prevent 
social exclusion and to create the conditions necessary to allow citizens to 
participate in society.  
In each of the systems under analysis, unemployment benefits are connected 
with both a duty and a right to work. Access to professional training and 
activation initiatives is recognised in the legislation of each of the MSs under 
consideration, as a way of supporting people toward employment.  
In all three MSs, the right to work and the right to be supported in the case of 
unemployment are viewed as two means of creating the conditions for 
citizens’ participation in economic, political and social life.  Thus, 
unemployment benefits and activation initiatives can provide the conditions 
for such participation5  
                                                
4 J. Peck, Workfare States, The Guilford Press, 2001, p. 118, 119. 
5 J. F. Handler, Social Citizenship and Workfare in the United States and Western Europe: 
The Paradox of Inclusion, Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
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Indeed, democratic systems aim to encourage the involvement of citizens in 
local community and national issues, and should guarantee equal civil and 
political rights for all citizens “as a way to empower people, to give them 
voices as well as, more broadly, to strengthen social inclusion and 
cohesion”6.  
Denmark 
The Danish system provides robust and generous welfare benefits. To 
prevent people from falling into the so-called “unemployment trap”, i.e. a 
lack of incentives for the unemployed to take up a job, the Danish system 
provides high-level educational and vocational training facilities and active 
programs to help unemployed people acquire new skills. Moreover, the 
Danish Constitution recognises the right of the individual to receive public 
assistance when he/she is unable to support him/herself toward this process 
of requalification. However, the person “shall comply with the obligations 
imposed by statute in such respect.”7 
At the same time, “in order to advance the public interest, efforts shall be 
made to guarantee work for every able-bodied citizen on terms that will 
secure his existence.”8 Thus, the right to work is linked to the State’s 
obligation to reach full employment for all citizens.9  Therefore, citizens’ 
right to work requires the State not only to adopt policies aimed at 
improving the employability of unemployed people, but also at promoting 
general macroeconomic policies in order to achieve full employment.  
Indeed, Denmark chose a “high road” to reach “full employment 
competitiveness and social welfare”, and this aspect has never been called 
                                                
6 M. Thomson, “Democracy, inclusion and the governance of Active Social Policies in the 
EU – Recent lessons from Denmark, the UK and France”, RECON Online Working 
Paper, Vol. 27, 2001. 
7 Danish Constitution, Article 75, (2). The duty to be active is also set by the Consolidation 
Act On An Active Social Policy 2000: Article 1 (2) of the Consolidation Act On An 
Active Social Policy highlights that “The purpose of providing financial support is to 
enable recipients to become self-supporting. Therefore, recipients and their spouses are 
required to apply their best efforts to improve and develop their working capacity, e.g. by 
accepting offers of employment or activation”. Please, see also: K. Ketscher, ‘The Danish 
Social Welfare System’ in B. Dahl, T. Melchior, D. Tamm (ed.) Danish Law in a 
European Perspective, Forlaget Thomson GadJura, Copenhagen, 2002, p. 299; K. 
Ketscher, “Contrasting legal concepts of active citizenship – Europe and the Nordic 
countries”, in B. Hvinden, H. Johansson (ed.), Citizenship in Nordic Welfare States – 
Dynamic of choice, duties and participation in a changing Europe, Routledge, 2007, p. 
143. 
8 Danish Constitution, Article 75, (1). 
9  The right to work in relationship with ALPMs also implies the duty to work; the freedom 
to work; the freedom to work and the right to choose ‘decent’ work; the freedom to work 
and right to choose (decent and) ‘suitable’ work; the freedom to work and the right to 
choose (decent, suitable) ‘rewarding’ work, as in M. Freedland, P. Craig, C. Jacqueson, 
N. Kountouris, Public, p. 225 ff. 
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into question by any party or by social partners. This “high road” of growth 
and welfare is based, on the one hand, on strong investment in ALMPs, 
educational measures such as lifelong learning strategies and vocational 
training, child care facilities, and other features of the welfare state, and, on 
the other hand, on high value production. 
Spain 
In Spain, the goal of full employment is a legally binding principle.10 The 
Spanish Constitutional Court recognizes the obligation of the State to 
provide interventions to guarantee the effectiveness of citizens’ social and 
economic rights.11 The effectiveness of the right to work is crucial to the 
enforcement of all other constitutionally recognized rights12. 
Nonetheless, for the first time, this objective was not included in the text of 
the 2012 Spanish LM reform 13 ; it has been replaced by the goal of 
“employability”, a concept that is more linked to the efforts of the individual 
to prosecute his/her right to work, rather than to the obligations of the State. 
Italy  
The Italian Constitution does not mention full employment as a public goal 
guaranteeing the right to work for all citizens. However, there are different 
interpretations of the constitutional “right to work.”14 One scholarly position, 
which was particularly strong during the 1980s, sees the right to work as a 
duty on the part of the State to reach full employment.15 On the other hand, 
several commentators on the Italian constitution have recently interpreted 
the right to work as a way of increasing citizens’ employability and 
enforcing activation duties, rather than reinforcing the State’s duty to reach 
full employment.16 Thus, perspectives on the State’s role are moving from a 
vision of the State’s duty to provide full employment to a duty to provide 
individuals with PES to make them “employable,” i.e. ready to be employed 
in the LM. It may therefore be said that “unemployment” is losing its 
collective dimension and coming to be perceived as a consequence of an 
                                                
10 J. Aparicio Tovar, “La Unión Europa no tiene competencia para imponer a Espana la 
política económica actual”, in Anuario, Fundación 1° De Mayo, Ed. Bomarzo, Albacete, 
2011, p. 118. 
11 STC 18/1984, Tribunal Constitucional, sentencia 18/1984, de 7 de febrero. 
12 J. L. Monereo Pérez, La protección de los derechos fundamentales. El modelo Europeo, 
Ed. Bomarzo, 2009; J. Aparicio Tovar, “La continuidad de una política de empleo 
flexibilizadora en la reforma laboral del 2010”, in A. Baylos Grau (ed.), Garantías de 
empleo y derechos laborales en la Ley 35/2010 de Reforma Laboral, Ed. Bomarzo, 2011. 
13 Real Decreto Ley n. 3/2012. 
14 Italian Constitution, Article 4. 
15 For example: G. F. Mancini, “Sub art. 4”, in G. Branca (ed.), Commentario della 
Costituzione, Zanichelli, Il Foro italiano, 1975; G. G. Balandi, Tutela del reddito e 
mercato del lavoro nell’ordinamento italiano, Giuffrè, 1984) 
16 E.g.: C. De Marco, “Gli ammortizzatori sociali tra vecchie e nuove proposte”, Rivista 
italiana di diritto del lavoro, Vol. 4, 2009, pp. 555-594; R. Garofalo, “Ammortizzatori 
sociali e occupabilità”, Diritto delle relazioni industriali, Vol. 3, 2006, pp. 671-689. 
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individual lack of will to be active. This tendency can be highlighted in the 
Spanish system, too. 17 
At the same time, as Lambertucci highlights,18 in Italy, the principle of 
substantive equality obliges the State to create conditions for active 
participation by citizens in economic, social and political life19, by removing 
those obstacles of an economic or social nature that limit the freedom and 
equality of citizens. Thus, the right to work should also be linked to this 
goal. 
The picture regarding conditionality and its relationship with unemployment 
seems to be quite complex, entailing the need for pro-active behaviour both 
by the unemployed and by the States. On one hand, unemployment could be 
determined by either (or “both”) the inactive behaviour of the person or (or 
“and”) by his/her inadequate professional profile. In this case, to prove that 
the person is not voluntarily unemployed, it is necessary that he/she 
complies with specific activation duties. On the other hand, unemployment 
could also depend on the lack of adequate national macroeconomic policy. 
On this view, individuals are not enabled to enjoy their right to work. Thus, 
this perspective makes the picture more complex and not reducible to a 
contract concerning social rights. 
At the same time, “social rights rest on the idea that they are the counterpart 
of the person’s membership of society or, in the case of unemployment 
insurance, of the prior integration of its members in a community based on 
solidarity”. 20  Thus, a contractualization approach might be considered 
limited, because it does not focus enough on the States’ duties to achieve full 
employment and to guarantee the effectiveness of the right to work.  
Furthermore, the right to be protected in case of unemployment is 
acknowledged by the Constitutions of the three MSs under analysis, and is 
not presented as the quid pro quo of a contract.21 Rather, it can be linked to 
the duty and right to be active in order to be part of society, and to be 
enabled to participate in economic, political and social life. At the same 
time, it also entails a State’s obligation to provide protection against 
unemployment through benefits and adequate macroeconomic policies 




                                                
17 J. L. Monereo Pérez, La protección de los derechos fundamentales. El modelo Europeo, 
Ed. Bomarzo, 2009. 
18 P. Lambertucci, “Il diritto al lavoro tra principi costituzionali e disciplina di tutela: brevi 
appunti”, Rivista Italiana di Diritto del Lavoro, Vol. 1, 2010, p. 91 ff. 
19 Article 3 Italian Constitution. 
20 M. Freedland, P. Craig, C. Jacqueson, N. Kountouris, Public, p. 341. 
21 K. Ketscher, “Contrasting”, p. 146.  
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3. The contractualization of the social rights process 
 
As mentioned, the contractualization of social rights was introduced to 
Europe by the Thatcher Government through the NPM. 
Such contractualization reflects the transition from welfare to workfare 
systems and growing pressure to reduce the public deficit. According to 
Hyman, such a process is developing, with EU support, toward a “work first 
approach”.22   
At the end of the 1990s, the EU began to champion the need for 
modernization of MSs’ social protection systems, as well as the transition 
from passive to active measures to prevent unemployed individuals from 
falling into the unemployment trap.23 
The Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council of 23 and 24 
March 2000 set a “new strategic goal for the next decade: to become the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, 
capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion” 24. To achieve this objective, the EU started to 
promote an overall strategy that included the modernization of the European 
social model, investment in people, and the fight against social exclusion.  
As for the modernization of the social model, MSs’ systems “need to be 
adapted as part of an active welfare state to ensure that work pays”. At the 
same time, the concept of “employability,” i.e. the goal of making people 
employable in the LM, started to be mentioned as a crucial factor to be 
considered in the development of ALMPs.  
                                                
22  R. Hyman, “Labour, Markets and The Future of ‘Decommodification’,” in O. Jacobi, M. 
Jepsen, B. Keller, M. Weiss (eds.), Social embedding and the integration of markets: An 
opportunity for transnational trade union action or an impossible task?, Hans-Böckler-
Stiftung, No. 195, 2007, http://hdl. handle.net/10419/116441 (last accessed, 02/03/2017). 
See also: R. Hyman, “Il futuro del principio ‘il lavoro non è una merce’ tra mercato e 
stato sociale”, Diritto delle Relazioni Industriali, No. 4, 2007, p. 988 ff.  
23 Modernising and Improving Social Protection in Europe, COM (97) 102 final, 
12.03.1997; Extraordinary European Council Meeting on Employment, Luxembourg, 20 
and 21 November 1997 Presidency Conclusions; Council Resolution of 22 February 1999 
on the 1999 Employment Guidelines, A Concerted Strategy for Modernising Social 
Protection, COM (99) 347 final, 14.07.1999.  
The unemployment issue, together with the ‘welfare without work’ systems, brought the 
European Employment Strategy to replace “the focus on demand side policies with the 
adoption of supply side policies… focusing in particular on active labour market policies 
such as training, work practice, and lifelong learning” in C. Barnard, EU Employment 
Law, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 22, 23 
24 Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council of 23 and 24 March 2000.  
The unemployment issue, together with the ‘welfare without work’ systems, brought the 
European Employment Strategy to replace “the focus on demand side policies with the 
adoption of supply side policies… focusing in particular on active labour market policies 
such as training, work practice, and lifelong learning” in C. Barnard, EU Employment 
Law, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 22, 23 
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At the beginning of the new millennium, Denmark, Italy and Spain adopted 
reforms that started to move toward an increasing connection between 
unemployment benefits and activation obligations, as did other MSs. 
However, before mentioning such reforms, I will sketch a brief introduction 
of the three systems in order to elucidate their main characteristics and of the 
protection they provide in case of unemployment. Indeed, the 
aforementioned normative changes have affected the MSs under 
consideration in different ways, depending on the specific features of their 
respective systems.    
 
 
3.1. Protection in case of unemployment 
 
Denmark 
Protection of unemployed persons in Denmark is robust and is based on two 
levels: the assistance level – means-tested cash-benefits administered by the 
municipalities, funded though general taxation, and based on principles of 
equality and redistribution 25  – and the insurance level, based on 
unemployment insurance provided by insurance funds (Ghent-system26).  
The system is also characterized by what is known as Danish flexicurity, 
which seeks to mediate between the flexibility requested by companies and 
the social protection needed by citizens, through a system called the “Danish 
triangle”, or “golden triangle”. This system makes it easy to “hire and fire”, 
but at the same time provides strong social security protection, and includes 
an efficient ALMP.27 Danish cultural, political and economic characteristics 
are relevant to the success of the Danish system, too.28  
                                                
25 Website of the Danish Ministry of Social Affair,  
http://english.sm.dk/international/introduction/Sider/Start.aspx 
26 B. Holmlund, “Unemployment Insurance in Theory and Practice”, The Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 100, 1998, pp. 113–141; K. Madsen, “Activation Policy in 
Denmark”, Centre for Labour Market Research, Aalborg University, Denmark, Paper for 
presentation at conference on activation policy, Korea Labor Institute, Seoul, 2009, p. 4.  
27 K. Madsen speaks about a “hybrid model” that “manages to reconcile the dynamic forces 
of the free market economy with the social security of the Scandinavian welfare state”, 
see above K. Madsen, “Activation Policy in Denmark”, p. 15. The “golden triangle” 
would be a “third way” between stong job protection and deregulation, in A. Tangian, 
“Not for bad weather: flexicurity challenged by the crisis”, ETUI Policy Brief, European 
Economic and Employment Policy, Vol. 3, 2010, p. 2. See also, e.g.: H. Jørgensen, 
“Flexible labour markets, workers' protection and the security of the wings: A Danish 
flexicurity solution to the unemployment and social problems in globalized economies?”, 
Cepal – Serie Macroeconomia del desarrollo, Vol. 76, 2009, p. 22; J. Hendeliowitz, 
“Danish Employment Policy, National Target Setting, Regional Performance 
Management and Local Delivery,” Employment Region Copenhagen & Zealand, 2008, 
www.oecd.org/datao- ecd/13/53/40575308.pdf, (accessed 1/7/2016); K. Madsen, “The 
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Spain 
In the case of unemployment, the Spanish system guarantees two levels of 
protection: the contributory and the non-contributory. Both are available to 
unemployed persons who have already worked and paid national insurance. 
Additionally, there is a form of social assistance, administered by the 
municipalidad, for people who are not eligible for other forms of social 
protection.29 In the last decade, legislation that strengthens the ALMPs has 
been adopted, but their effectiveness is still considered inadequate to cope 
with the LM’s needs.  
Italy 
In Italy, unemployed people who have already worked can apply for social 
insurance benefits if they meet the eligibility requirements. The body of 
legislation in the field is stratified, i.e. unemployment benefits and activation 
policies for the unemployed are characterized in Italy by an excessive 
production of law.  
Over the years, eligibility requirements have been progressively expanded. 
Recently, a new assistance level has been introduced: the “reddito di 
inclusione” (ReI). This is a general assistance scheme to tackle poverty, and 
provides for up to € 485 per month, tied to individualized activation 
measures, as well as measures targeted at social inclusion and integration 
into the LM. The ReI entitlement period is limited to 18 months: 
reinstatement of the benefit is possible after six months of discontinuation, 
for a period not exceeding 12 months.30  
 
 
3.2. Reforms toward contractualization 
 
Denmark 
Denmark began to adopt a policy of tightly linking unemployment benefits 
and activation duties in the 1990s, when it implemented its model, known all 
over the world as a successful example of LMP, focused on vocational 
training and on tailored-made initiatives to empower the unemployed. 
                                                                                                              
Danish model of 'flexicurity': experiences and lessons”, Transfer: European Review of 
Labor and Research, 2004.  
28 A. Tangian, “Not for bad weather”, p. 75; K. Madsen, “Activation Policy in Denmark”, p. 
17; K. Madsen, “Flexicurity in Danish – A Model for Labour Market Reform in 
Europe?”, Intereconomics, Vol. Vol. 43, Iss. 2, 2008; G. Färm, H. Jørgensen, P. Palshøj, 
“Nordicmodel.info: The story of active societies based on welfare and justice”; P. 
Flaschel, A. Greiner, S. Luchtenberg, “Labor Market Institutions and the Role of Elites in 
Flexicurity Societies”, Review of Political Economy, Vol. 24, n. 1, 2012, pp. 103-129, see 
in particular p.104.  
29 J. F. Blasco Lahoz, J. López Gandía, Curso de seguridad social, Tirant lo Blanch, 
Valencia, 2017. 
30    Legislative Decree 15 September 2017, n. 147. 
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Yet, in 2003, things began to change. The Danish Government adopted the 
More people into employment 2002 (Flere i Arbejde) reform: educational 
schemes were reduced by 50 per cent and a work first approach was 
adopted, with knock-on effects on the traditional Danish activation system.31 
Legislation started to be oriented toward increasing contractualization in a 
punitive sense, i.e. by fostering sanctions and scaling up the duty to accept 
any job, through the concept of “suitable” job offer, which reduced the 
ability of an unemployed person to refuse a job offer. 
Such legislation, in force since 2012, has reduced unemployment benefits, 
tightened eligibility requirements and introduced stricter obligations in terms 
of activation, orienting the system toward a form of “meaningless 
activation”32, i.e. an activation policy which requires the unemployed person 
to accept any, first-available job. 
Spain 
In 2002, a new Spanish regulation introduced obligations to be active – to 
attend courses and to accept job offers – through an agreement between the 
PES and the unemployment benefits beneficiary (i.e. the compromiso de 
actividad, Ley n. 45/2002). A 2012 Royal Legislative Decree 33  also 
underlined the relevance of activation measures as conditions to enable 
people to become employable, and downsized the role played by 
macroeconomic policies in tackling unemployment. In the same year, a law34 
was adopted both to address undeclared work and to fight the eventual abuse 






                                                
31 The Act No. 1036 of 2002 amended the Active Employment Market Policy Act (No. 54 
of 2001) and specified the duties for unemployed persons to accept offers by the 
employment service; rules on individual progress contacts between job seekers and the 
employment service; etc. Moreover, the Active Employment Contributions Act No. 419 
of 2003 specified rules on possible offers available by employment service and 
municipality; job plans; appointment with job allocation; rights and obligations for 
beneficiaries of unemployment benefits; etc. Last regulation in the field on active 
employment Bekendtgørelse af lov om en aktiv beskæftigelsesindsats, No. 1342 of 
21/11/2016, Active employment Act. Specific duties are also set for beneficiaries of 
insurance unemployment benefits (Bekendtgørelse af lov om arbejdsløshedsforsikring, 
No. 784 of 21/06/2017, Unemployed Insurance Act) or assistance Bekendtgørelse af lov 
om aktiv socialpolitik, No. 269, 21/03/2017, Active Social Policy Act). 
32 J. G. Andersen, “Denmark: ambiguous modernization of an inclusive unemployment 
protection system”, in J. Clasen and D. Clegg (ed.), Regulating the risk of unemployment, 
Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 187-207. 
33  Real Decreto Ley n. 3/2012. 
34  Ley n. 13/2012. 
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Italy 
Since the beginning of the last century,35 unemployment benefits have been 
linked to activation duties, but it is particularly since the beginning of the 
new millennium that a trend toward contractualization of unemployment 
benefits has been witnessed.  
The Italian reform of 200036 linked the status of unemployed person to the 
signing of a declaration obliging the unemployed person to be “active”. Only 
by signing this document could the person access employment services and, 
eventually, unemployment benefits. In addition, the unemployed person and 
their employment office may have signed a contract of sorts stating the 
parties’ mutual obligations (i.e. the patto di servizio). Recent legislation is 
also oriented in the same direction.   
In 2012, Italy adopted a labour law reform37 concerning several aspects of 
the LM and  employment contracts:  more emphasis was placed on the 
obligations of the unemployed, and requirements to be met in order to retain 
unemployed status became tighter, while the patto di servizio became 




4. Contractualization and LM actors 
 
The contractualization of social rights approach, i.e. the approach that sees 
social rights as a kind of quid pro quo or contract between the public 
administration and citizens, has influenced legislative developments in the 
MSs under analysis. This approach seems to have affected the roles of 
specific LM actors, too, such as PESs and social security institutions, work 
agencies, and social partners. In order to highlight how these roles have 
begun to change, I will consider: (1) recent administrative reforms and their 
effects on the organisation of employment services; (2) the increasing 
tendency to create job centres, which can manage both unemployment 
benefits and activation measures; (3) a “management by objectives” 
approach in employment offices; (4) the role of social partners; and (5) the 




                                                
35 In particular, this was set since the Regio Decreto Legge n. 2270/1924: F. Liso, “Part 
time, disoccupazione e ammortizzatori sociali”, in C. Lagala (ed.), Part time e 
disoccupazione nella riforma degli ammortizzatori sociali Giuffrè, 2004, p. 21. 
36 Decreto Legislativo n. 181/2000. 
37  Legge n. 92/2012. 
38  Art. 20 Decreto legislativo n. 150/2015. 
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Since the 1960s, relevant training reforms for skilled and semi-skilled 
workers have been implemented in Denmark. Additionally, in 1969, the 
Public Employment Service (Arbejdsformidlingen, or AF)39 was created to 
better facilitate job matching. 
The 1993/1994 reform set up a National Labour Board with Ministerial 
control and Regional Labour Market Boards to define target groups and 
activation tools and to establish the goals to be achieved by the AF.40 During 
this period, the PES worked to provide tailor-made initiatives to the 
unemployed. 
As mentioned above, the 2003 “More people into employment” reform 
introduced a “work first approach” to Danish ALMPs, very different from 
the previous system, which had instead been focused on empowering the 
unemployed through professional skills.  
Such an approach has also been influenced by the way in which 
municipalities are financed: In fact, municipalities receive, for each insured 
unemployed person, “75 per cent reimbursement of the costs for claimants 
who participate in an activation programme, 50 per cent for claimants who 
are “passive”, and no subsidy if the unemployed person is not in activation at 
a time when they are required to be by law. Municipalities thus have a strong 
incentive to activate people as much as possible, provided they can find 
cheap solutions, preferably via private providers.”41 It can be argued that 
such an approach places the emphasis on economic aspects and cost-cutting 
rather than on the provision of adequate interventions. 
The 2006 administrative reform introduced a one-tier model by creating job 
centres. The reform also increased LM policy-making competence at the 
central State level, strengthened the municipalities’ responsibilities, and 
weakened decision-making power at a regional level.   
A new agency was formed in Denmark on 1 January 2014: the Danish 
Agency for Labour Market and Recruitment focuses on moving people from 
unemployment and social security benefits into jobs. This Agency aims, 
further, to retain people in the Danish LM and support recruitment of highly 
qualified professionals from outside Denmark.42  
Spain 
                                                
39 H. Jørgensen, “Flexible labour markets”, p. 39 ff. J. Hendeliowitz, “La riforma dei servizi 
per l’impiego danesi”, SPINN, Periodico di informazione e dibattito per i Servizi per 
l'impiego, Vol. 5, 2005. 
40 H. Jørgensen, “Flexible labour markets”, p. 44. 
41 J. G. Andersen, “Denmark: ambiguous modernization”, p. 197, 198. 
42 http://www.sfr.dk/da/English.aspx 
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With regard to Spain, in 1978, the INEM (Istituto National de Empleo, 
National Employment Institute) was introduced and became responsible for 
job intermediation, employment policy, and unemployment benefits. In 
1985, the Government promoted ALMPs by linking young people’s 
vocational training to actual job offers. Thus, for the first time, access to 
employment services was connected with the need to perform “active” 
individual actions.43  Until 1998, ALMPs were entirely developed by the 
State, but this function was then transferred to the Comunidades Autónomas 
(i.e. Regions).44 In fact, because the administrative procedures of the INEM 
became over-complicated and extremely bureaucratic, the government 
decided to begin the decentralization of services previously provided by the 
INEM.45 Thus, in 2003, the SPEE (National Public Employment Service)46, 
replaced the INEM.  
The SPEE is made up of three bodies: the Sectorial Employment body, the 
Work Affairs body, and the General Council of the National Public 
Employment Service. The latter is a tripartite advisory organ that includes 
social partners.  
In the new activation-oriented model, the National Employment System 
(NES) functions to coordinate the various administrations. The NES is thus 
constituted by the SPEE and the Public Employment Services of the 
Comunidades Autónomas. Unemployment benefits are managed by the 
SPEE through its PESs, whereas activation policies are promoted by the PES 
of the Comunidades Autónomas, in accordance with the National Public 
Employment Service guidelines.47 At a local level, the Diputaciones or the 
                                                
43 L. Gavira, Integrated approaches to active welfare and employment policies, European 
Foundation for Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2002. The Act is the 
Plan Nacional de Inserción y Formación Profesional. 
44 F. Rocha Sánchez, “Relfexiones y prepuestas para la reforma de las políticas activas de 
empleo en España” Estudios De La Fundación, Fundación 1° De Mayo, Centro Sindical 
de Estudios, Vol. 42, 2010; A. Martín Valverde, F. Rodrígues, S. Gutiérrez, J. García 
Murcia, Derecho del Trabajo, Ed. Tecnos, 2010, p. 432; S. Del La Casa Quesada, 
“Políticas activa y políticas pasivas de empleo: la respuesta de la protección por 
desempleo ante la crisis económica”, in S. Del La Casa Quesada, M. R. Vallecillo Gámez 
(ed.), Empleo, mercado de trabajo y sistema productivo: el reto de la innovación en 
políticas de empleo, Ed. Bomarzo, 2011, p. 215, 216; R. Ballester, “European 
Employment Strategy and Spanish Labour Market Policies”, Jordasas de Economía 
Laborar, Working Papers. Department of Economics, University of Giron, Vol. 14, 2005.  
45 Law n. 53/2003 (Ley n. 56/2003). See G. Hernández, “I Servizi per l’occupazione in 
Spagna: Dall’intermediazione al collegamento tra politiche attive e passive”, in C. Lagala, 
M. D’Onghia (ed.), Politiche di attivazione dei disoccupati in Europa, Ediesse, 2010, pp. 
241-244. 
46 Servizio Público de Empleo Estatal. 
47  O. Homs, NOTUS, Social and Employment Policies in Spain, Policy Department A: 




Ayuntamientos (local)48 have the authority to develop their own employment 
policy initiatives, which are funded by the Comunidad Autónoma.49  
The 2011 reform50 sought to guarantee coordination between different levels 
of LMPs; a Catalogue of Services was issued that aimed to set the range of 
opportunities available to unemployed people and companies to encourage 
job creation. 
Recently, the Spanish Employment Activation Strategy for 2014-2016 set 
specific targets to be achieved by the PES. Such initiatives are mainly aimed 
at young people, the long-term unemployed, and those older than 45. 
Through the aforementioned Strategy, resources have been consistently 
devoted to AMLP, and PESs have started to implement targets through 
annual plans. Moreover, in March 2015, the vocational training system was 
reformed in order to strengthen the relationship between passive and active 
LMPs and to support entrepreneurship.51     
With regard to the fight against poverty, the main instrument is the Spanish 
Action Plans for Social Inclusion, introduced in 2006. For the period 2013-
2016, the plan aimed to improve coordination at the national level, to 
provide better social protection, and to link minimum income schemes to 
participation in ALMP initiatives.  
Italy  
In 199752, PESs were decentralized from the national level to the Regions, 
and employment services were devolved to the district level (Provincia).53 
Trilateral Commissions were established at local and regional levels, in the 
form of advisory boards without decision-making power.54 In 2001, the 
Constitution was amended 55  by the reshaping of relationships between 
national and Regional Constitutional competences in active and passive 
LMPs. ALMPs were subject to concurrent legislative competence.  
                                                
48 M. Á. Malo, “Labour market policies in Spain under the current recession”, ILO - 
Discussion Paper Series, International Institute for Labour Studies, 2011, p. 67. 
49 A. Martín Valverde, F. Rodrígues, S. Gutiérrez, J. García Murcia, Derecho del Trabajo, 
p. 432. 
50 Real Decreto Ley n. 3/2011. 
51  O. Homs, NOTUS, Social and Employment Policies in Spain. 
52  Decreto Legislativo n. 469/97. 
53 M. Napoli, “Disegno di legge delega e modifiche al Titolo V della Costituzione”, Diritto 
delle Relazioni Industriali, Vol. 3, 2002, pp. 361-368. See in particular p. 365. Please, see 
also P. Varesi (ed.), I servizi per l’impiego. Un nuovo ruolo delle strutture pubbliche nel 
mercato del lavoro, F. Angeli, 2000; F. Carinci, “I due volti della riforma: 
regionalizzazione e privatizzazione”, Quaderni di Diritto del Lavoro Relazioni 
Industriali, n. 22, 1999, p. 3; V. Filì, L’avviamento al lavoro tra liberalizzazione e 
decentramento, Klueva-Ipsoa, 2002. 
54 D. Gottardi, F. Guarriello (ed.), M. Roccella, Manuale di diritto del lavoro, Giappichelli, 
2015. 
55 Legge Costituzionale n. 3/2001. 
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Concerning ALMPS, in particular, unemployment benefits conditionality 
and punitive aspects were tightened in 201256. At the same time, a “basic 
level of services” was introduced: these services were defined as those 
employment services to be provided in all the territory of the state to ensure 
a minimum standard of services. This minimum standard was to be common 
to each Region, even if it could be improved by each of them. However, a 
lack of resources devoted to reaching this goal makes this basic level 
difficult to achieve.57 
The 2015 reform58 introduced a new agency for managing the ALMPs: the 
National Agency for Activation policies (Agenzia Nazionale per le Politiche 
Attive del Lavoro, ANPAL). ANPAL coordinates the ALMPs across the 
country and, in particular, a services network for employment policies.  
 
 
4.2. Increasing tendency to create job centres that can manage and 
provide both unemployment benefits and activation measures 
 
Denmark 
As already mentioned, the 2007 Danish administrative reform introduced, in 
effect, a different administrative framework for employment policies:59 
Public Employment Offices were replaced by “small job centres with a 
hybrid character.”60 The new job centres carry out functions that were 
previously executed by the municipalities and by the PESs.  
Job centres are to guarantee access to unemployment services to all citizens, 
both ex-workers who have paid national insurance contributions and people 
who have never contributed. Moreover, uninsured unemployed people apply 
for both employment services and unemployment benefits at job centres, at 
the municipal level. This new setup, implemented in August 2009, replaced 
the previous two-tier system with one tier only. However, different 
conditions for those who have paid insurance contributions and for those 
who have not continue to determine an unemployed person’s eligibility in 




                                                
56  The so-called Monti Fornero reform, i.e. the Legge n. 92/2012. 
57  P. Pascucci, “Servizi per l’impiego, politiche attive, stato di disoccupazione e 
condizionalità nella legge n. 92 del 2012,” Rivista del diritto della sicurezza sociale, No. 
3, 2012, p. 543–511. 
58  The so-called Renzi reform, i.e. the Legislative Decree n. 150/2015. 
59  Strukturreformen, 1.1.2007. 
60 H. Jørgensen, “Flexible labour markets”, p. 45. 
61 K. Madsen, “Activation Policy in Denmark”, p. 4. 
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Spain 
In Spain, the SPEE is responsible for paying unemployment benefits, while 
the PESs of the Comunidades Autónomas are responsible for promoting 
activation policies. Despite their different assignments, they provide their 
services through the same offices, and their staff-members work together on 
the basis of collaboration agreements. Coordination is guaranteed through 
networking, supervised by the National Public Employment Service. 
Italy  
In Italy, the previous project of the 2012 reform envisaged that INPS could 
provide both activations services and unemployment and other benefits.  But 
this proposal was then abandoned and, as mentioned, above, a new agency 
was created. Regulation was then introduced to better coordinate PESs and 
INPSs, and the new Agency is now charged with supporting and 
strengthening such aims. 
 
 
4.3. “Management by objectives” (MbO) in employment services 
 
Denmark 
The aforementioned 2007 Danish administrative reform introduced a new 
approach to the management of employment measures, oriented toward 
supporting job centres and ensuring accountability by means of new 
planning and monitoring tools, such as: performance audit; strategies to help 
fulfil national and local authority employment objectives that indicate 
targets, define measures and interventions, and set resources; analysis of job 
centre outcomes carried out by the Regions; and an official web portal, the 
jobindsats.dk, for unemployed people to search for jobs. These measures are 
carried out on the basis of indications from the government administration. 
According to Jørgensen, Baadsgaard and Nørup, the introduction of such a 
benchmarking approach wasn’t accompanied by any political debate on 
choosing or developing the selected objectives. Therefore, in their opinion, 
the reform paid little attention to concepts such as justice, quality, and 
accessibility.62   
It is also important to point out potential obstacles in implementing the 
reform: former PESs (Arbejdsformidlingen, or ‘AF’) and local authority 
administrators come from very different backgrounds and legislative 
                                                
62 H. Jørgensen, D. Baadsgaard and I. Nørup, “From learning to steering – NPM-inspired 
reforms of the famous Danish labour market policy illustrated by measurement and 
organizational recalibration in the employment system”, CARMA, Aalborg University, 
Denmark, Paper for the conference “Welfare States in Transition: Social Policy 
Transformation in Organizational Practice”, Chicago, 15-16, May 2009, p. 15. 
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environment, yet are now expected to work collaboratively on local 
initiatives in 91 different local areas.63 
Spain 
The “management by objectives” (MbO)64 approach has also been adopted 
by the PES in Italy and Spain, but are yet to demonstrate significant 
improvements in the quality of services. In fact, despite the setting of 
objectives and the implementation of specific web portals and data bases, 
etc., investments in ALMPs in these MSs have long been insufficient, and 
activation initiatives are relatively ineffective in terms of job placement or 
enhancement of  unemployed persons’ job profiles.65 Yet, at least in Spain, 
significant recent investment has been devoted to training activities and 
employment incentives: in 2015, for example, a new Programme for 
Employment, Training and Education (POEFE) was adopted and allocated a 
€ 3 billion total budget.66 
From an administrative perspective, a potential obstacle to reach 
effectiveness in ALMPs in Spain can be seen in the fact that SPEE 
employees come from the INEM and must adapt themselves to a different 
approach to carrying out their functions in order to provide the services 
mentioned in the so-called Catalogue of Employment Services. This 
catalogue, which defines the specific responsibilities and functions of the 
different offices, was introduced in 2001.  
All the aforementioned changes shaped a different approach in LMP. 
Nevertheless, the process of changing the approach of PES staff-teams may 
take many years: INEM employees were used to a hands-off bureaucratic 
approach, substantially different from that required by those now working 
for SPEE to promote and implement the new activation policies.  
Italy 
In Italy, the concept of employment services was introduced as a standard by 
the 1997 administrative reform.67 The PES directors had to adapt their 
workforces to the new, less-bureaucratic functions 68 : activation policy 
emerged as a crucial issue from an outplacement perspective, and from the 
                                                
63 H. Jørgensen, Arbejdsmarkedspolitikkens fornyelse – Innovation eller trussel mod dansk 
flexicurity?, LO og FTF København, 2007, p. 50. 
64  M. Freedland, P. Craig, C. Jacqueson, N. Kountouris, Public, p. 60. 
65  See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-DO-12-001/EN/KS-DO-
12-001-EN.PDF and 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Category:Labour_market 
66  O. Homs, NOTUS, Social and Employment Policies in Spain, p. 10. 
67  Decreto Legislativo n. 469/1997. 
68 Decreto Legislativo n. 469/1997 (the so-called Legge Bassanini). Please, see M. Rosano, 
“Prospettive di restyling per la gestione del mercato del lavoro”, in M. Cinelli, G. Ferraro, 
Lavoro, competitività, welfare, Commentario alla legge 24 dicembre 2007, n. 247 e 
riforme correlate, Utet, 2008, p. 9-28, in particular p. 11. 
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perspective of integration with passive policy. The 2012 reform 69 
highlighted the need to strengthen the link between active and passive LMP 
and to monitor both the unemployment benefit beneficiaries and the PESs in 
complying with their duties.  
The Renzi Government attempted to amend the constitutional rule 
concerning regional and national competences in the LM. However, the 
proposed amendment failed when put to referendum. 
According to the Renzi proposal, the Regions would have received exclusive 
competences (i.e. no more concurrent legislative competence) in specific 
fields (regional organization of services for companies, professional 
vocational training, etc.) and the State would have retained the “tutela e 
sicurezza del lavoro”, including competence regarding PESs. In this way, 
the State would have held primary responsibility for this area of policy.  
The most interesting aspect of the proposal would have been the ability of 
the State to delegate its competences to the Regions in order to support them. 
In fact, worth noting  is the non-homogeneity of services in the LM provided 
by the PESs within the national territory; the considerable regional and 
municipal differences are evidenced in the coexistence of examples of bost 
best practice and of inefficiency.70 
Without the approval of the 2017 Constitutional reform, which was based on 
several very diverse matters and not just on the one discussed here, the 
introduction of the new national Agency cannot properly find the right 










                                                
69  Legge n. 92/2012. 
70  F. Liso, “Brevi appunti sugli ammortizzatori e sui servizi all’impiego nel Protocollo del 
23 luglio 2007”, in A. Perulli (ed.), Le riforme del lavoro. Dalla legge finanziaria 2007 al 
protocollo sul Welfare, Halley Editrice, 2007; A. Alaimo, Il diritto sociale al lavoro nei 
mercati integrati. I servizi per l’impiego tra regolazione comunitaria e nazionale, 
Giappichelli, 2009; F. Liso, Servizi all’Impiego, in Eniclopedia Giuridica Treccani, 2007, 
pp. 1-10; etc. 
  On the non-homogeneity of the employment services: Indagine sui servizi per l’impiego. 
Rapporto di monitoraggio, 2013. Ministero del Lavoro e PS, Studi e Ricerche sul Mercato 
del Lavoro, in Lavoro/Documents/Rapportomonitoraggio SPI 2013.pdf, (accessed 1st 
October 2016). 
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4.4. Progressive weakening of the social partners’ role: LM 
policymaking and management 
 
Denmark 
Danish trade unions and employers’ associations have traditionally played a 
crucial role in LM policymaking due their long-term relationships based on 
co-determination and collaboration (among other things).71  
However, from 2007 onward, things appear to have changed. Some experts 
see the aforementioned 2007 Danish administrative reform as “a means of 
consolidating and further improving the level of welfare in Denmark.”72 At 
the same time, others interpret it as a way to disempower the regions and 
strengthen local council administrations and, at the same time, to weaken 
social partners’ role in the LM.73  
In recent years, legislation has increased the role of the Danish “a-kasserne”, 
or unemployment insurance funds, in managing ALMP. In particular, they 
have to manage and offer, to their members, particular employment services 
such as job orientation activities, job-matching services and frequent 
interviews to check the availability to work of the unemployed.74   
Spain 
In 2012, the newly-elected Spanish government adopted a Royal Legislative 
Decree75  that affected the regulations on industrial relations, collective 
dismissal, and collective bargaining. This reform was adopted without Trade 
Union involvement, and without heed to the recommendations of an 
agreement signed by the social partners no more than 20 days before.76 This 
made clear the government’s modus operandi of excluding social partners 




                                                
71  H. Jørgensen, “Flexible labour markets”, p. 18 ff. The “September compromise” was 
achieved as a consequence of a general strike in 1899; K. Madsen, “Flexicurity in Danish 
– A Model”, p. 75. 
72 J. Hendeliowitz, “Danish Employment Policy”, p. 11. 
73 H. Jørgensen, M. Schulze, “Leaving the Nordic Path? The changing role of Danish Trade 
Unions in the Welfare Reform Process”, Social Policy and Administration, Vol. 45, No, 
2, 2011.  
74 H. Jørgensen, D. Baadsgaard and I. Nørup, “From learning to steering “, p. 8. J. G. 
Andersen, “Denmark: ambiguous modernization”, p. 194. 
75  Real Decreto Ley n. 3/2012. 
76 A. Baylos Grau, “El sentido general de la reforma: la ruptura de los equilibrios 
organzativos y colectivos y la exaltación del poder privado del empresari”, Revista de 
Derecho Social , Vol. 57, 2012, pp. 9-18, 10; M. E. “Baamonde, Rodríguez-Piñero, M. 




In Italy, the 2001 White Paper77 suggested increasing participation of the 
social partners in the provision of unemployment benefits through the “enti 
bilaterali”, or bilateral entities, which are made by companies’ and workers ́ 
delegates and funded by both companies ́ and workers ́ contributions. These 
entities may manage both passive and active policies and are particularly 
effective in the handicraft sector. No attention was given, however, to 
creating the conditions for effective participation of the social partners in 
LM policy-making, especially in respect of trade unions.  
In 2007, a trilateral agreement known as the Welfare Protocol was signed by 
the Government, the trade unions and the employers’ associations. Part of 
this trilateral agreement was implemented through law:78 the duration of 
unemployment benefits was extended, and bilateral entities (trade unions – 
employers’ associations) could play an integrative role in social security 
provision.   
Through bilateral entities, or in other ways (i.e. the creation of specific 
bilateral funds), the 2012 reform has provided financial support in case of 
temporary lack of work to workers who work in companies with 15 
employees or more and who cannot access other means of national financial 
support (such as the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni).  According to Renga, in 
this way, the 2012 reform allow for the transfer of a part of the duty of social 
protection from the State to private actors.79 
The legislative debates on both the 2012 and 2015 reform on LM were 
characterized by weak involvement on the part of social partners. 
 
 




As of the 2007 reform, job centres in Denmark are free to enter into 
agreements with private actors in order to support them in carrying out their 
                                                
77 Libro Bianco sul mercato del lavoro in Italia. Proposte per una società attiva e per un 
lavoro di qualità. The 2001 Italian White Paper of 2001 was commissioned by the Italian 
Ministry of Labour and Social Policy on the Italian labour market. It proposed a concept 
of “active society”. Please, see M. Biagi, C. Dell’Aringa, N. Forlani, P. Reboani and M. 
Sacconi, “White Paper on the Labour Market in Italy. Proposal for an Active Society and 
Quality Employment”, in R. Blanpain (ed.), White Paper on the Labour market in Italy, 
The Quality of European Industrial Relations, and Changing Industrial Relations, In 
Memoriam Marco Biagi, Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations 44, Kluver Law 
International, 2002, pp. 1-177. 
78 Legge n. 247/2007. 
79 S. Renga, “La ‘riforma’ degli ammortizzatori sociali”, 3-4 Lavoro e Diritto, Vol- 3-4, 
2012, pp. 621-642, 636. 
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tasks. Since 2010, local authorities have been responsible for the payment of 
unemployment insurance benefits. In particular, municipalities receive funds 
from the State on condition they meet specific performance indicators.80 This 
trend can also affect the involvement of private actors in providing 
employment services in the LM and orient the services they offer toward a 
work-first approach. 
Spain 
Even in Spain, job intermediation has started to play an increasing role in 
LMP. Both public and authorized private bodies provide intermediation 
services: in particular, in 2003, regulations81 expressly considered private 
bodies to be key elements of employment policies aiming at full 
employment. The PESs of the Comunidades Autónomas had the authority to 
determine the conditions for collaboration with private agencies that carry 
out employment intermediation and manage overall policy for activation. 
Regarding active and passive LMPs, the 2010 LM reform82 opened up the 
possibility for private bodies to provide different services; not just temporary 
work, outsourcing, recruitment, assessment, training and development, 
career management and workforce consulting, but also “labour market 
intermediation”, in order to intercede between job seekers and employers.83 
Italy 
In 1997, the public monopoly over employment services was abolished in 
Italy, employment intermediation was opened up to private actors, 
employment services were decentralised, and active and passive LMPs 
started to be integrated with each other.84 The same year, the so-called “Treu 
Package” 85  made the LM participation of private actors possible by 
abolishing the prohibition on providing labour through intermediaries.   
The 2001 reform86 strengthened the work agencies’ role in the LM, allowing 
them to carry out employment intermediation and be involved in the 
provision of labour, as well as in other activities such as the recruitment of 
workers. Emphasis was placed on the work agencies’ potential role in 
                                                
80 J. G. Andersen, “Denmark: ambiguous modernization”, p. 197, 198. 
81  Ley n. 56/2003. 
82  Ley 35/2010. 
83 C. Chacartegui Jávega, “La Actuación de las empress de trabajo temporale como agencias 
de colocación. La crisis como pretexto en el avance de la iniciativa privada”, Revista de 
Derecho Social, “La reforma Laboral”, Vol. 57, 2012, pp. 71-84; in particular p. 71, 72. 
The 1994 reform opened the possibility for private agencies to work to deal with 
employment intermediation. The Law n. 35/2010 abrogated several limitations to 
temporary work provisions and allowed the employment intermediation to be provided by 
profit-making organizations. 
84  Decreto Legislativo n. 469/1997. 
85  Legge n. 196/1997. 
86  Legge n. 30/2003 and Decreto Legislativo n. 276/2003. 
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improving the LM efficiency. Unfortunately, however, the following years 




Despite significant differences characterizing the Danish, Spanish and Italian 
systems, similar tendencies and converging developments in the 
employment and social protection field may be highlighted. A common 
tendency can be observed in the three MSs toward contractualizing 
unemployment benefits and, at the same time, increasingly monitoring the 
fulfilment of connected obligations. The increasing contractualization of 
unemployment benefits requires beneficiaries to undertake more and more 
activation duties and, in the case of non-compliance beneficiaries, to lose 
their benefits. Thus, stricter activation duties could mean that beneficiaries 
face a higher risk of losing unemployment benefits (consequently saving the 
State’s money).  
PESs have increased their efforts to monitor compliance with activation 
duties. 
At the same time, it is possible to highlight a common and increasing 
tendency toward the creation of administration or administrative practices – 
i.e. job centres in Denmark, coordination agreements in Spain, the new 
Agency in Italy – that provide or coordinate both unemployment benefits 
and activation measures. At the same time there is also a common, increased 
focus on the punitive aspect and on controlling possible breaches of law in 
the course of service provision. In fact, in this way, the provider of benefits 
may immediately check whether activation duties have been complied with. 
The three MSs considered here have adopted administrative law reforms that 
have affected the organisation of PESs in the inter-relationship between the 
local and national levels. Delivery of services has been gradually devolved 
to a local level, whereas the decision-making process that formulates ALM 
policy seems to be reverting to the centre. Thus, on the one hand, ALMP 
management has been decentralized while, on the other hand, policy making 
in ALMPs is becoming ever more a national competence, and no longer a 
regional one.  
It is also possible to highlight the growing control of services provided by 
the PESs through “management by objectives”. This process, however, may 
increase the level of bureaucracy of such organisations, especially if fixed 
objectives are not related to meaningful indicators in terms of effective 
quality of services.   
                                                
87 P. A. Varesi, “Il workfare territoriale”, in D. Gottardi, T. Bazzani, (ed.), Il workfare 
territoriale, Ed. Scientifiche Italiane, 2014. 
 211 
The development of institutions in the field seems to have been conditioned 
by the contractualization idea and by the need to reduce public expenditure. 
The gradual outsourcing of social protection and activation services shows 
the new role played by private actors in managing employment services88: 
public-private partnerships have increased in several MSs, “partly as a result 
of budgetary constraints”89.  Public administrations may look at private 
actors, which provide employment services, as a kind of business 
opportunity, and may outsource a portion of their employment services to 
these private actors, in order to save money.  
Although legislative changes have been introduced in the three MSs within 
the ALMP, such changes have not always sought to improve the quality of 
activation initiatives.  
Moreover, it is possible to point out a progressive weakening of the role of 
social partners in LM policy-making, especially of the trade unions. At the 
same time, in Denmark, the social partners’ role has increased with respect 
to the monitoring of the availability to work of the unemployed. Meanwhile, 
in Italy, the role of bilateral entities in providing social security for 
unemployed people has increased. Thus, trade unions in Denmark are 
becoming gradually more involved in the monitoring of activation duties, 
while in Italy they have become more involved in the provision of 
unemployment benefits, and less involved in LM policy-making. 
When considering the Constitutional principles of the MSs, one may 
question whether: (i) the emphasis on contractualization would not risk 
reduce the ability to enforce the right of protection in the case of 
unemployment or not; (ii) the right to work would be supported by actual 
activation policies or not, especially considering the growing work first 
approach; and (iii) the duty to work would be focused on the quality of job 
(suitability of job offer), in this case offered by employment services to 
unemployed people, or not.  
It is also relevant to point out that in Denmark people may effectively fall 
into the unemployment trap because of the strong welfare system, while in 
Italy and Spain this outcome is less likely due to the different and weaker 
welfare systems. In any case, however, one may postulate that an 
increasingly punitive approach does not per se address unemployment, 
which requires, rather, a macroeconomic policy supporting the creation of 
                                                
88 Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser v. Macroton [1991] ECR I-1979; Case C-55/96 Non-
Contentious Proceedings brought by Job Centre Coop. arl [1997] ECR I-7140. See also C. 
Barnard, EU Employment Law, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 36; S. Sciarra, “Job 
centre: an illustrative example of strategic litigation”, in S. Sciarra (ed.), Labour Law in 
the Courts, Hart Publishing, 2001, p. 241. 
89  M. Freedland, P. Craig, C. Jacqueson, N. Kountouris, Public, p. 98. 
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jobs, or a redistribution/re-division of the work available between all 
potential workers.   
As mentioned, above, the emphasis on contractualization and punitive 
aspects, and, therefore, the sanctioning function of LMP, seem to influence 
the role of the LM actors. In fact, administrative institutions seem not to play 
a pro-active role in economic development, and thus, in LM shaping linked 
to specific activities promoting the creation of jobs. Their role is instead 
focused on strengthening the bond between granting benefits, on one hand, 
and monitoring activation duties fulfilment, on the other.  
However, the goal of full employment, which is recognised by the Treaty on 
European Union (Art. 3), seems irreducible to the mere enhancement of the 
employability of the unemployed. Enhancing an individual’s employability 
must focus on high quality activation policies within a framework that 










This contribution analyses how the concepts of “C&C” may contribute to the 
improved functioning of European, national and territorial LMs by exploring 
the concepts of C&C as it is already in use at the EU level, before moving 
onto an exploration of its operation at the domestic level.  
The concepts of “coordination” and “cooperation” (“C&C”) between 
different LM actors can be found in the domestic and European legislation. 
C&C between LM actors can be useful in: (i) aiding job matching, linking 
the social security system to adequate activations policies, bridging 
companies’ needs with vocational training initiatives, and integrating 
national security protections, etc.; (ii) in analysing the resources of different 
actors across a broad spectrum, in order to plan long-term responses and to 
coordinate projects; (iii) policy-making in terms of territorial and national 
growth, especially with respect to public administration, PESs, chambers of 
commerce and industry, and social partners, etc.; (iv) in mapping existing 
initiatives and services may be a valid tool to allow C&C between different 
actors and to plan coordinated policies to support people and their activation. 
Databases may also constitute an important tool in developing coordination 
and cooperation, and may thus provide a more informed picture of the LM, 
as well as of economic and social development in a given territorial area.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The development of innovative research tools to safeguard the viability of 
social security systems of EU Member States (MSs) is becoming more and 
more critical: in this regard, a key role may be played by coordination and 
cooperation activities at different levels, between actors in the labour market 
(LM).  
This contribution seeks to analyse how the concepts of “coordination” and 
“cooperation” (“C&C”) may contribute, and how European Employment 
Services (EURES) is contributing, to the improved functioning of European, 
national and territorial LMs. In particular, this contribution will explore the 
concepts of C&C as it is already in use at the EU level, before moving onto 
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an exploration of its operation at the domestic level. Specifically, concerning 
this last aspect, I will discuss: (i) the opportunities provided by Italian law in 
the field under analysis; and (ii) an Italian case study in LM networking at 
the territorial level.  
C&C represent not only a potentially efficient way to sustain social security, 
but also a means to strengthen the links between, on one hand, benefits and 
activation initiatives for citizens and, on the other hand, job and training 
opportunities, while also taking into account working conditions offered by 
the labour relationship. From this perspective, C&C between LM actors 
should focus on the person’s circumstances both within and outside of the 
LM. 
In this vein, Hugo Sinzheimer’s body of work integrated social security in 
labour law provisions and, in simultaneously moving beyond the traditional 
distinction between private and public law, he shifted the focus onto the 
person for the first time. Following from Sinzheimer’s quest for innovative 
strategies to ensure persons an adequate level of social security protection, 
the focus should shift from mere social security reforms – often directed 
toward downsizing expenditure in the field and consequently downsizing 
services/supports – to new possibilities outside the boundaries of social 
security law.  In this regard, the concepts of C&C represent a valid and 
useful path for further exploration. 
Within the realms of labour and social security law, the concepts of C&C are 
often mentioned by European Treaties referring to different aspects of 
employment and social security.1 Thus, the concepts of C&C can take on 
different meanings, depending of their specific used in the various Treaties.  
                                                
1  The EU encourages the cooperation between national employment services (Article 46 
TEU); the administrative cooperation, e.g., in order to support, coordinate or supplement 
the actions of the Member States (Article 6 TFEU). The EU shall contribute to a high 
level of employment by encouraging cooperation between MS and by supporting, and if 
necessary, complementing their action (Art. 147 TFEU); the European Parliament and the 
Council may adopt incentive measures to encourage cooperation between MS in the field 
of employment and social law (Art. 149 TFEU; Art. 153 TFEU); the Commission shall 
also encourage cooperation between MS and facilitate the coordination and encourage 
cooperation of their action in all social policy fields (Art. 156 TFEU); the Social 
Protection Committee should promote cooperation on social protection policies between 
MS (Art. 160 TFEU); the Union shall encourage the cooperation between MS in 
education and vocational training (Title XII TFEU and Art. 145 TFEU).  
 Coordination of MS´s economic policies should be achieved to reach the Union´s 
objectives. For the same reason, employment policies should be consistent with the broad 
guidelines of the economic policies of the MS and the Union (Art. 146 TFEU). The 
Employment Committee promotes coordination between MSs (Art. 150 TFEU) on 
employment and LM policies.  
MS shall conduct their economic policies and shall coordinate them in order to develop 
and strengthen the EU´s economic, social and territorial cohesion (Art. 174 TFEU, ff.). 
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According to the Cambridge Dictionary, “coordination” is “the act of 
making all the people involved in a plan or activity work together in an 
organized way” and “cooperation” is “the act of working together with 
someone or doing what they ask you”.2 
In this contribution, C&C refer to selected potential coordinative or 
cooperative interrelationships between LM actors, which may have a 
positive impact on the LM. 
The concepts of “coordination” and “cooperation” between different LM 
actors can be found in the domestic and European legislation. C&C between 
LM actors can be useful in aiding job matching, linking the social security 
system to adequate activations policies, bridging companies’ needs with 
vocational training initiatives, and integrating national security protections, 
etc. Coordination and cooperation also make it possible to analyse the 
resources of different actors across a broad spectrum, in order to plan long-
term responses and to coordinate projects. 
Moreover, C&C of LM actors can prove crucial to policy-making in terms of 
territorial and national growth, especially with respect to public 
administration, PESs, chambers of commerce and industry, and social 
partners, etc. Such actors may plan a project to aid local development, which 
may be integrated in various ways, such as labour, education, services, and 
social protection, etc. Mapping existing initiatives and services may be a 
valid tool to allow C&C between different actors and to plan coordinated 
policies to support people and their activation. Databases may also constitute 
an important tool in developing coordination and cooperation, and may thus 
provide a more informed picture of the LM, as well as of economic and 
social development in a given territorial area.  
 
 
2. The European level 
 
The EU promotes several different kinds of C&C, all of which are focused 
on the integration of domestic and European administrations. This 
integration processes are designed to enable the participation of different 
institutions, and to increase the efficiency of administrations, via (among 
other things) the use of shared databases. 
Decision 93/569/EEC implemented the Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community, and 
specifically introduced the network of services known as EURES.  
The EURES network includes public and private partners of the employment 
services, approved by them and operating under national labour law 
provisions, who have signed an agreement with the Commission and with 
                                                
2  https://dictionary.cambridge.org. 
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the social and economic partners designated by conventions establishing the 
cross-border EURES. In this way, EURES integrates private and public 
actors, as well as national and supranational interests. It is made up of actors 
linked with the domestic PESs,3and is interconnected with the Commission, 
to which MSs must send data related to LM performance and working 
conditions, etc.4  
In accordance with aforementioned Decision 93/569/EEC, the MSs must 
inform the Commission of problems arising in connection with freedom of 
movement and employment of workers, and of the development conditions 
of employment by region and by branch of activity. At the same time, 
EURES should provide workers with information on vacancies and 
applications for employment in the other MSs, together with information on 
living and working conditions. Further, EURES is to promote transnational, 
interregional and cross-border exchange, whilst also providing transparent 
information, in order to develop European LMs and make them accessible to 
all. In this vein, EURES is also to develop methodologies and indicators to 
monitor and evaluate planned activities, with information to be sent to the 
Commission on an annual basis.5  
From the beginning, EURES sought to achieve these goals by, in particular, 
coordinating the different national public employment services (PESs). It 
then widened the scope of its operations to include the provision of open and 
free access, as well as CV data entry, for all workers. Thus, EURES seeks to 
develop cooperation and the exchange of information, and encompasses the 
Commission, the employment services of the MSs, and any further national 
partners they might have.  
Within the EURES-network, national PESs are integrated, aiding the 
development of a system based on reciprocal confidence and loyal 
collaboration, oriented toward establishing common rules. 
This is particularly important as the national PESs play a key role in the 
implementation of the European Employment Strategy, and MSs are 
responsible for developing their efficiency and effectiveness.6 EURES takes 
                                                
3  M. Freedland, P. Craig, C. Jacqueson, N. Kountouris, Public Employment Services and 
European Law, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 86, 191 ff. 
4  In particular “central employment services of the Member States shall co-operate closely 
with each other and with the Commission with a view to acting jointly as regards the 
clearing of vacancies and applications for employment within the Community and the 
resultant placing of workers in employment”: Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the 
Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community. 
5  Commission Decision of 23 December 2002 implementing Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1612/68 as regards the clearance of vacancies and applications for employment. 
6  In 1996 the Commission created the High Level Panel on Free Movement for Persons, in 
order to cope with problems affecting the freedom of movement for workers within the 
Community. In March 1997 the experts of the panel presented about 80 recommendations 
focused on the role of the EURES network. Consequently, in 1997 the Commission 
 217 
advantage of digitized technologies (internet, website) that allow access to 
several databases. At the same time, the PESs of the MSs must improve 
quality and access to information on job requests and offers, through the 
implementation of these tools7. Indeed, even the Joint Declaration by the 
Heads of Public Employment Services in the European Economic Area of 
1998 had aimed to develop the technological system to become directly 
accessible to all actors concerned. EURES can therefore be seen as a further 
development of this goal. 
Common databases and integrated IT systems may be valid tools to enable 
and promote networking among different actors in the LM in order to 
achieve effective LM policies (LMPs), such as activation measures, several 
kinds of initiatives in support of unemployed people, and in terms of other 
supports, etc. Technological integration among all PESs of the MSs has 
become crucial to achieving efficient and fast communication between them 
and the EURES database. 8  The goal of integration is undoubtedly 
challenging, particularly considering the different levels of efficiency among 
the MSs’ PESs. This issue was fundamental to the 2013 Commission’s 
proposal9 to expand, reinforce and consolidate on-going initiatives between 
PESs. Such cooperation should also facilitate the implementation of LM 
projects financed by the European Social Fund (ESF), and the proposed 
initiative could contribute to improved cost-efficiency.  
After almost one year, the proposal became a Decision in 2014,10 replacing 
the existing informal advisory group of the European Network of Heads of 
PES with a formal cooperation-network in order to contribute to the 
modernization and the strengthening of PES. The full potential value of this 
network is to reside in the “continued participation of all Member States” 
within the areas of PES responsibility, encouraging their cooperation in 
order to contribute to “Europe 2020”. This network is to achieve its goals 
through “benchlearning”, i.e. “the process of creating a systematic and 
                                                                                                              
adopted the Action Plan for Free Movement for Workers, in order to provide a clear and 
transparent legal framework oriented to increase the efficiency of the European labour 
market: E. Baldoni, “The Free Movement of Persons in the European Union: A legal – 
historical overview”, Pioneur Working Paper, Vol. 2, 2003, p. 10 ff. 
7  Commission Communication ‘Modernising public employment services to support the 
European Employment Strategy’, Brussels, 13.11.1998, COM(1998) 641 final. 
8  Memorandum of Understanding between the Public Employment Services of the EEA for 
the development of the EURES network, 16 November 1998. See also Communication 
from the Commission, ‘Annual Growth Survey 2013’, Bruxelles, 28 November 2012 
COM (2012) 750 final. 
9  Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on enhanced co-
operation between Public Employment Services, Brussels, 17.6.2013 COM(2013) 430 
final. 
10  Decision No 573/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 
2014 on enhanced cooperation between Public Employment Services (PES). 
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integrated link between benchmarking and mutual learning activities, that 
consists of identifying good performances through indicator-based 
benchmarking systems, including data collection, data validation, data 
consolidation and assessments, with appropriate methodology, and of using 
findings for tangible and evidence-informed mutual learning activities, 
including good or best practice model”.11 The Decision also provided for the 
allocation of specified amounts of funding for the network. 
Moreover, the Decision sought to formalise and strengthen informal 
cooperation between the PESs. In particular, in the previous proposal for the 
Decision, the Commission expressed the belief that, “a European network of 
PES established on solid legal ground would be able to increase 
comprehensively coordinated activities among PES and provide the network 
with legitimacy to act. A formalised structure can enable the network to 
contribute to the development of innovative, evidence-based policy 
implementation measures in line with the Europe 2020 objectives.” Thus, 
providing the existing informal network with a formal role may make it 
more effective and efficient.  This perspective may be useful insofar as 
shared purposes and motivations – which the informal network is based on – 
remain fundamental to the newly formalised structure. Consequently, shared 
purposes, goals and motivations within a network would be essential to 
making it operate effectively efficiently. 
Regulation (EU) 2016/589 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
established a framework for cooperation to facilitate the exercise of freedom 
of movement for workers within the Union by focussing on: (i) the EURES 
organisation and the functioning of the EURES network, including social 
partners and other actors (at the domestic level, national coordination offices 
are responsible for the application of the Regulation in the respective MSs); 
(ii) cooperation between the Commission and the MSs, with the 
establishment of a European Coordination Office responsible for assisting 
EURES in carrying out its activities; (iii) the promotion of initiatives by and 
between MSs to achieve a balance between supply and demand in the LM by 
achieving a high level of quality employment; and (iv) the promotion of 
mobility services for workers and employers, such as the organisation of a 
common IT platform for listing job vacancies and job applications.12 
The C&C between LM actors can contribute to enabling MSs to achieve 
effective employment-policy outcomes. As mentioned, these outcomes can 
be evaluated through performance indicators. Thus, benchmarking – which 
was supported by the Treaty of Lisbon and became a tool for implementing 
                                                
11  Art. 2 or the Decision No 573/2014/EU. 
12  Regulation (EU) 2016/589 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 April 
2016 on a European network of employment services (EURES), workers' access to 
mobility services and the further integration of labour markets, and amending Regulations 
(EU) No 492/2011 and (EU) No 1296/2013. 
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the European employment guidelines – seems to be a pillar of the PES 
network approach. Nevertheless, benchmarking should not be used to merely 
track the success of formal objectives according to bureaucratic processes; 
rather, it should effectively contribute to improving employment policies of 
the MSs. Moreover, how benchmarks are structured and conceived should be 
debated by LM actors, including social partners.13  
Other kinds of C&C in employment policies have also been promoted by the 
EU, such as economic, social and territorial cohesion (art. 4 TEUF). This 
policy is included in the Title XVIII of the TEUF and aims at promoting 
economic and social progress, together with a high level of employment and 
sustainable development.14 The 2007 Territorial Agenda, renewed in 2010, 
noted the need to address spatial inequality and Europe 2020-linked 
territorial cohesion, with the goal of inclusive growth and the fostering of a 
high-employment economy.15 
Over the years, economic, social and territorial cohesion (Article 174 TFEU) 
policy has adopted a multi-level governance system, made up of different 
actors with integrated competences. This system has progressively created 
interactive cooperation networks at the territorial level, composed by 
European institutions, domestic authorities, companies, and other actors.16 
In the 1990s, European Institutions looked for innovative solutions in order 
to cope with increasing unemployment. From this point of view, “the 
European Council…” welcomed “…the positive reaction to the initiatives on 
territorial employment pacts and…” encouraged the “… implementation of 
the 60 projects proposed by the Member States”.17  These pacts – as field 
trials – helped facilitate the exploration of local and bottom-up approaches to 
employment, while beginning also to base their action on multi-stakeholder 
partnerships at a local level. These partnerships included economic and 
                                                
13  A similar consideration on benchmarking in the LM is provided on its introduction in the 
Danish system by: H. Jørgensen, D. Baadsgaard and I. Nørup, “From learning to steering 
– NPM-inspired reforms of the famous Danish labour market policy illustrated by 
measurement and organizational recalibration in the employment system”, CARMA, 
Aalborg University, Denmark, Paper for the conference “Welfare States in Transition: 
Social Policy Transformation in Organizational Practice”, Chicago, 15-16, May 2009, p. 
15.  
14  R. Blanpain, European Labour Law, Kluwer Law International, 2010, p. 141. 
15  E. Medeiros, Uncovering the Territorial Dimension of European Union Cohesion Policy, 
Routledge, 2017. 
16  R. Sapienza, “La politica comunitaria di coesione economica e sociale come sistema di 
Multi-level Governance” in R. Sapienza (ed.), Politica comunitaria di coesione 
economica e sociale e programmazione economica regionale, Giuffrè, 2003, p. 1, 4. The 
European Commission has also been central in promoting the depoliticisining factor, i.e. 
in trying to avoid political compromise in resources allocation: L. Hooghe, Cohesion 
Policy and European Integration. Building Multi-level Governance, Oxford University 
Press, 1996.  
17  Dublin European Council, 13 and 14 December 1996, Presidency Conclusions. 
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social actors, non-profit organizations, schools, and universities, etc., and 
began to function as an integrated, coordinated and innovative strategy in 
order to address unemployment.18  
According to the Council, the territorial dimension of the cohesion policy 
lies in its “capacity to adapt to the particular needs and characteristics of 
specific geographical challenges and opportunities”.19 For this reason, the 
development of high-quality partnerships, within a comprehensive strategy 
pursuing specific objectives and actions, is essential. Hence, the territorial 
aspect is directly linked to the need to coordinate between local actors and 
the territorial, domestic and European levels. The emphasis on the territorial 
level was also reaffirmed in the middle of the last (still current for some 
MSs) economic crisis: on the one hand, the Council highlighted the role of 
cohesion policy and structural funds as “important delivery mechanisms to 
achieve the priorities of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth in MSs and 
regions”20, while, on the other hand, the Commission found that an effective 
implementation of Europe 2020 would require a governance system that 
“links the EU, national, regional and local levels of administration” and 
“within this context, the role of local development approaches under 
cohesion policy should be reinforced”.21 Thus, European financial resources 
are to be targeted toward clear objectives, supporting the promotion of 
partnerships and the involvement of local and regional stakeholders, social 
partners, and civil society.22 In particular, European Funds, especially the 
European Social Fund, are vital in directing social policies aimed at active 
and social inclusion.23 Moreover, economic, social and territorial cohesion 
                                                
18  Commissione Europea, L’occupazione al primo posto, Panoramica sui patti territoriali per 
l’occupazione in Italia, Ufficio delle pubblicazioni ufficiali delle Comunità europee, 
Lussemburgo, 1999.  
19  Council Decision of 6 October 2006 on Community strategic guidelines on cohesion 
(2006/702/EC). 
20  Council Decision of 21 October 2010 on guidelines for the employment policies of the 
Member States (2010/707/EU). “In its conclusions of 17 June 2010, the European Council 
stressed the importance of promoting economic, social and territorial cohesion in order to 
contribute to the success of the new Europe 2020 strategy”. Please, see E. Marlier, D. 
Natali, R. Van Dam, Europe 2020: Toward a More Social EU?, P.I.E. Peter Lang S.A., 
2010. 
21  Brussels, 9.11.2010 COM (2010) 642 final, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, The 
Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank, Conclusions of the fifth 
report on economic, social and territorial cohesion: the future of cohesion policy 
22  D. Strazzari, “La progressiva interrelazione tra le politiche di coesione e la Strategia 
Europea per l'occupazione. segnali di un federalismo competitivo europeo?” in E Ales, M. 
Barbera, F. Guarriello (ed.), Lavoro, welfare e democrazia deliberative, Giuffrè, 2010, p. 
654. 
23  A. Alaimo, “Presente e futuro del modello sociale europeo. Lavoro, investimenti sociali e 
politiche di coesione”, Rivista del Diritto e della Sicurezza Sociale, Vol. 2, 2013, pp. 253 
ff., pp. 272-274. 
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may be achieved through specific actions,24 for example, the creation of 
specific legal instruments to support workers in their transitions into the 
LM.25  
The idea of C&C with several actors was also included in the new definition 
of corporate social responsibility, as “the responsibility of enterprises for 
their impacts on society”.26 Companies are to “have in place a process to 
integrate social, environmental, ethical, human rights and consumer 
concerns into their business operations and core strategy in close 
collaboration with their stakeholders”.27 The Commission sought to promote 
dialogue with enterprises and other stakeholders on issues such as 
employability, demographic change and active ageing, and workplace 
challenges, and expected companies to help mitigate the social effects of the 
current economic crisis, including job losses.28  
In the context of LM C&C, the proposal of 2014 on the creation of a 
European Platform sought to enhance cooperation in the prevention and 
deterrence of undeclared work. 29  Having explained that the main 
responsibility for tackling undeclared work lies with the MSs, the 
Commission identified three specific types of enforcement bodies, clarifying 
that responsibility rests with these specific actors. Meanwhile, targeted 
policies and the improvement and coordination of inspection practices are 
given priority. The main goal of the document is the reduction of incentives 
for employers to utilise undeclared work, and for workers to engage in such 
activities. Useful exchange experiences have already taken place in this 
field, either in the context of the Mutual Learning Programme under the 
                                                
24  Art. 175 TEUF 
25  E. Ales, “Dalla politica sociale europea alla politica europea di coesione economica e 
sociale. Considerazioni critiche sugli sviluppi del modello sociale europeo nella stagione 
del metodo aperto di coordinamento”, Working Paper C.S.D.L.E. “M. D’Antona”, No. 
51, 2007, p. 38. 
26  Brussels, 25.10.2011 COM (2011) 681 final, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, The 
Committee of the Regions: A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social 
Responsibility. 
27  Brussels, 25.10.2011 COM (2011) 681 final, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, The 
Committee of the Regions: A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social 
Responsibility. 
28   This trend toward an active companies’ contribution to social concerns could be 
highlighted in particular since the Green Paper ‘Promoting a European framework for 
Corporate Social Responsibility’, Brussels, 18.7.2001 COM(2001) 366 final. Please see: 
C. Barnard, S. Deakin, “Reinventing the European corporation? Corporate governance, 
social policy and the single market”, Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 33, Iss. 5, 2002, p. 
495. 
29  Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing a 
European Platform to enhance cooperation in the prevention and deterrence of undeclared 
work, COM (2014) 221 final.  
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European Employment Strategy, or as a part of multilateral projects. 
However, with regard to voluntary multilateral cooperation, not all MSs 
have participated in these initiatives. It is evident, therefore, that such 
proposals work effectively when participants believe in the merits of the 
project and thus actively cooperate to carry out it.    
The 2014 proposal also led to the Decision of the European Parliament and 
the Council of 9 March 2016, which established a European Platform to 
enhance cooperation in tackling undeclared work ((EU) 2016/344). 
 
 
3. Italian C&C-networks  
With regard to Italy, the concepts of C&C between LM actors have been 
supported by recent legislation. 
a) Databases as tools of coordination and cooperation 
Common databases are seen as useful tools for achieving efficient 
coordination between active and passive LMPs and for interlinking PESs, 
local administrations, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, and the 
National Social Security Institute (INPS)30.  
Technological integration among different actors in the LM has been a goal 
of the State for a long time. In particular, legislation has established the 
creation of the Sistema Informativo del Lavoro (Informative Labour System, 
SIL), of the Borsa Continua Nazionale del Lavoro (National Employment 
Exchange), and of several databases of the INPS31. 
Law Decree n. 185/2008 provided for the signing of agreements between 
INPS and enti bilaterali,32 non-profit entities composed of social partners 
and charged with the provision of services to their subscribers (employers 
and employees). These agreements may regulate information exchange in 
order to interconnect services/supports with activation policies and 
vocational training.  
The Directive of 10 February 2009 of the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Policy established the creation of a database of beneficiaries of 
unemployment benefits and other subsidies, in order to enhance matching of 
job offers to available job places. This database must be accessible to INPS 
                                                
30  D. Gilli, R. Landi, “Potenziamento dei sussidi di disoccupazione e organizzazione dei 
servizi per il lavoro”, Diritto delle relazioni industriali, Vol. 2, 2008, pp. 320 ff. 
31  S. Pirrone, P. Sestito, “Mercato del lavoro, sistemi di protezione sociale, libertà di 
iniziativa economica privata. Dal collocamento ai servizi per l’impiego: dieci anni di 
evoluzione normativa per una riforma incompiuta”, Diritto delle relazioni industriali, 
Vol. 3, 2006, pp. 611 ff.  
32  “Bilateral entities.” 
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and to PES.33 Another database created by the Casellario dell’assistenza34 
law contains information on assistance subsidies granted to citizens, and 
seeks to increase the efficiency with which financial resources are managed. 
Recently, Law n. 92/2012,35 created two kinds of database: (i) anonymous 
databases, to facilitate studies, analyses, etc. of the LM situation; and (ii) a 
database in the INPS, integrating information from other actors, aimed at 
controlling both the amount/duration of unemployment benefits actually 
used by beneficiaries, and the services that the PESs provide.  Furthermore, 
Law Decree n. 76/2013, converted into Law n. 99/2013, introduced another 
database, the Banca Dati delle Politiche Attive e Passive (Art. 8), or 
“database of active and passive policies”, which aimed at streamlining 
activation initiatives, implementing the Youth Guarantee36, and overhauling 
the evaluation system introduced by the Fornero Reform37.  Several other 
existing databases converged into this new one. 
As will be discussed in more detail, below, the 2015 Renzi reform created a 
new agency for activation policies, as well as a new database administered 
by same. This new database incorporates previous databases and further data 
on the effects of active and passive LM policies.  Thus, on the one hand, the 
Italian legislature has supported the creation of common databases in order 
to improve their advancement in achieving efficient LMPs, while, on the 
other hand, it is also evident that the body of legislation in the field is 
stratified, with questionable outcomes in terms of efficiency. 
In the context of networking, also worth mentioning is the Sistema 
informativo nazionale della prevenzione (SINP), which is designed to 
integrate several databases and to be accessible to specific actors in the field 
of diseases and work-related injury prevention measures/interventions. 
However, the aforementioned databases are yet to be fully established: an 
important problem is the lack of communication and integration between the 
IT systems of the different LM subjects involved. Further, regional 
differences – especially the differences between northern and southern 
Regions – complicate the feasibility of coordination. 38  Moreover, the 
Regions have developed their own databases, often not linked to the national 
                                                
33  M. Tiraboschi, S. Spattini, J. Tschöll, Guida pratica ai nuovi ammortizzatori sociali, Il 
Sole 24 Ore, 2010; D. Garofalo, Gli ammortizzatori sociali in deroga, Ipsoa, 2010, p. 111. 
34  Law Decree n. 78/10, Misure urgenti in materia di stabilizzazione finanziaria e di 
competitività economica, art. 13. 
35   Fornero Reform, from the name of the minister of labour at the time. 
36  Council Recommendation of 22 April 2013 on establishing a Youth Guarantee (2013/C 
120/01). 
37  M. Marocco, “La doppia anima delle politiche attive del lavoro e la Riforma Fornero”, 
Working Paper CSDLE “Massimo D’Antona”, No. 192, 2013. 
38  G. Baronio, M. Marocco, “Il caso dei “Centri Integrati per l’Impiego”: le prospettive di 
costruzione di un sistema integrato di politiche attive e passive in Italia”, Collana Studi 
Isfol, Vol. 3, 2008. 
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ones, while meanwhile, at a national level, database operators are often 
reluctant to provide information to external actors.  
 
b) Coordination and cooperation: normative attempts 
Law n. 92/2012 provided for the creation of specific C&C networks at the 
territorial level (the reti territoriali)39, probably both to provide a legal 
framework for actors already engaged in networking, and to encourage those 
territories in which these kinds of network had never been established. The 
reti territoriali sought to integrated education, vocational training and job 
services, in order to contribute to the realisation of growth strategies, youth 
employment, and welfare reforms, etc.  
Despite the promotion of a bottom-up approach in the LM, this regulation 
was unable to create effective changes in the Italian framework. This was 
due to the vague enunciation of goals to be achieved, which did not specify 
the meaning of “growth strategies”, “welfare reforms”, etc.40 
The Law Decree n. 76/2013, converted into the Law n. 99/2013, introduced 
a specific entity – the Struttura di Missione – that was to propose guidelines 
and, later, initiatives to integrate different IT systems, in order to improve 
the efficiency of the Banca Dati delle Politiche Attive e Passive (Law n. 
99/2013). The Struttura di Missione was to link different relevant public 
actors at a national level – such as the ministry of labour and social policy, 
the INPS, national technical agencies (ISFOL and Italia Lavoro), etc. – 
together with regional and local public entities, such as Regioni and 
Province Autonome. This network was designed, for the first time, to 
provide an opportunity to coordinate different actors playing relevant roles at 
different levels in the LM and, while also respecting the relationship 
between the domestic and regional/local levels. However, with the Renzi 
Government, a new centralized approach has been adopted41 and the work of 
the Struttura di Missione has been suspended.  
The Renzi reform, through Legislative Decree n. 150/2015, introduced 
important changes in the field of active LM policies, such as the creation of 
a new Agency, the National Agency for Activation policies (Agenzia 
Nazionale per le Politiche Attive del Lavoro, ANPAL). This Agency seeks 
to coordinate the active LM policies in all the national territory and, 
specifically, coordinate a service network for employment policies.42 This 
                                                
39  Art. 4, par. 55, Law n. 92/2012. 
40  T. Bazzani, “Rete e problema occupazionale: i recenti interventi normativi”, Diritti Lavori 
Mercati, Vol. 2, 2014, p. 403. 
41  P. A. Varesi, “Politiche attive del lavoro e servizi per l’impiego: la perdurante necessità di 
costruire reti locali tra istituzioni competenti e stakeholders” in T. Bazzani, D. Gottardi 
(ed.), Il coordinamento degli attori del mercato del lavoro, Ed. Scientifiche Italiane, 
2015. 
42  Legilsative Decree n. 150/2015. 
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network is made up of several private entities, such as social partners and 
public actors, as well as regional structures, the INPS, the National Institute 
of work insurance (INAIL), PESs,43 inter-professional vocational training 
funds, bilateral entities, Italia Lavoro, 44  the network of chambers of 
commerce, industry, handicraft and agriculture, universities, intermediate 
schools, and, of course, the ANPAL. 
In addition to the aforementioned examples of C&C, all of which are 
operated under the supervision of public administrations, C&C in labour law 
may also include the promotion of industrial districts by social partners, 
supporting local development through collective agreements at the territorial 
level.45 
 
4. The territorial workfare project 
 
Having painted a picture of the broader legislative framework, I shall now 
turn our attention to a case, at the territorial level, in which different LM 
actors have decided to work together to improve some aspects of the LM 
system. 
The Territorial Workfare Project is funded by the University of Verona and 
by two local “bilateral entities”, the Ente bilaterale del Commercio, in the 
trade sector, and the Cassa edile, in the building sector. The project 
promotes a network of several public and private actors in the local LM. The 
collaboration between these entities has been focused on the mapping of 
local initiatives in passive and active LMPs. The research team analysed the 
relationship between local passive initiatives, such as special local 
                                                
43  On the PES in Italy: F. Liso, “Brevi appunti sugli ammortizzatori e sui servizi all’impiego 
nel Protocollo del 23 luglio 2007,” in A. Perulli (ed.), Le riforme del lavoro. Dalla legge 
finanziaria 2007 al protocollo sul Welfare, Halley Editrice, 2007, which describes the 
situation of the employment agencies as a patchworked situation, in particular p. 113. For 
a deeper analysis see also A. Alaimo, Il di- ritto sociale al lavoro nei mercati integrati. I 
servizi per l’impiego tra rego- lazione comunitaria e nazionale, Giappichelli, 2009; F. 
Liso, “Servizi all’Im- piego,” Enciclopedia Giuridica Treccani, 2007, p. 1–10; F. Liso, 
“Appunti sulla trasformazione del collocamento da funzione pubblica a servizio,” in R. 
De Luca Tamajio, M. Rusciano, L. Zoppoli (eds.), Mercato del lavoro: riforma e vincoli 
di sistema, Editoriale scientifica, 2004; F. Liso, “I servizi all’impiego,” in D. Garofalo, M. 
Ricci, Percorsi di diritto del lavoro, Ca- cucci, 2006; F. Liso, “Collocamento. I) Diritto del 
lavoro (voce; aggiorna- mento),” Enciclopedia Giuridica Treccani, 1988, p. 1–24.  
44  Italia Lavoro is a subsidiary company, entirely held by the Italian Ministry of Economy 
and Finance. Italia Lavoro works for the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy and 
promotes initiatives in the field of employment policies and social inclusion. Italia 
Lavoro became ANPAL Servizi S.p.A. from December 2016 (Law 11 December 2016, n. 
232).  
45  G. Villa, “Reti di imprese e contratto plurilaterale”, Giurisprudenza commercial, Vol. 1, 
2010, pp. 944 ff.; T. Treu, “Trasformazioni delle imprese: reti di imprese e regolazione 
del lavoro”, Mercato Concorrenza Regole, Vol. 1, 2012, p. 7 ff. 
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unemployment benefits, subsidies, etc., and activation duties. The research 
project has focused on the initiatives promoted at the local level in order to 
support unemployed people in their transition to a job, highlighting: (i) 
sources of financing; (ii) requirements for accessing to the initiatives; (iii) 
relationships with other actors in promoting initiatives; and (iv) whether 
initiatives are conditional upon activation duties; etc. 
Important achievements of the research concern: (a) the interest shown by 
the actors in other participants’ initiatives and willingness to collaborate on 
common projects; (b) a mutual acknowledgment of the scarcity of financial 
resources; and (c) the involvement of private resources in specific projects. 
In some cases, these private actors played a role as a mere sponsor, while in 
other cases they also acted as planners or managers of projects. The most 
important example concerns a bank foundation that provided a local PES 
with €1.5m over three years in order to create special subsidies. These were 
linked to activation measures for specific categories of unemployed people. 
Such benefits integrated the national social security system, providing 
protection for people otherwise without support.  
LM actors highlighted the need for a common database: problems such as 
different IT systems, different classifications of data, lack of resources, and 
inadequate legislation, etc., did not allow this goal to be achieved. 
Regarding the role of the LM actors involved, the project showed that PESs 
and bilateral entities play a pivotal role in C&C activities; nevertheless, 
social partners didn’t make as important a contribution as policy makers in 
respect of LMPs.  Indeed, social partners had already signed a territorial 
agreement for development and growth, but the stated aims of the agreement 
proved to be unsupported by the will of the signatories in practice. 
With regard to job matching, one of the programme’s main inefficiency 
issues was considered to be the lack of relationships between the PES and a 
significant number of companies. This became a reason for a further project, 
aimed at trialling a C&C-network between the participants of the “territorial 
workfare project”, additional actors, and three companies of significance at 
the local level (Auchan, Berner, and Quarella). This second project sought to 
facilitate the companies’ business development, to produce new and/or better 
employment, and to promote projects oriented toward developing local 
employment. Through an analysis of specific business needs, the research: 1) 
recognised several players active at the local level, in order to make them 
collaborate with each other and with the three companies; 2) studied the 
possible development of C&C between the three companies and local 
partners; and 3) encouraged a useful collaboration between them. In 
particular, the project focused on: a) employment services addressed to firms 
(vocational guidance, vocational training, information about job regulations 
for job seekers, information about job regulations and law procedures related 
to recruitment, and the promotion of internships, etc.); b) the possible 
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promotion of clusters between firms involved in the project; and c) 
coordination, where possible, between local policies and companies’ needs 
through companies’ associations.  
Interesting outcomes were achieved by this project, such as agreements 
between PESs and companies in order to enable PESs to select employees 
for companies with reference to the professional profiles they requested, 
which were then able to be matched to those of unemployed people. The 
PESs were able to propose to unemployed people that they participate in 
tailored courses and vocational training in order to achieve an adequate and 
suitable professional profile. At the same time, representatives of these PESs 
visited companies to gain understanding of the specific duties and functions 
associated with each job. 
Further initiatives were also agreed between companies and bilateral entities 
in order to promote commercial relationships with mutual interests.  
Moreover, companies have begun to think about promoting possible clusters, 




Coordination and cooperation are two concepts that may be applied to actors 
in the LM in order to make the LM more efficient and more sustainable, 
from both an economic and a social point of view. 
In particular, C&C between LM actors should be considered an opportunity 
to reach clear policy objectives, a way to enhance the sustainability of social 
protection systems, and a means of guaranteeing adequate protection for 
unemployed people. Thus, networks in the LM should be able to go beyond 
their formal objectives and actually make substantive achievements. 
Indeed, C&C that is limited to the achievement of mere formal objectives – 
i.e. benchmarking without reference to real employment policy goals – may 
run the risk of becoming a bureaucratic system used by entities to legitimate 
their existence and, moreover, may also encourage the loss of responsibility 
in policymaking. 
Looking at the extreme consequences of the bureaucratization, Hannah 
Arendt asserted that “in a fully developed bureaucracy there is nobody left 
with whom one could argue, to whom one could present grievances, on 
whom the pressures of power could be exerted”.46 The division of a process 
into small parts may render a person involved in the process responsible only 
for the small part he/she works with, and progressively less and less 
responsible for the outcomes of the process in their entirety.  
                                                
46  H. Arendt, “A Special Supplement: Reflections on Violence”, The New York Review, 
February 27, 1969. Please, see http://www.nybooks.com/ 
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For Max Weber, the “stahlhartes Gehäuse”, or “iron cage”, traps individuals 
in systems based purely on efficiency, rational calculation, and control. 
Bureaucratization permits the calculation of advantages and disadvantages, 
but is nevertheless unable to justly handle individual cases. Thus, the 
rationalization of a society brings about its depersonalization. Weber 
believed that societies could progress toward either a zweckrational, i.e. 
social action based on bureaucracy, or a wertrational, i.e. social action 
oriented toward ethical goals, using rational and efficient means to achieve 
these.47  
In this light, the bureaucratization brought about by C&C initiatives may be 
avoided by promoting the involvement of LM actors in projects in which 
they discuss and share common goals, and in which they relate to each other 
proactively. Thus, social partners may play a pivotal role, so long as 
institutions support and promote their activities. 
Going forward, C&C may also prove strategic in the development of active 
LM policies at the EU level, i.e. activation initiatives linked to the possible 
introduction of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme.48 Moreover,  
C&C may prove valuable in the implementation of the Pillar of Social 





                                                
47  M. Weber, Economy and society, University of California Press, 1978. 
48  R. Repasi, “Legal Options and Limits for the Establishment of a European 
Unemployment Benefit Scheme”, EU Commission, DG for Employment, Social Affairs 
and Inclusion, 2017. 
